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RR RUEHRG
DE RUEHBR #0043/01 0081047
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
R 081047Z JAN 08
FM AMEMBASSY BRASILIA
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INFO RUEHAC/AMEMBASSY ASUNCION 6502
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RUEHLP/AMEMBASSY LA PAZ 5863
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S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 04 BRASILIA 000043 
 
SIPDIS 
 
NOFORN 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/07/2028 
TAGS: PTER PGOV PREL KCRM AR PA BR
SUBJECT: COUNTERTERRORISM IN BRAZIL: LOOKING BEYOND THE 
TRI-BORDER AREA 
 
REF: BRASILIA 1664 
 
Classified By: DEPUTY CHIEF OF MISSION PHIL CHICOLA FOR REASONS 1.4 B A 
ND D 
 
¶1. (S/NF) Summary: The Government of Brazil remains highly 
sensitive to public claims suggesting that terrorist or 
extremist organizations have a presence or are undertaking 
activities in Brazil--a sensitivity that appears to be the 
rise and is resulting in more than symbolic reactions.  At an 
operational level and away from the public spotlight, 
however, the GOB is a cooperative partner in countering 
terrorism and terrorist-related activities. Even though the 
Argentina-Brazil-Paraguay tri-border area (TBA) exclusively 
dominates headlines, the primary counterterrorism concern for 
both Brazilian officials and the U.S. Mission in Brazil is 
the presence and activities of individuals with links to 
terrorism--particularly several suspected Sunni extremists 
and some individuals linked to Hizballah--in Sao Paulo and 
other areas of southern Brazil.   To a lesser extent, the TBA 
remains a concern, primarily for the potential that 
terrorists may exploit conditions there--including lax border 
controls, smuggling, drug trafficking, easy access to false 
documents and weapons, movement of pirated goods, 
uncontrolled cash flows--to raise funds or arrange logistics 
for operations.   Post will focus over the coming year on 
keeping the higher levels of the Brazilian government engaged 
politically and diplomatically on CT objectives, and on 
seeking to ensure that they do not undermine the productive 
partnerships at the operational level. End Summary. 
 
---------------------------- 
Policy-Level Sensitivities 
------------------------- 
 
¶2. (S/NF) The Brazilian government is a cooperative partner 
in countering terrorism and terrorist-related activity in 
Brazil--to include investigating potential terrorism 
financing, document forgery networks, and other illicit 
activity--that could contribute to the facilitation of 
attacks in the region or elsewhere.  Nonetheless, the highest 
levels of the Brazilian government, particularly the Ministry 
of Foreign Relations, are extremely sensitive to any public 
claims that terrorists have a presence in Brazil--whether to 
raise funds, arrange logistics, or even transit through the 
country--and will vigorously reject any statements implying 
otherwise.  This sensitivity results, in part, from their 
fear of stigmatizing the large Muslim community of Brazil 
(estimated, but unconfirmed, by some sources at over 1 
million) or prejudicing the area's image as a tourist 
destination.  It is also a public posture designed to avoid 
being too closely linked to what is seen as the US's overly 
aggressive War on Terrorism.  This sensitivity manifests 
itself in various symbolic and concrete ways. 
 
-- (C) The GOB participates reluctantly in the "3 1 Mechanism 
on Security in the Triborder Area," which annually gathers 
diplomatic, law enforcement, and intelligence representatives 
of the three Triborder (TBA) countries together with the U.S. 
to deliberate strategies to deter a host of transnational 
criminal activities that could be exploited by potential 
terrorists to facilitate attacks.  At the conferences, the 
Brazilian delegations often decry statements made by U.S. 
officials claiming that the TBA is a hotbed of terrorist 
activity and challenge U.S. participants to present the 
evidence on which U.S. officials base those statements. 
Itamaraty officials repeatedly question the value of this 
four-way cooperation, insisting that "bilateral concerns 
should be addressed bilaterally" (reftel). 
 
-- (U) The GOB refuses to legally or even rhetorically label 
U.S.-designated terrorist groups such as HAMAS, Hizballah or 
the FARC as terrorist groups--the former two being considered 
by Brazil as legitimate political parties.  As a result, 
their threshold for accepting evidence of terrorism financing 
 
BRASILIA 00000043  002 OF 004 
 
 
activity in the region, at least publicly, is very high and 
any information indicating that individuals in the TBA send 
funds to the groups in Lebanon, in their view, does not 
necessarily constitute an activity supporting terrorism. 
 
-- (U) At the diplomatic level, the GOB has twice refused to 
officially endorse Argentina's claims that the 
perpetrators of the 1994 terrorism attack in Buenos Aires may 
have received support from individuals in the TBA by 
abstaining from voting in favor of issuing Interpol capture 
notices for the 5 Iranian and 1 Lebanese national suspected 
of involvement in the attack. 
 
-- (U) Two key CT-related legislative initiatives continue to 
languish.  Neither the anti-terrorism nor the anti-money 
laundering legislation has been introduced to Congress, 
despite both being ready for more than a year.  If passed, 
the bills would establish the crime of terrorism and 
associated activities and would facilitate greater law 
enforcement access to financial and banking records during 
investigations, criminalize illicit enrichment, allow 
administrative freezing of assets, and facilitate 
prosecutions of money laundering cases by amending the legal 
definition of money laundering and making it an autonomous 
offense. 
 
--------------------------------------- 
Combined with Operational Cooperation 
--------------------------------------- 
 
¶3. (S/NF) Despite negative rhetoric in Itamaraty and at 
higher levels of the GOB, Brazilian law enforcement and 
intelligence agencies--principally the Federal Police, 
Customs, the Brazilian Intelligence Agency (ABIN), and 
others--are aware of the potential threat from terrorists 
exploiting the favorable conditions existing in Brazil to 
operate and actively track and monitor suspected terrorist 
activity and follow all leads passed to them.  The Federal 
Police will often arrest individuals with links to terrorism, 
but will charge them on a variety of non-terrorism related 
crimes to avoid calling attention of the media and the higher 
levels of the government. Over the past year the Federal 
Police has arrested various individuals engaged in suspected 
terrorism financing activity but have based their arrests on 
narcotics and customs charges. 
 
¶4. (U) Brazil is capable of monitoring domestic financial 
operations and effectively utilizes its financial 
intelligence unit, the Financial Activities Oversight Council 
(COAF), to identify possible funding sources for terrorist 
groups.  The GoB has carried out name checks for persons and 
entities on the UNSCR 1267 and 1373 terror finance lists, but 
has so far not found any assets, accounts or property in the 
names of persons or entities on the UN terror-finance lists. 
Brazil also established National Strategy to Combat Money 
Laundering (ENCLA) and is creating a data base called the 
Electronic Declaration of Cash Carriage (EDPV), which will 
assist in monitoring individuals who transfer funds abroad. 
Although the system is a prototype and is still being tested, 
Brazilian law enforcement officials are encouraged by initial 
results. 
 
--------------------------------------------- --------------- 
Primary Concern: Individuals Linked to Terrorism in Southern 
Brazil 
--------------------------------------------- --------------- 
 
¶5. (S/NF) The primary counterterrorism concern for both 
Brazilian officials and the U.S. Mission in Brazil is the 
presence and activities of individuals with links to 
terrorism--particularly several suspected Sunni extremists 
and some individuals linked to Hizballah--in Sao Paulo and 
other areas of southern Brazil.  The Federal Police, and to a 
lesser extent ABIN, monitor the activities of these suspected 
extremists who may be tied to terrorist groups abroad and 
 
BRASILIA 00000043  003 OF 004 
 
 
share this information with their U.S. counterparts. 
 
¶6. (S/NF) Brazilian law enforcement officials actively 
monitor the presence of several suspected Sunni extremists 
with possible ties to terrorist groups abroad who may be 
capable of lending logistical support--through financing, 
safehaven, false travel documents-- for terrorist attacks in 
the region or abroad.  In 2007, the Federal Police arrested a 
potential Sunni extremist terrorist facilitator operating 
primarily in Santa Catarina state for failure to declare 
funds entering the country and is in the process of deporting 
him.  Also in 2007, Brazilian Federal Police took down a Rio 
de Janeiro-based false document ring that was supplying 
falsified Brazilian documents to non-Brazilians, among them 
suspected international drug traffickers. 
 
--------------------------------------------- -------------- 
Secondary Concern: Argentina-Brazil-Paraguay Tri-Border Area 
--------------------------------------------- -------------- 
 
¶7. (S/NF) To a lesser extent, the TBA remains a concern for 
the U.S. Mission and Brazilian counterparts, primarily for 
the potential that terrorists may exploit the favorable 
conditions there--lax border controls, smuggling, drug 
trafficking, easy access to false documents and weapons, 
movement of pirated goods, uncontrolled cash flows--to raise 
funds or arrange logistics for operations.  While there are 
some individuals suspected of having links to Hizballah and 
HAMAS, there is little evidence these groups have an 
operational terrorist presence in the region.  According to 
Brazilian security service sources, the Muslim presence in 
Foz do Iguacu represents a very small percentage of the 
Muslim population in Brazil, and even those who provide some 
financial support to the groups have little or no connection 
to them.  The GOB pursues CT investigations in the TBA and 
shares the results of their investigations, but their 
principal concern remains the array of other transnational 
criminal activity that takes place in the region.  The area 
is a major entry point for drug traffickers into Brazil.  In 
addition, it is a focus of concern for Brazil in other areas 
such as arms trafficking, smuggling of pirated and 
counterfeit goods, as well as money laundering and terrorist 
financing. 
 
¶8. (S/NF) To cover this range of transnational criminal 
activity, the GOB's police and intelligence services have an 
extensive presence in the region and liaison relationships 
with Argentine, Paraguayan, and other national intelligence 
services, including USG agencies.   Furthermore, the GOB has 
attempted to institutionalize some of this cross-border 
cooperation, although with mixed success.  For example, 
Brazilian Customs completed a new inspection station at the 
Friendship Bridge in the TBA. This should enable the GOB to 
intensify its crack down on contraband crossing the bridge, 
though law enforcement officials expect that traffickers will 
respond to the tough controls by trying to move their goods 
clandestinely across the border elsewhere via boat.  Brazil 
also conducts maritime patrols on their side of the Itaipu 
Lake to deter smuggling activity, although resource 
constraints and lack of equipment hampers their 
effectiveness.  The long-standing goal of conducting joint 
patrols with the Paraguayans remains elusive.  Finally, in 
order to more effectively combat trans-border criminal 
organizations with its neighbors, Brazil established a joint 
intelligence center (JIC) in the TBA, but staffing issues 
have hampered its operations, and it is not apparent that the 
GOB has pushed the other countries too vigorously to send 
representatives. 
 
----------- 
Comment: 
----------- 
 
¶9. (S/NF) Operational elements of the various Brazilian 
security and law enforcement agencies understand that the 
 
BRASILIA 00000043  004 OF 004 
 
 
full scope of the problem goes beyond the TBA, and is almost 
certainly more significant in Sao Paulo and other parts of 
Brazil.  However, the constant barrage of terrorism-related 
media coverage regarding the TBA tends to heighten GOB 
sensitivities, and particularly those of Itamaraty, 
increasing their reluctance to countenance any claims that 
terrorists could possibly have a presence in any part of 
Brazil.  While this sensitivity generally manifests itself in 
nothing more than public rebukes of declarations by U.S. 
officials and sniping during meetings by Itamaraty officials, 
it does occasionally result in more than symbolic reactions 
by the GOB.  Brazil's AMIA abstention at Interpol, reversal 
on CT legislation, and inflexibility on 3 1 all represent 
concrete challenges to local law enforcement officials and 
regional partners in advancing CT cooperation.   Post will 
focus over the coming year on keeping the higher levels of 
the Brazilian government engaged politically and 
diplomatically on this issue, and on seeking to ensure that 
they do not undermine the work being done at the operational 
level. End Comment. 
 
SOBEL