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Viewing cable 08DAMASCUS46, SYRIA: 2007 COUNTRY REPORTS ON TERRORISM

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
08DAMASCUS46 2008-01-22 12:33 2011-08-24 01:00 UNCLASSIFIED Embassy Damascus
VZCZCXRO7731
OO RUEHAG RUEHDF RUEHIK RUEHLZ RUEHROV
DE RUEHDM #0046/01 0221233
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
O 221233Z JAN 08
FM AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 4554
INFO RUEHXK/ARAB ISRAELI COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUCNMEM/EU MEMBER STATES COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHGB/AMEMBASSY BAGHDAD PRIORITY 0744
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC PRIORITY
RUMICEA/USCENTCOM INTEL CEN MACDILL AFB FL PRIORITY
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 DAMASCUS 000046 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
S/CT FOR RHONDA SHORE 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PTER ASEC PGOV SY
SUBJECT: SYRIA:  2007 COUNTRY REPORTS ON TERRORISM 
 
REF: STATE 146856 
 
1. (SBU) Russell Comeau is the Embassy POC.  Address:  6110 
Damascus Place, Dulles, VA 20189.  Unclassified e-mail: 
ComeauR@State.gov.  Tel:  ( 963-11) 3391-3785. 
 
2. (SBU) Syria was designated as a State Sponsor of Terrorism 
in 1979.  Since then it has continued political support to 
Palestinian terrorist groups, and political and material 
support to Hizballah since the group's creation.  HAMAS, 
Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ), the Popular Front for the 
Liberation of Palestine (PLFP), and the Popular Front for the 
Liberation of Palestine-General Command (PFLP-GC), among 
others, all base their external leadership in Damascus and 
operate within Syria's borders.  The Syrian government 
insists that the Damascus-based groups are confined to 
political and informational activities, but Palestinian 
groups with leaders in Syria have claimed responsibility for 
anti-Israeli terrorist attacks. 
 
3. (SBU) Over the course of the year, Syria's public support 
for the Palestinian groups varied, depending on Syrian 
national interest and international pressure.  As in 2006, 
President Bashar al-Asad expressed public support for 
Palestinian rejectionist groups.  Hamas Politburo head Khalid 
Mish'al and his deputies continued to reside in Syria and the 
Syrian government facilitated their movements by providing 
security escorts for their motorcades.  Additionally, Mish'al 
led Friday prayers at various mosques throughout Syria and 
gave several public speeches expressing gratitude for Syria's 
support.  At times, however, the Syrian regime claimed to 
have utilized its influence to restrain the rhetoric and 
activities of Palestinian groups.  In advance of the November 
2007 Annapolis Conference, for example, the Syrian government 
postponed a Palestinian rejectionist conference organized by 
Hamas, PFLP-GC, and PIJ to occur in November in Damascus. 
 
4. (SBU) Syrian officials publicly condemned some acts of 
international terrorism, including bombing attacks that 
killed Lebanese members of parliament.   At the same time, 
the Syrian regime made a distinction between what it 
considered to be legitimate armed resistance by Palestinians 
in the Occupied Territories, by Lebanese Hizballah, and by 
Iraqi opponents of the "occupation of Iraq."  The Syrian 
government has not been implicated directly in an act of 
terrorism since 1986, although an ongoing UN investigation 
into the February 2005 assassination of former Lebanese Prime 
Minister Rafik Hariri continued to investigate Syrian 
involvement.  Separately, four Syrian members of Fatah 
al-Islam were arrested in connection with the February 13, 
2007 Ain Alaq bus bombings in Lebanon.  Syrian Interior 
Minister Maj. Gen. Bassam Abdul Majeed spoke publicly in 
March 2007 on the matter and rejected suggestions that the 
Syrian regime was involved in the attack. 
 
5. (SBU) Syria continued to strengthen ties with Iran, 
another state sponsor of terrorism.  Iranian President 
Ahmadinejad, accompanied by the Iranian Defense Minister and 
the Iranian Army Chief of Staff, met with Syrian President 
al-Asad and other senior Syrian officials in July 2007. 
During this visit, Ahmadinejad also met with Palestinian 
rejectionist groups, including two separate meetings with the 
leaders of Hamas and PIJ and a collective meeting with 
leaders of PFLP, PFLP-GC, Democratic Front for the Liberation 
of Palestine (DFLP), and Fatah al-Intifada.  Additionally, 
local media reported that Hizballah leader Nasrallah met with 
Ahmadinejad at the Iranian Embassy in Damascus.  According to 
open source reporting, Syria and Iran worked successfully to 
rearm Hizballah after the July-August 2006 War between 
Lebanon and Israel. 
 
6. (SBU) Although the Syrian government suspended 
intelligence cooperation with the U.S. and several foreign 
governments in 2004, over the last 12 months Damascus took 
action against al-Qaida and other terrorist groups and 
individuals.  Additionally, the Syrian government worked to 
increase security cooperation with Iraq during the course of 
the year.  In July 2007, Syria hosted a meeting of technical 
border security experts representing Iraq's neighbors, the 
U.S., and other countries.  Syria also participated in two 
ministerial-level Iraq Neighbors' Conferences in Sharm 
el-Sheikh, Egypt (May 2007) and Istanbul (November 2007). 
 
7. (SBU) The Syrian government refused to implement mandatory 
visa requirements for citizens of Arab countries but claims 
 
DAMASCUS 00000046  002 OF 002 
 
 
to have increased its scrutiny of military aged Arab males. 
In August 2007, Syria hosted Iraqi Prime Minister Maliki and 
signed several security-related agreements.  As of year's 
end, Syrian and Iraqi officials had held several ministerial 
and working level meetings focused on enhanced economic and 
security cooperation.  According to U.S. and Iraqi officials, 
2007 witnessed a marked reduction in the flow of foreign 
terrorists transiting through Syria into Iraq. On December 2, 
2007 Lieutenant General Odierno, Commanding General, 
Multinational Corps - Iraq, noted publicly there had been a 
25 to 30 percent reduction in the number of foreign fighters 
entering Iraq from Syria. 
 
8. (SBU) Despite acknowledged reductions in foreign fighter 
flows, the scope of the problem remained large.  Syria 
continued to allow former Iraqi regime elements to operate in 
the country.  According to the December 2007 "Measuring 
Stability and Security in Iraq" report to Congress, nearly 90 
percent of all foreign terrorists known in Iraq used Syria as 
an entry point.  While the Syrian government has taken some 
steps to intercede in foreign fighter movements through the 
country, the Syrian government can do more to wrap-up known 
terror networks and foreign fighter facilitators operating 
within their borders.  Separately, the Syrian government has 
cracked down on pro-PKK (Kongra Gel) sympathizers in 
northeastern Syria, and President al-Asad expressed his 
public support of Turkish military action against Kongra Gel 
militants operating in southern Turkey and northern Iraq. 
 
9. (SBU) Syria remains a source of concern regarding 
terrorist financing.  The Commercial Bank of Syria remains 
subject to U.S. sanctions.  Industry experts report that 70 
percent of all business transitions are conducted in cash and 
only eight percent of all Syrians use formal banking 
services.  Syria's black market money-changers continue to 
operate unabated and regional "hawali" networks are 
intertwined with smuggling and trade-based money laundering - 
facilitated by notoriously corrupt customs and immigration 
officials, raising significant concerns that the Syrian 
government officials and Syrian business elite are, at the 
very least, complicit in black market and/or terror financing 
schemes. 
 
10. (SBU) Syria's government-controlled press continued to 
tout Syrian regime efforts to combat terrorism; the media 
reported in March 2007 that the Syrian security forces had 
arrested a Sayidda Zeinab based fundamentalist for supporting 
terrorist attacks in the region.  In May 2004, the Syrian 
government unilaterally ended intelligence cooperation with 
the U.S., therefore the details of this arrest remain unknown 
as do the specifies of other purported Syrian government 
efforts to curtail terrorism, including the findings of an 
internal investigation into the September 12, 2006 attack on 
the U.S. Embassy which resulted in the injuring of one 
locally employed guard, the death of a Syrian security 
officer who responded to the attack and the deaths of all 
four assailants. 
CORBIN