VZCZCXRO1279
RR RUEHRG
DE RUEHBR #0129/01 0251453
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
R 251453Z JAN 08
FM AMEMBASSY BRASILIA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 0919
INFO RUEHAC/AMEMBASSY ASUNCION 6543
RUEHBU/AMEMBASSY BUENOS AIRES 5267
RUEHMN/AMEMBASSY MONTEVIDEO 7201
RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW 0349
RUEHFR/AMEMBASSY PARIS 0349
RUEHSG/AMEMBASSY SANTIAGO 0124
RUEHRG/AMCONSUL RECIFE 7635
RUEHRI/AMCONSUL RIO DE JANEIRO 5723
RUEHSO/AMCONSUL SAO PAULO 1510
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BRASILIA 000129 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPARTMENT FOR PM, WHA, AND EEB 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/24/2018 
TAGS: PREL MARR EAIR PGOV BR
SUBJECT: BRAZILIAN DEFENSE MINISTER ON DCA, TRIP TO FRANCE 
AND RUSSIA, CIVIL AVIATION 
 
REF: A. STATE 3557 
     ¶B. BRASILIA 99 
     ¶C. STATE 3163 
 
Classified By: AMBASSADOR CLIFFORD SOBEL, REASON 1.4 (B) AND (D) 
 
¶1. (C) Summary.  Brazilian Defense Minister Nelson Jobim told 
the Ambassador January 17 that he would like to sign a 
Defense Cooperation Agreement (DCA, ref A) when he visits 
Washington in March, but that he faces stiff opposition in 
the Ministry of External Relations (MRE or Itamaraty).  He 
briefed the Ambassador on his upcoming trip to France and 
Russia, and on his continuing work regarding civil aviation 
matters.  The internal GOB discussion on the merits of a DCA 
will likely center on the message the GOB thinks it will send 
regarding the nature of Brazil's relationship with the United 
States.  End summary. 
 
Defense Cooperation Agreement: The Battle is Joined 
--------------------------------------------- ------ 
 
¶2. (C) In a private breakfast on January 17, the Ambassador 
told Jobim that his initial approach on a DCA to MRE Under 
Secretary for Political Affairs Everton Vargas had not been 
 
SIPDIS 
well received, and that Vargas had specifically mentioned 
Secretary General (Vice Minister) Samuel Guimaraes when 
 
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asking for time to work the issue internally (ref B).  Jobim 
responded that Guimaraes posed a serious problem, not only on 
the DCA but on a variety of issues.  Jobim said that 
Guimaraes "hates the United States" and is actively looking 
to create problems in the relationship.  Jobim said that he 
has had to beat back more than one outlandish proposal by 
Guimaraes calculated to upset relations with the U.S. and 
other industrialized countries. 
 
¶3. (C) Jobim said that he would like to sign the DCA when he 
travels to Washington in March.  Guimaraes has told him that 
cannot happen and is working hard to prevent the DCA from 
being concluded.  He argued that, as Jobim's predecessor went 
to the United States in 2007, protocol demands a return visit 
by the U.S. Defense Secretary.  (Comment: Strictly speaking, 
this is not true, as the meeting between the SecDef and 
Jobim's predecessor was not part of an official counterpart 
visit.  End comment.)  He told Jobim that his trip would 
"mean nothing" compared with the symbolism of a visit by the 
SecDef to Brazil.  Jobim said he pushed back, telling 
Guimaraes that "Itamaraty is the process," not the substance 
of engagement on his issues.  But he told the Ambassador that 
he does not want to "win the battle and lose the war" and 
expend too much political capital on the DCA, so will have to 
proceed carefully.  In particular, he said, if Guimaraes and 
FM Amorim join forces against a DCA, that could be a serious 
problem. 
 
Submarines in France, Helos in Russia 
------------------------------------- 
 
¶4. (C) Jobim told the Ambassador that the primary purpose of 
his upcoming trip to France is to discuss design issues for a 
nuclear-powered submarine.  He also said that he will look at 
France's Rafale airplane.  In Russia Jobim's primary purpose 
is to ensure servicing for Brazil's Russian helicopters.  He 
noted that Russia wants to open a jeep facility in Porto 
Alegre, and that he will travel to Russia in an Embraer plane 
in the hope of making sales there. 
 
Civil Aviation: Engaged on Latest Problems 
------------------------------------------ 
 
¶5. (SBU) Jobim told the Ambassador that he believes he has 
found options for avoiding the proposed draconian increase in 
landing fees at Sao Paulo's Guarulhos airport (ref C), 
especially as they can have another apron ready quickly.  He 
asked for another few weeks to work the issue.  Discussing 
Brazil's airport operator Infraero, he said that the current 
management problems are so big that more time will be needed 
before he can consider opening it up to foreign investors. 
 
¶6. (C) Comment: Jobim's candid comments on Guimaraes confirm 
similar messages from U/S Vargas and Long-Term Planning 
 
BRASILIA 00000129  002 OF 002 
 
 
Minister Roberto Unger (ref B) regarding the difficult 
internal battle in the GOB that will surround the proposal 
for a DCA with the United States.  As he has since the 
beginning of his tenure, Jobim continues to challenge the 
historic supremacy of Itamaraty in all areas of foreign 
policy.  President Lula's direction to Jobim to postpone his 
visit to Washington (initially planned for January) until he 
had met with his Latin American counterparts was almost 
certainly provided on the basis of input from Itamaraty and 
presidential foreign policy advisor Marco Aurelio Garcia.  In 
the same way, the merits of a DCA are likely to be considered 
by the GOB at least in part in light of the message it will 
convey regarding the nature of Brazil's relationship with the 
United States.  Once again, President Lula may have to play 
the deciding role between an unusually activist Defense 
Minister interested in developing closer ties with the United 
States and an MRE that is firmly committed to maintaining 
control over all aspects of foreign policy and to keeping a 
measure of distance between Brazil and the United States. 
 
SOBEL