VZCZCXRO4956
RR RUEHAG RUEHAST RUEHDA RUEHDF RUEHFL RUEHIK RUEHKW RUEHLA RUEHLN
RUEHLZ RUEHPOD RUEHROV RUEHSR RUEHVK RUEHYG
DE RUEHBW #0021/01 0041712
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 041712Z JAN 08
FM AMEMBASSY BELGRADE
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 2014
INFO RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 BELGRADE 000021 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
SENSITIVE 
 
E.O.  12958: N/A 
TAGS: PREL PREF PGOV PHUM KV SR
 
SUBJECT: SERBIA:  UNHCR FINALIZES KOSOVO CONTINGENCY PLANNING WHILE 
GOVERNMENT STILL HAS WORK TO DO 
 
 
SUMMARY 
------- 
 
¶1.  (SBU) In the lead-up to Kosovo final status UN High Commissioner 
for Refugees (UNHCR) has finalized preparations on its contingency 
planning related to possible population displacements within and out 
of Kosovo.  UNHCR assumes final status will involve a form of 
supervised independence for Kosovo, including a possible "secession 
attempt" by North Mitrovica.  The Ministry for Kosovo and the 
Serbian Commissariat for Refugees admit that their preparations are 
still underway, while offering few concrete details of their 
planning and insisting that they expect minimal population flows 
from Kosovo into Serbia.  End Summary. 
 
KOSOVO FRONT AND CENTER AT UNHCR GENEVA HQ 
------------------------------------------ 
 
¶2.  (SBU) Kosovo is a key priority at UNHCR's headquarters in 
Geneva, UNHCR Deputy Director for Europe Udo Janz told refcoord on 
December 6, 2007.  UNHCR was well aware of the possible scale and 
scope of potential population movements in and out of Kosovo in the 
run-up to the determination of final status, Janz said, adding that 
UNHCR would have the lead on humanitarian coordination in the 
region.  "Every UN country team in the region recognizes this and 
will proceed accordingly," Janz said.  UNHCR has organized a monthly 
Geneva-based inter-agency meeting, and created a pre-emergency task 
force on Kosovo.  Effective January 2008, UNHCR will reinforce field 
operations in the region, to include the deployment of a public 
information officer to Pristina and two emergency staffers to 
Pristina and Belgrade.  Janz assured refcoord that two humanitarian 
coordinators would be named in Serbia and Kosovo in the event of a 
serious crisis:  UNHCR heads in Belgrade and Pristina would take up 
these roles. 
 
UNHCR: PLANNING COMPLETED, PREPARATIONS IN PLACE 
--------------------------------------------- --- 
 
¶3.  (SBU) According to the UNHCR contingency plan, which local staff 
have shared with refcoord, Kosovo final status will involve some 
form of supervised independence, possibly followed by a "secession 
attempt" by the Serb-dominated area of North Mitrovica.  UNHCR's 
plan estimates that there could be 19,000 persons displaced from 
Kosovo to Serbia if transition is peaceful and a possible 72,000 
people if the transition is accompanied by violence.  According to 
the plan, in the event of a hard partition of North Mitrovica, UNHCR 
Belgrade will assume from UNHCR Pristina responsibility for North 
Mitrovica. 
 
¶4.  (SBU) In a December 7, 2007 meeting with key stakeholders and 
donors in Belgrade, local UNHCR representatives reported they 
planned to double stock of non-food items (NFIs) from 10,000 to 
20,000 beneficiaries in Serbia.  In the absence of the World Food 
Program (WFP) UNHCR will take the lead on food distribution.  It has 
pre-positioned food stocks for 5,000 beneficiaries for 14 days, 
distributed at the onset of any eventual emergency.  Beyond this 
initial period, UNHCR will closely coordinate with the International 
Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) and the Serbian Red Cross, who 
have agreed to distribute food for the first three months. The World 
Health Organization (WHO) and the UN Children's Fund (UNICEF) 
respectively will take the lead on health and nutrition. 
 
¶5.  (SBU) UNHCR is also prepared for potential unrest in Southern 
Serbia's Presevo, Bujanovac, and Medvedja municipalities, which have 
substantial ethnic Albanian populations, on the unlikely chance that 
they demand unification with Kosovo.  According to UNHCR's 
contingency plan, such a demand could provoke suppression by Serbian 
security forces and a possible influx of persons into Kosovo. 
UNHCR's plan estimates that up to 20,000 ethnic Albanians could flee 
to Kosovo in the unlikely event of violence in South Serbia.  The 
population on the move would mainly originate from areas closer to 
the boundary.  Should there be no violence the population movement 
would be minor, up to 5,000 individuals, and possibly short term. 
UNHCR Representative in Serbia Lennart Kotsalainen and UNHCR Senior 
Program Officer Angelita Cecere told refcoord on several occasions 
in November and December 2007 that although this was an unlikely 
scenario, UNHCR added it to the plan as a precautionary measure. 
 
FEW CONCRETE EXAMPLES OF GOS PLANNING, COORDINATION 
--------------------------------------------- ------ 
 
¶6.  (SBU) The Serbian government has shared little over the past 
several months with regard to its plans to deal with possible 
population movements from Kosovo into Serbia.  As the prospect of an 
independent Kosovo becomes more likely, the Ministry for Kosovo and 
the Serbian Commissariat for Refugees have admitted to refcoord that 
preparations are underway, but they emphasize that they expect 
minimal population movements.  The government has offered few 
concrete examples regarding its planning, and instead stressed that 
it will focus its efforts on encouraging Serbs to remain in Kosovo. 
 
 
BELGRADE 00000021  002 OF 002 
 
 
 
¶7.  (SBU) State Secretary for the Ministry for Kosovo Dusan 
Prorokovic told refcoord December 20, 2007 that the Ministry "has 
made preparations for the worst case scenario," including possible 
population movements on the same scale of March 2004, particularly 
through the Southern Serb municipalities of Bujanovac and Vranje. 
He added that the Ministry was coordinating its plans with the 
Serbian Commissioner for Refugees and other relevant government 
bodies.  UNHCR Senior Protection Officer John Young told refcoord on 
December 26, 2007 that the Ministry planned to have four operational 
bases close to the Kosovo administrative border to keep fresh 
displaced individuals in Southern Serbia in an attempt to put 
political pressure on Kosovo authorities and the international 
community.  According to Young, the Ministry, via its Coordination 
Center for Kosovo, intended to take charge of inter-ministerial 
coordination in the event of population movements. 
 
¶8.  (SBU) The Serbian Commissariat for Refugees, though technically 
responsible for accommodation and registration in the event of 
population movements, was less forthcoming than the Ministry for 
Kosovo on planning.  Dragisa Dabetic told refcoord on December 27, 
2007 that his only "action plan" was to continue to service the 17 
collective centers which house 827 individuals in Kosovo, located 
mostly in Serb enclaves.  When pressed, he said that in the event of 
a Unilateral Declaration of Independence (UDI) by Kosovo, with no 
violence, he expected only a handful of individuals, if any at all, 
would cross the border, and they would be easy to assist.  He 
claimed that if violence against minorities were to accompany a UDI, 
it would be because the international community "allowed this to 
happen."  Though he tacitly admitted the Commissariat would assist 
individuals coming to Serbia from Kosovo, he added that "it is 
ironic the international community expects Serbia to clean up their 
mess."  Dabetic provided no indication that he was in the loop on 
what the Ministry for Kosovo was planning. 
 
COMMENT 
------- 
 
¶9.  (SBU) Post is confident in UNHCR's preparations and capacity at 
both the headquarters and local level to respond to any potential 
displaced persons from Kosovo to Serbia.  We are encouraged that 
UNHCR has open lines of communication with the GOS.  Post is 
concerned, however at the lack of GOS planning and its potential 
inability to respond in a coordinated, rapid manner in case of large 
movements of people across the border.  As it has done in the past, 
the GOS most likely will muddle through in the event of a serious 
emergency, but it will likely be too little, too late.  We are also 
troubled by the GOS's intention to restrict the movement of any new 
displaced persons to Southern Serbia, effectively limiting their 
freedom of movement.  Post will continue to encourage and remind key 
ministries of their responsibilities to adequately and effectively 
provide for displaced persons.  End Comment. 
 
¶10.  (U) This message has been cleared by USOP. 
 
 
BRUSH 
 
 
 
 
 
 
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