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Viewing cable 08KHARTOUM107, DDDC CONSULTATIONS ONGOING, BUT UNCOORDINATED

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
08KHARTOUM107 2008-01-25 08:45 2011-08-24 16:30 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Embassy Khartoum
VZCZCXRO0902
OO RUEHGI RUEHMA RUEHROV
DE RUEHKH #0107 0250845
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
O 250845Z JAN 08
FM AMEMBASSY KHARTOUM
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 9780
INFO RUCNFUR/DARFUR COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE
UNCLAS KHARTOUM 000107 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPT FOR AF A/S FRAZER, AF S/E WILLAMSON, AF/SPG 
NSC FOR PITTMAN AND HUDSON 
ADDIS ABABA ALSO FOR USAU 
 
E.O. 12958:  N/A 
TAGS: PGOV PREL KPKO UN AU SU
SUBJECT: DDDC CONSULTATIONS ONGOING, BUT UNCOORDINATED 
 
1. (SBU) Meeting with poloffs on January 23, Darfur-Darfur Dialogue 
and Consultation (DDDC) chair Abdul Mohamed painted a somber picture 
of the clumsy integration of UNAMID, the DDDC and the Joint 
Mediation Support Team (JMST). According to Mohamed, no 
communications or administrative structure have been set up to 
coordinate the activities of the three bodies. (Note: This 
observation is in line with what post has heard from AU sources. End 
note.) 
 
------------------------------- 
TIJANI SECT ENTERING THE SCENE? 
------------------------------- 
 
2. (SBU) Mohamed said that DDDC consultations in the field were 
ongoing, concentrating on selecting representatives for a civil 
society advisory board which would be present at future talks. 
Mohamed also said that the spiritual leader of the Tijani Sufi sect 
(of which most Muslims in Sudan are members) would be coming to 
Darfur next week to engage with civil society leaders and IDPs. 
Khartoum-based Tijaniya representatives had also engaged the 
government on the issue of compensation, he said; discussions 
centered on traditional forms of compensation including monetary 
payments, land returns and restitution (efforts by various religious 
leaders and Sufi orders to stop the violence in Darfur have been 
ongoing for years and all have failed). 
 
3. (SBU) Consultations with Arab groups were ongoing, he said, and 
the DDDC was considering holding separate, low-key workshops to 
focus on the particular concerns of Arab tribes in Darfur. Poloffs 
noted the importance of joint consultations, as well, and that 
consultations targeted solely at an Arab constituency would no doubt 
be resisted by a suspicious central government. Mohamed suggested 
that many among the Arab tribes viewed the government's acceptance 
of UNAMID as a capitulation, and the government was in turn 
obstructing UNAMID deployment in order to regain ground. The 
appointment of Musa Hilal to a presidential advisory position was 
also intended to solidify Arab support for the government, he said, 
in addition to acting as a counter-measure against recent reported 
alliances between some Arab tribes and insurgent groups. Hilal is 
opposed even by parts of his own Mahamid tribe. (Note: According to 
separate sources, the DDDC's engagement with Arab tribes has been 
limited, superficial and inconsistent. End note.) 
 
---------------------- 
DIASPORA CONSULTATIONS 
---------------------- 
 
4. (SBU) Mohamed also previewed the DDDC's upcoming consultations 
with the Darfuri diaspora in Europe and the United States, arranged 
by Concordis and the United 
States Institute of Peace. The 'Elders' group would be co-sponsoring 
the U.S. consultations, he said, as part of their engagement efforts 
in Darfur. The DDDC itself was expanding its relationships with 
other international organizations, including seconding consultants 
from UNIFEM, UNICEF and local NGOs, as well as bringing in 
DFID-funded experts. In terms of the public research project 
undertaken by the Annenberg Foundation during the late summer and 
now dormant, Mohamed said he was working with the Sudanese 
government for permission to resume work. 
 
5. (SBU) Characterizing the Sudanese government as expert in 
"managing crisis" rather than welcoming stability, Mohamed thought 
that the government had been somewhat prepared to negotiate a 
settlement in Darfur several months ago, but is now less inclined. 
He cautioned that negotiations should take place as soon as possible 
after consultations with the movements conclude, or else realities 
on the ground would shift yet again and render those consultations 
obsolete. 
 
6. (SBU) Comment: The DDDC is still encumbered - though less so - by 
its affiliation with the DPA, and as such tends to subcontract work 
to organizations such as Concordis and USIP. It is very troubling 
that JMST, UNAMID and DDDC activities remain largely uncoordinated, 
though not surprising given the personalities involved and the 
frequent turnover of staff in Sudan. While Mohamed was reluctant to 
advocate setting firm deadlines for consultations and ensuing 
negotiations, his advice on their rapid sequencing is valid. Post 
will explore the feasibility of funding a civil society advisor to 
the DDDC and will consult further. 
 
FERNANDEZ