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Viewing cable 08KHARTOUM106, HAC PROMISES TO COOPERATE ON DAI ISSUE

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
08KHARTOUM106 2008-01-25 08:16 2011-08-24 16:30 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Embassy Khartoum
VZCZCXRO0881
PP RUEHGI RUEHMA RUEHROV
DE RUEHKH #0106 0250816
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 250816Z JAN 08
FM AMEMBASSY KHARTOUM
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 9779
INFO RUCNFUR/DARFUR COLLECTIVE
RUEHRN/USMISSION UN ROME
RHMFISS/CJTF HOA
UNCLAS KHARTOUM 000106 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPT FOR AF/SPG, S/CRS, AF SE NATSIOS 
ADDIS ABABA FOR USAU 
DEPT PLS PASS USAID FOR AFR/SUDAN 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PGOV PREL KPKO SOCI AU UNSC SU
SUBJECT: HAC PROMISES TO COOPERATE ON DAI ISSUE 
 
REF: (A) KHARTOUM 100 
(B) KHARTOUM 91 
 
1. (SBU) CDA Fernandez met January 24 with Minister of Humanitarian 
Affairs Haroun Ron and Humanitarian Affairs Commissioner Hassabo 
Abdel Rahman for the second time this week to attempt to resolve the 
issue of USAID-funded transition partner Development Alternatives, 
Inc. (DAI).  Post is concerned about the escalation of threats made 
against DAI by HAC NGO Director Moutassim Abulgassim (reftel).  When 
HAC Commissioner Hassabo effectively avoided all of our calls 
throughout the day (and with acting MFA Ali Karti also avoiding us) 
we finally succeeded in meeting with Minister Ron late in the 
afternoon.  When Minister Ron heard about the escalation of threats, 
he and and Under-Secretary Charles Manyang, both sympathetic SPLM 
officials, immediately convoked HAC Commissioner Hassabo to his 
office. 
 
2. (SBU) CDA relayed reports that Mutassim had reportedly threatened 
DAI and given a 48-hour deadline to resolve labor disputes and turn 
over various documents to the HAC.  He said this was an unnecessary 
escalation of the situation given that AID Director Fleuret and 
Hassabo himself had met on this issue only days before. As discussed 
with USAID before the meeting, CDA suggested some self-discipline by 
the HAC on the issue, USAID is very willing to discuss all the 
DAI-related issues upon Fleuret's return to Sudan in two weeks and 
USAID can accompany the HAC to Darfur to sort out whatever 
misunderstandings there may be.  CDA pointed out that the reported 
accusations against DAI, that they had given money to opposition 
groups and had even armed them, were ridiculous and untrue.  CDA 
noted that Minister Ron and Hassabo had requested that USAID 
transition from humanitarian assistance to development, and that in 
order for this to happen we must avoid situations like the one with 
DAI.  CDA requested that Hassabo direct Mutassim to stand down on 
his insistent and improper demands and wait two weeks until Fleuret 
and Hassabo had a chance to address the situation themselves in 
Nyala. 
 
3. (SBU) Hassabo claimed there must have been a misunderstanding and 
insisted that no threats or ultimatums had been delivered to DAI. 
He noted the agreement reached with Fleuret to resolve the situation 
in two weeks when they could travel together to Nyala.  Hassabo 
assured CDA and the Minister that everything would be resolved 
amicably. 
 
4. (SBU) Comment: We hope that with this second meeting the 
escalation of rhetoric and reported threats will subside. 
Unfortunately, the good offices of the SPLM appointed Minister and 
Under-Secretary often do not avail before the nefarious influence of 
Hassabo and the Minister of State, indicted war criminal Ahmed 
Haroun. It seemed to work this time and our sense is that Hassabo 
will in fact call off his henchmen for now.  But this is only one 
small skirmish in a drawn out war of attrition by influential 
elements in the regime against the NGO community, the West, and 
American interests in Sudan. 
 
FERNANDEZ