VZCZCXRO7753
OO RUEHGI RUEHMA RUEHROV
DE RUEHKH #0033 0091229
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
O 091229Z JAN 08
FM AMEMBASSY KHARTOUM
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 9679
INFO RUCNFUR/DARFUR COLLECTIVE
RHMFISS/CJTF HOA

UNCLAS KHARTOUM 000033 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPT FOR AF/SPG, S/CRS 
DEPT PLS PASS USAID FOR AFR/SUDAN 
 
E.O. 12958:  N/A 
TAGS: PGOV PREL KPKO SOCI AU UNSC SU
SUBJECT: SUDAN ARMY ATTACKS UNAMID CONVOY 
 
REF: 2007 KHARTOUM 2044 
 
¶1. (SBU) On January 8, UNAMID claimed that Sudanese Armed Forces 
(SAF) attacked a UNAMID 29-truck convoy on January 7 at 
approximately 2200 near Tine, West Darfur located 125 kilometers 
north of Geneina. UNAMID spokesmen Nourreddine Mezni told poloff on 
January 9 that Joint Special Representative Rudolph Adada met with 
Under-Secretary Mutriff Sidiqque on Janaury 8 about the attack. 
Mezni said that the GoS made no apologies for the attack (nor did it 
deny the attack) but agreed to a joint UN-GOS investigation into the 
cause of the attack. Mezni said the investigation would start as 
soon as possible. Mezni said that UNAMID Force Commander General 
Martin Agwai is returning to El-Fasher today. 
 
¶2. (SBU) In a January 8 press statement condemning the attack, the 
UN claimed that the attack occurred approximately two kilometers 
from Tine, when GoS forces fired small arms, RPGs and mortars at the 
convoy hitting one of nine fuel tankers.  Observers reported that 
the 70-troop convoy protection force did not return fire and the 
convoy arrived at Tine by 2300. 
 
¶3. (SBU) Despite the obvious risk in sending overland convoys, 
UNAMID had no choice but to re-supply its bases in West Darfur 
following suspension of some air re-supply operations due to JEM 
threats to shoot any aircraft from the skies over West Darfur 
(reftel).  UNAMID company sites at Umm Barro (190 personnel), Tine 
(161) and Kulbus (244) had not re-supplied by air for almost two 
weeks and were critically low on supplies.  By January 2, the camps 
had only a few days of food and fuel.  Following one emergency 
airlift of a four-day supply of rations, UNAMID began planning the 
re-supply convoy by ground.  Major General Karenzi, UNAMID Deputy 
Force Commander, said that re-supply by ground was not only due to 
the JEM threat, but also would show UNAMID action in the countryside 
and would test UNAMID logistics capabilities to supply camps using 
land convoys. 
 
¶4. (SBU) UNAMID Chief of Staff Patrick Davidson-Houston told 
fieldoff January 6 that UNAMID discussed the convoy operation with 
locally-based GoS officials and field commanders in El Fasher, as 
well with movement leaders. 
 
¶5. (SUB) COMMENT: This incident highlights dramatically the dangers 
faced by UNAMID in Darfur, and especially in West Darfur where 
Chadian rebels are based.  The convoy was operating at night, 
communicating using Thuraya phones (not HF or VHF radios as would be 
standard for most militaries), and may not have adequately 
communicated its presence to GoS forces.  The UNAMID spokesman 
downplayed the significance of the UN Headquarter's condemnation of 
the incident, and highlighted instead the GoS promise to investigate 
the incident.  However, this promise is a very common Sudanese 
regime ploy - attack, expel, harass, destroy and then, in a show of 
"flexibility," offer some sort of talks or negotiations. 
 
¶6. (U) Tripoli minimize considered. 
 
FERNANDEZ