VZCZCXRO5474
OO RUEHGI RUEHMA RUEHROV
DE RUEHKH #0014 0060409
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
O 060409Z JAN 08
FM AMEMBASSY KHARTOUM
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 9659
INFO RUCNFUR/DARFUR COLLECTIVE
RHMFISS/CJTF HOA

UNCLAS KHARTOUM 000014 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPT FOR AF/SPG, S/CRS 
DEPT PLS PASS USAID FOR AFR/SUDAN 
 
E.O. 12958:  N/A 
TAGS: PGOV PREL KPKO SOCI AU SU UNSC CD
SUBJECT: MURDER OF SLA/MINAWI CEASEFIRE COMMISSION REPRESENTATIVE 
 
REF: KHARTOUM 0005 
 
¶1. (SBU) SUMMARY: On the same day that JEM representative to the 
Ceasefire Commission GEN Mohammed Basher was arrested along with 
five other JEM members, an SLA/Minawi representative was killed in 
Mellit (North Darfur) along with his nephew, who worked for PAE. 
These two events demonstrate the challenges that UNAMID faces on the 
ground. END SUMMARY. 
 
SLA/MINNI MINAWI MEMBER MURDERED 
-------------------------------- 
¶2. (SBU) At approximately 10:00 a.m. on December 30 an AMIS Land 
Cruiser was carjacked in Mellit (North Darfur) by two bandits armed 
with AK47s who stopped the driver at gunpoint and then shot the two 
occupants of the vehicle, SLA/Minni Minawi representative to the 
Ceasefire Commission LTC Ahmed Mohammedin Wadi and his nephew, Yusuf 
Abdullah Mohammedin, a PAE Staff member.  The carjackers dumped the 
wounded Yusuf from the vehicle and drove north with Wadi in the car. 
 SLA/Unity forces reportedly exchanged gunfire with the carjackers 
at a check point in Hashaba.  The vehicle was later recovered by 
SLA/Unity in east Kutum with Wadi dead inside.  The vehicle has 
since been handed over to AMIS, and as of December 31 Wadi's family 
was in El Fasher to make arrangements for the disposition of the 
body.  The PAE staffer was medically evacuated to El Fasher, where 
he was treated at the hospital but died of his injuries that 
evening.  His death was announced at the December 31 AMIS Morning 
Brief. 
¶3. (SBU) SLA/Minawi representatives on December 31 and January 1 
provided more details about the incident.  They told FieldOff that 
the shooter was from Mellit (as was Wadi) and that both of the 
bandits were from the Berti tribe (both Wadi and Yusuf were 
Zaghawa).  The reps report that the shooter, after having dropped 
Yusuf from the car, drove off with Wadi toward Umm Sidir and tried 
to bury him in a shallow hole when he was caught by locals and 
turned over to SLA/Unity reps in the area.  The SLA/Unity forces, 
allegedly of Abdullah Yehia's faction and led by Commander Yusuf 
Norain, captured the shooter and have since refused to turn him over 
to authorities.  [NOTE: One SLA/Minawi rep initially told FieldOff 
that Norain had summarily executed the shooter on the spot, which he 
considered "not a normal act."  However there is no evidence yet 
that the perpetrator was in fact killed. END NOTE].  While no 
definitive information on the identity of the shooter is yet known, 
SLA/Minawi reps claim he is a soldier of Commander Jar al-Nabi of 
the G-19, which operates in this part of northern North Darfur but 
which has been relatively dormant over the past few months. 
 
A TEST TO UNAMID 
---------------- 
¶4. (SBU) In their tendency to resort to conspiracy theories (Minni 
reps are quick to link the Mellit incident with the January 1 
shootings of U.S. Embassy personnel in Khartoum) the movements 
consider the arrest of GEN Basher and the killing of Wadi to be GoS 
provocations, though as yet there is no link between the murder and 
the GoS.  More importantly, the movements see these two events as an 
opportunity for the newly-inaugurated UNAMID mission to demonstrate 
its resolve in restoring order to Darfur.  SLA/Minawi reps say they 
are anxious for UNAMID to deploy as quickly as possible so as to 
dispel the image that all it is doing is paying lip service and 
making empty statements regarding events unfolding on the ground. 
"The ball is now in the UN's court," one SLA rep declared. 
 
¶5. (SBU) COMMENT: UNAMID must become more adept than AMIS at 
responding to events such as the arrest of GEN Basher and the murder 
of the SLA/Minawi CFC representative.  Statements of condemnation 
for such events are just a start; UNAMID must begin to intervene in 
events unfolding around it and become more assertive with all actors 
if it hopes to restore order amidst the chaos.  A major gripe across 
the board by rebel movements with regard to UNAMID deployment is 
that it has not been properly coordinated with rebel field 
commanders on the ground.  Constructive engagement and coordination 
with the movements and the GoS security forces is the first step 
toward engaging rather than merely observing and reacting. 
 
POWERS