VZCZCXRO4836
OO RUEHGI RUEHMA RUEHROV
DE RUEHKH #0138/01 0301136
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
O 301136Z JAN 08
FM AMEMBASSY KHARTOUM
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 9824
INFO RUCNFUR/DARFUR COLLECTIVE

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 KHARTOUM 000138 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPT FOR AF A/S FRAZER, S/E WILLIAMSON AND AF/SPG 
ADDIS ABABA FOR USAU 
NSC FOR PITTMAN AND HUDSON 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958:  N/A 
TAGS: PREL PGOV KPKO AU UN SU
SUBJECT: DPKO GUEHENNO's VISIT TO KHARTOUM AND ADDIS ABABA 
 
REFTEL: KHARTOUM 111 
 
¶1. (SBU) Summary: The GOS successfully avoided senior-level meetings 
with DPKO U/S Guehenno during his visit to Sudan and continues to 
drag its feet on finalizing a Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA) and 
other UNAMID-related issues.  The AU Summit in Addis Ababa provides 
a good opportunity to pressure the GOS into finalizing the SOFA. 
The GOS sent a note verbale to UNAMID indicating that UNAMID Chief 
of Staff Davidson-Houston should leave the country immediately. End 
summary. 
 
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Government Rejects Meetings with Guehenno 
----------------------------------------- 
 
¶2. (SBU) The Government of Sudan (GoS) rebuffed UN requests for 
senior-level meetings with visiting Undersecretary General for 
Peacekeeping Operations Jean-Marie Guehenno during his recent trip 
to Sudan, two UN sources in Khartoum told Poloff on January 29. 
Khartoum granted Guehenno only one official meeting--with MFA State 
Minister Samani Al Wasila (who is not a regime insider).  As a 
result, the only discussions on UNAMID deployment occurred during 
the preparatory discussions for the AU Summit in Addis Ababa, 
attended by Guehenno, Joint Special Representative (JSR) Rudolphe 
Adada, and the Sudanese Government's coordinator for UNAMID 
deployment, MFA Undersecretary Mutriff Siddiq. 
 
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NOT MUCH DARFUR ACTION AT AU SUMMIT SO FAR 
------------------------------------------ 
 
¶3. (SBU) AU Summit preparatory discussions are reportedly stalled 
over issues related to the UNAMID Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA), 
troop-contributing countries, and Chief of Staff status.  The Deputy 
UNAMID Force Commander told FieldOff on January 28 that the GoS "is 
not moving" on the SOFA and that this foot-dragging has drawn 
attention away from issues of equal priority that the FC had wanted 
to see addressed, including the status of the Joint Commission. 
"It's a bit unfortunate," lamented the Deputy FC, "that the Joint 
Commission just is not a priority."  JSR Adada's Special Assistant, 
who accompanied Adada to Addis Ababa, confirmed in a conversation 
with Poloff in Khartoum on January 29 that GOS representative Siddiq 
had demurred in even discussing the SOFA or any other substantive 
issues affecting UNAMID deployment.  She said that the Government 
continues to insist that night flights are not feasible, despite 
UNAMID's readiness to utilize emergency lights on the runways--which 
UNAMID now has in country--as an interim solution. 
 
¶4. (SBU) On the potential expulsion of the UNAMID Chief of Staff, 
the Deputy FC told Fieldoff that the JSR received a letter from the 
MFA threatening to declare persona non grata British Brigadier 
General Patrick Davidson-Houston.  The JSR reportedly wrote back to 
the MFA demanding an explanation for this decision and highlighting 
the fact that Davidson-Houston is in a staff officer position. 
According to the UK Embassy, the GoS responded with a note verbale 
on January 25 stating Davidson-Houston should depart Sudan 
"immediately."  UNAMID has told us they plan to wait for a more 
explicit request from Sudan, specifying a date for 
Davidson-Houston's departure. 
 
---------------------------------------- 
UNAMID ASKS JANE HOLL LUTE FOR MORE TIME 
---------------------------------------- 
 
¶5. (SBU) The Deputy FC described recent visits to Darfur by senior 
UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) officials as 
"useful" insofar as they forced the visitors to appreciate "what we 
don't have in terms of logistics, communications and equipment." 
The Deputy FC, who accompanied DPKO Assistant-Secretary-General Jane 
Holl Lute on her itinerary, noted that both Holl Lute and 
Under-Secretary-General Jean-Marie Guehenno were receptive to 
UNAMID's requests, often tasking their staffs in Darfur and in New 
York as soon as UNAMID officials described a problem that needed 
immediate attention.  The Deputy FC expected that this level of 
concern would translate into more DPKO pressure on the GoS to 
confront issues still plaguing the mission, especially freedom of 
movement of its personnel and equipment.  JSR Adada's Special 
Assistant anticipated that such pressure may encourage President 
Bashir to accept the SOFA during the upcoming AU Summit in order to 
avoid international embarrassment. 
 
¶6. (SBU) In this regard, the Deputy FC recounted an awkward exchange 
between A/SYG Holl Lute and the Wali (governor) of South Darfur 
after the A/SYG was made to wait an hour to see him in his Nyala 
office.  Alluding to the January 7 GoS attack on a UNAMID supply 
convoy, the Wali reprimanded UNAMID for not having done a better job 
of coordinating with the GoS on dispatching its convoys.  The Wali 
tried to make a joke about UNAMID's mistaking speed for time: that 
 
KHARTOUM 00000138  002 OF 002 
 
 
the GoS had been trying to enforce a speed limit on UNAMID rather 
than to restrict its movement through the area.  A/SYG Holl Lute was 
reportedly not amused and stood firm on the need for the GoS to 
guarantee UNAMID's freedom of movement throughout Darfur. 
 
¶7. (SBU) In briefing A/SYG Holl Lute on UNAMID challenges and 
problems (reported in reftel) the Deputy FC admitted that UNAMID 
officials had told her the peacekeeping operation was not ready to 
receive the Egyptian and Ethiopian battalions being pushed to deploy 
as part of the Early Effects Package.  The Deputy FC cited political 
and logistical concerns as reasons: local populations mistrusted 
both the Ethiopians and the Egyptians, as they are seen as being too 
friendly with the GoS; and there is simply no place to house or no 
way to feed those numbers of troops at this time.  The Deputy FC 
further speculated that Eritrea would used the presence of Ethiopian 
troops in Sudan as a pretext for its own sort of military 
intervention through its ties to Darfur's rebel movements.  Despite 
these reservations, UNAMID reported in its January 29 morning brief 
in El Fasher that the Egyptian battalions will arrive by April and 
that DPKO plans to airlift the entire contingent at a cost of 
approximately 7.5 million dollars, according to DPKO estimates. 
 
¶8. (SBU) Comment: The AU summit provides a good opportunity to 
pressure the GOS into finalizing the SOFA agreement.  The fact that 
the GOS refused to schedule meetings with DPKO U/S Guehenno reflects 
badly on the GOS and shows how obstructive the regime intends to be 
with regard to UNAMID deployment. As post has reportedly repeatedly, 
the GOS actually seems to be escalating its obstruction of UNAMID 
over last year's actions, with the case of the UNAMID COS as a major 
case in point. End comment. 
 
FERNANDEZ