VZCZCXRO6047
RR RUEHRG
DE RUEHBR #0035/01 0071322
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
R 071322Z JAN 08
FM AMEMBASSY BRASILIA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 0791
INFO RUEHAC/AMEMBASSY ASUNCION 6494
RUEHBU/AMEMBASSY BUENOS AIRES 5217
RUEHMN/AMEMBASSY MONTEVIDEO 7161
RUEHSG/AMEMBASSY SANTIAGO 0081
RUEHRG/AMCONSUL RECIFE 7568
RUEHRI/AMCONSUL RIO DE JANEIRO 5650
RUEHSO/AMCONSUL SAO PAULO 1423
RHEFHLC/HOMELAND SECURITY CENTER WASHINGTON DC
RUEABND/DEA HQS WASHDC
RHMCSUU/FBI WASHINGTON DC
RUEAWJA/DEPT OF JUSTICE WASHDC

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BRASILIA 000035 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
FOR WHA, WHA/BSC, AND INL 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/02/2018 
TAGS: KCRM KJUS PGOV BR
SUBJECT: BRAZIL: LESS GUNS, MORE BUTTER: LULA TAKES ON 
CRIME (PART 1 OF 3) 
 
REF: A. A. BRASILIA 000761 
     ¶B. B. SAO PAULO 000873 
     ¶C. C. RECIFE 000087 
 
Classified By: DEPUTY CHIEF OF MISSION PHIL CHICOLA FOR REASONS 1.4 B A 
ND D 
 
¶1. (C) Summary: After much hesitation, President Lula was 
finally forced to wade into the public security debate in 
light of consistent polling that places crime as the number 
one concern of most Brazilians.  The result, a public 
security plan called the National Program on Public Security 
with Citizenship (PRONASCI), was unveiled earlier this year 
and received Congressional sanction in October.  The program 
was developed under the premise that the crime problem in 
Brazil is too big and complex to be solved by simply putting 
more bullets, guns, and boots on the ground.  The program 
seeks to address the social causes of crime as well--a stance 
that has earned the Lula government scorn and charges of 
being soft on crime.  Although the Lula government deserves 
praise for finally proposing a national public security plan, 
the unorthodox nature of some of the initiatives together 
with the program's complexity and limited territorial reach 
reduce the chances that this particular government will 
succeed in putting a sufficient dent in the crime problem to 
take the public security issue off the table as a major issue 
for the 2010 presidential elections. 
 
¶2. (U) This cable in one in a series by Mission Brazil on 
crime issues at both the national and regional levels 
(reftels).  Septels will address PRONASCI's approach to law 
enforcement reform and the potential role of the military in 
solving Brazil,s growing public security concerns. 
 
---------------------------------------- 
Crime No Longer Just a State Issue 
---------------------------------------- 
 
¶3. (C) Since the fall of the military government 20 years 
ago, the Brazilian constitution has assigned responsibility 
for public security to the states.  According to Ricardo 
Balestreri, Director of Research for the Ministry of 
Justice's National Secretariat for Public Security (SENASP) 
this began to change in 2000 when President Fernando Henrique 
Cardoso proposed the nation's first public security plan.  In 
Balestreri's view, since Cardoso's plan, public security has 
become an issue in which the federal government increasingly 
is expected to be a co-protagonist.  However, Federal Deputy 
Raul Jungmann (PPS, Socialist People's Party, opposition; of 
Pernambuco), who serves as Vice-Chairman of the Chamber of 
Deputies' Committee on Public Security and Organized Crime, 
told poloff that it is still far from being primarily a 
federal issue.  Crime remains a topic that many federal 
politicians-- in particular leftist ones such as 
himself--would prefer to avoid both for political reasons 
(fear of being held accountable for astronomical national 
crime rates) and because of historical sensitivities (use of 
the military and police as tools of repression during the 
military era). 
 
¶4. (U) Public opinion polls, however, have consistently shown 
that the general public is fed up with the crime situation in 
Brazil and are demanding a get-tough approach against 
criminal activity.  The most recent poll to confirm this, 
carried in the November 28, 2007 of Brazil,s premier news 
magazine "Veja," showed that 61% approved of the harsh 
methods used against suspected criminals in the popular film, 
"Tropa da Elite."  The same poll showed the public is 
clamoring for the active involvement of the federal 
government, with 88% of those polled approving of the 
military taking an active role in combating crime.  Although 
some observers believe public concern on crime in the past 
has not translated into an election issue at the national 
level (see Ref A), political parties may be reassessing this 
view--one political analyst here told poloffs that he has 
talked with two political parties about developing political 
messages, heading towards the 2008 local and 2010 
presidential elections, on crime and public security that 
avoid appearing too militaristic or too soft. 
 
BRASILIA 00000035  002 OF 003 
 
 
 
------------------------------------------ 
Lula Enters the Fray with PRONASCI 
------------------------------------------ 
 
¶5. (C) Alexandre Sankiewicz, Legislative Consultant on 
Criminal Justice issues for the Brazilian Chamber of 
Deputies, told poloff that, in the past, only spectacular 
criminal incidents prompted the federal government to address 
public security issues. The response usually took the form of 
a flurry of punitive but short-lived military-style 
operations and calls for changes to the penal code (e.g., 
increasing criminal penalties, lowering the criminal age of 
majority for heinous crimes to 16), which tended to have 
either little long-term impact or not to be approved once 
public pressure subsided.  Breaking with that pattern, as a 
result of the intense public pressure stemming from episodes 
such as the horrific killing of a 6 year old boy on the 
streets of Rio de Janeiro (Ref A), the Lula government 
devised what his government proclaimed is the first national 
public security plan to ever deal with crime in a 
comprehensive fashion.  The plan, PRONASCI, breaks with most 
previous approaches at the national level by attempting to 
tackle crime both by addressing the needs of the law 
enforcement community and by targeting what the government 
views as the underlying social causes of crime--mainly 
hunger, poverty, lack of social inclusion, and failure of the 
state to maintain a presence in entire areas of the major 
cities. 
 
¶6. (U) Also referred to as the PAC da Seguranca (or Security 
PAC, so called after the Accelerated Growth Program, the 
government's infrastructure investment program), PRONASCI 
will invest 6.7 billion Reais (about USD 3.94 billion) 
through 2012 and consists of 94 programs run by the Ministry 
of Justice as well as 15 other ministries (including the 
Ministries of Planning, Health, Science and Technology, Labor 
and Employment, Culture, Sports, and Cities).  The government 
will implement the program in the 11 cities with the highest 
crime-rates:  Rio de Janeiro, Sao Paulo, Porto Alegre, Belo 
Horizonte, Brasilia, Curitiba, Belem, Recife, Maceio, 
Salvador, and Vitoria, focusing on three core areas: 
enhancing education and technical training for law 
enforcement professionals, investing in and improving the 
prison system, and targeting the socio-cultural factors that 
lead to crime. 
 
--------------------------------------- 
Dealing with the Roots of Crime 
--------------------------------------- 
 
¶7. (U) For many within the governing coalition, the real 
importance of PRONASCI lies in its attempt address for the 
first time what they call the social causes of crime. 
Federal Deputy Carlos Eduardo Vieira da Cunha (PDT, 
Democratic Workers Party, governing coalition; of Rio Grande 
do Sul), a member of the Chamber of Deputies' Committee on 
Public Security and Organized Crime, told poloff that the 
emphasis on social programs was necessary in order to 
overcome the tendency of the population to support harsh 
police measures instead of addressing the roots of crime. 
Inspired by the success of "Bolsa Familia" (the government's 
popular cash assistance program), the government plans to 
establish under PRONASCI three types of "bolsas", ranging 
from R$100 to R$190 a month: "Projeto Reservista-Cidadao" 
(Citizen-Reservist), for members of the armed forces to do 
community work after completing their obligatory service; 
"Projeto de Protecao dos Jovens em Territorio Vulneravel" 
(Protection of Youth in Vulnerable Areas), for youth in 
danger of entering a life of crime; and "Projeto Maes da Paz" 
(Mothers of Peace) for mothers in poor and crime-ridden 
communities to serve as community leaders and provide 
guidance to at-risk youths. 
 
¶8. (U) PRONASCI would also provide funding for a variety of 
initiatives designed to address a range of disparate social 
ills from the prevalence of domestic violence to lack of 
access to cultural and sporting facilities for at risk youth. 
 It would strengthen the Maria da Penha Law by creating 53 
 
BRASILIA 00000035  003 OF 003 
 
 
domestic violence centers dedicated to rehabilitating 
aggressors under the law, establishing domestic violence 
courts, and specialized legal assistance units for victims of 
domestic violence.  The program would also create 20 centers 
that would train and develop community leaders specialized in 
conflict resolution in vulnerable communities and will 
establish 132 Community Councils on Public Security to ensure 
community dialogue and accountability with the police. 
 
--------------------------------------------- ---------------- 
Proposal Exposes Government to Criticism Over Competence, 
Ideology 
--------------------------------------------- ---------------- 
 
¶9. (SBU) Most analysts and officials with which Post spoke 
offered praise for the concept behind PRONASCI, while 
expressing skepticism at its chances for success.  Federal 
Deputy Marcelo Melo (PMDB, Democratic Movement Party, 
government coalition; of Goias), PRONASCI rapporteur in the 
Chamber of Deputies, admitted to poloff that the Lula 
administration lacked the competence to administer and 
execute the program. Furthermore, a chorus of opposition 
members has called PRONASCI nothing more than an effort to 
foster "clientelism" among the poor. As Federal Deputy 
Jugmann stated, "the PT does not have a program for 
governance but one for power" supported by handing out cash 
payments to every niche group.  As a result of this 
perception, opposition members succeeded in stripping the 
three new "bolsa" programs from the version of PRONASCI that 
became law.  The government has re-submitted the three 
programs to Congress and Minister of Justice Tarso Genro is 
pressing for their approval, calling them an essential 
component of PRONASCI. 
 
------------ 
Comment: 
------------ 
 
¶10. (C) Lula's effort to address Brazil,s growing crime and 
public security problem in a comprehensive fashion has raised 
government efforts to a new level.  PRONASCI will provide a 
significant test for his signature approach to Brazil,s 
social ills.  The government does not appear to have the 
institutional capacity to implement such a broad program that 
requires coordination among more than a dozen federal 
ministries and agencies, in addition to dozens of state and 
local government agencies.  Even if effectively implemented, 
the proposed programs and policies may not be the right mix 
to put a dent in crime levels, particularly in the short 
term.  Finally, public impatience with the worsening 
situation and the additional cost on top of Lula,s already 
extensive social support programs may undermine the sustained 
implementation required for PRONASCI,s key social elements. 
 The general public is clamoring for immediate solutions and 
a show of strength from government at all levels, rather than 
the socially-oriented, long-term solutions offered through 
PRONASCI.  This disconnect will continue to leave the door 
open for the opposition to hammer the government on its weak 
public security credentials when the next horrific criminal 
incident inevitably takes place.  And it almost guarantees 
that public security issues will be among the top voter 
concerns heading into next year,s local and 2010,s general 
elections. 
 
SOBEL