VZCZCXRO1266
RR RUEHIK RUEHPOD RUEHPW RUEHYG
DE RUEHBUL #0129/01 0141143
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 141143Z JAN 08
FM AMEMBASSY KABUL
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 2398
INFO RUCNAFG/AFGHANISTAN COLLECTIVE
RUEHZG/NATO EU COLLECTIVE
RUEKJCS/OSD WASHINGTON DC
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC
RHMFIUU/HQ USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 4372
RHEHAAA/NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL WASHINGTON DC
RUEAIIA/CI WASHINGTON DC
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 KABUL 000129 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPARMENT FOR SCA/FO DAS CAMP, SCA/A 
STATE PASS TO USAID FOR AID/ANE, AID/DCHA/DG 
NSC FOR JWOOD 
OSD FOR sHIVERS 
CENTCOM FOR CG Cstc-a, CG CJTF-82 POLAD 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958 N/A 
TAGS: MCAP MOPS PREL PGOV PTER PHUM AF
SUBJECT: FARAH PROVINCE: IMPROVING DEVELOPMENT BUT WORSENING 
SECURITY AND WEAK GOVERNANCE LEAD TO MIXED RESULTS 
 
¶1. (SBU) Summary: The level of development improved in Farah even as 
security worsened.  Security in Farah province deteriorated in late 
2007 with insurgent attacks in several districts beginning in the 
province's east, then westward in an arc across the province's 
southern border to Farah city and north into Herat.  The United 
States and Iran are important contributors of aid.  Governance at 
all levels from the governor down to the districts is ineffective. 
End Summary. 
 
SECURITY 
-------- 
¶2. (SBU) Although the number of "significant acts" against Afghan 
National Security Forces (ANSF) and Coalition Forces (CF) has 
remained at approximately the same level for the past 18 months, the 
overall security situation in the province has declined dramatically 
as insurgents have sought to expand their influence westward.  In 
November, an estimated 300 insurgents, many of them believed to be 
foreign fighters from Helmand, took over Gulestan district, raised 
their flag and occupied it for more than a week before Afghan 
National Security Forces, with belated Coalition Forces' help, were 
able to reestablish government control.  Insurgents also attacked 
Bakwa, Khaki Safed, Pusht Rod, and Delaram districts, although they 
were unable to hold these districts.  ince the initial incursions 
in November, insurgents have launched several repeat attacks against 
each of these districts.  The insurgents may attempt to establish 
eastern Farah as a launching point for operations in nearby Ghor and 
Herat. 
 
¶3. (SBU) The Afghan National Police (ANP) continued to be a weak 
presence in Farah.  Although a new police chief and the Focused 
District Development (FDD) process provide hope for improvement, the 
ANP lack adequate manpower, training, and leadership.  President 
Karzai's appointment of General Sheerzai Khyalbaz as ANP Chief in 
late November brings better leadership at the provincial level, but 
police at the district level frequently suffer from a lack of 
leadership, as many district commanders are junior officers or 
soldiers.  In Bakwa, Bala Baluk, and Khaki Safed districts, ANP 
soldiers instead of officers lead the district police; and although 
a Colonel leads the Gulestan ANP, he is widely suspected of 
collaborating with the Taliban.  The ANP suffered heavy losses in 
their late 2007 encounters with the Taliban and are presumed to be 
severely intimidated, evidenced subsequently by police units 
abandoning their stations after receiving phoned threats from 
insurgents.  The police are undermanned in light of the declining 
security situation, with approximately 1200 police, 70 percent of 
whom can be accounted for in person. 
 
DEVELPMENT 
----------- 
¶4. (U) Although the level of development in Farah improved in 2007, 
few development organizations and NGOs operate in the province due 
to security concerns.  However, private new construction projects 
are increasing in Farah city, and Farah has made clear gains in 
educational opportunities.  In the past year, the PRT has funded 
five high schools and a School of Excellence that will provide 
religious and secular higher education.  Farah also has an 
agricultural high school, a women's dormitory and nursing/midwife 
training facility, a teacher training institute, and a women's 
education center.  The PRT contributed over USD 4 million to the 
development of Farah in 2007 through CERP funds, and USAID is 
implementing over USD 1.5 million in projects over the next several 
months. 
 
¶5. (SBU) Funding from non-U.S. sources also played a critical role 
in Farah's development.  Iran is funding a 120-km road, currently in 
the survey stage, from the Iranian border into Farah city.  The 
Iranian government will also build a customs station on both sides 
of the border.  Indian engineers have begun the USD 35-million, 
18-month survey for the Bakshabad dam project, a World Bank project 
that will provide water and electricity to Farah when completed over 
the next decade. 
 
GOVERNANCE 
---------- 
¶6. (SBU) Governor Baluch has delivered a lackluster performance in 
the areas of poppy eradication, leadership, and concern for his 
 
KABUL 00000129  002 OF 002 
 
 
citizens.  Governor Baluch says the right things about poppy 
eradication but has a poor eradication record.  The population 
believes he is deeply corrupt, and he has done nothing to dispel 
allegations of his corruption or involvement in the drug trade.  He 
seldom visits the districts and only supports development projects 
that will benefit him, paying no attention to the needs of districts 
further away from Farah city.  Baluch appears to be nervous about 
his job and recently has attempted to demonstrate to the PRT 
Commander and PRToff that he is on top of the security situation in 
Farah. 
 
¶7. (SBU) District administration is a clear weak spot in Farah. 
Currently Bakwa and Gulestan, the most volatile districts in the 
province, lack district leaders.  In Delaram, the brother of the 
last district manager, whom insurgents assassinated in early 
December, is administering the district unofficially.  Although the 
other districts of Farah do have district managers, it is often in 
name only.  In Lashwa Juwayn, Shib Koh, Pusht Rod, and Khaki Safed, 
the district managers work only once or twice a month, and the 
district manager in Khaki Safed is illiterate.  The new ANP Chief 
visited each district in Farah upon his arrival and found that only 
two districts - Ana Dara and Purchamon - had managers who were 
performing their jobs. 
 
¶8. (SBU) Despite lack of adequate coordination and resources, many 
ministry line directors perform their jobs reasonably well.  The 
Directors for Health and Education work closely with the PRT, are 
well qualified, and care about their jobs.  The Director for Women's 
Affairs speaks to the PRT often and expresses good intentions, but 
she does not translate ideas into action.  The Director of Women's 
Labor has cooperated with the PRT on a number of projects and has a 
good relationship with the women of Farah.  The Director for 
Refugees and Repatriation, a critical position considering the 
number of deportees returning from Iran, does not have many 
resources but has reached out effectively to NGOs and Kabul for 
assistance.  Although the line directors meet monthly as part of the 
Provincial Development Council, the different sectors have only held 
one round of sectoral meetings since the creation of the Provincial 
Development Plan in summer 2007. 
 
¶9. (SBU) The Provincial Council (PC) has an effective relationship 
with the people of Farah, but is intensely frustrated because of the 
lack of respect the Governor and other parts of the government give 
it.  Although many people in Farah keep their local disputes and 
problems within the tribal system, the PC has earned their trust, 
and they turn to the PC for dispute resolution and problems 
involving the government.  One area where the PC could improve is in 
outreach to the district managers and engagement with the Provincial 
Development Committee to ensure that the development needs of 
districts far from Farah City are considered. 
 
WOOD