VZCZCXRO9207
RR RUEHBC RUEHDA RUEHDE RUEHIHL RUEHKUK
DE RUEHGB #0176/01 0231804
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 231804Z JAN 08
FM AMEMBASSY BAGHDAD
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 5328
RHEHAAA/WHITE HOUSE WASHINGTON DC//NSC//
INFO RUCNRAQ/IRAQ COLLECTIVE
RUEHTC/AMEMBASSY THE HAGUE 0043
RUEATRS/DEPT OF TREASURY WASHDC
RUEHVEN/USMISSION USOSCE 0001
RUEHRC/DEPT OF AGRICULTURE WASHDC

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 BAGHDAD 000176 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
NEA/I 
AID/W/ANE/IRO FOR PRYOR AND STAAL 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: EAID AMGT PGOV ECON PREL SOCI PINR IZ
SUBJECT: INFORMAL MINISTERIAL CAPACITY ASSESSMENT 2007 
 
¶1. (SBU) Summary: The Ministerial Engagement Team (MET) 
leaders in Embassy Baghdad conducted the second of two 
informal assessments to determine the level of institutional 
capacity of several Iraqi ministries.  The Mission used the 
same methodology in both years and the results of the 
December 2007 review were compared to the August 2006 
assessment.  There was across-the-board improvement in all 
ministries, with an estimated 12% overall average improvement 
in the last year.  The survey results noted significant 
improvements in budget execution, contracting and procurement 
metrics; these findings are confirmed by increased national 
spending rates.  The Government of Iraq (GoI) is poised to 
capitalize on this increased capacity development in 2008 if 
political will supports continued development in key public 
administration processes, training, and political commitment 
to service delivery.  Significant weaknesses exist in the use 
and development of technology, strategic planning, and human 
resource and workforce management.  USG and donor 
representatives continue to encourage the GoI to invest its 
national resources in these areas, while USG technical 
assistance also continues to address these weaknesses.  We 
caution that this is an informal assessment and should only 
be used to assess trends, not interpreted for mathematical 
precision or the effectiveness of U.S. assistance programs. 
END SUMMARY. 
 
INSTITUTIONAL CAPACITY OF 12 MINISTRIES WAS REVIEWED IN 2006 
AND 2007. 
 
¶2. (U) Background: Embassy Baghdad conducted a second annual 
assessment of several Iraqi ministries in December 2007 to 
review their performance and determine whether there has been 
progress against a set of indicators.  Although the 
assessments provide information to confirm and develop 
Embassy Baghdad,s capacity building assistance plan for 2008 
they do not directly gauge effectiveness of US assistance in 
this area.  The focus was squarely on the GoI.  Twelve 
ministries were measured in 2006 and 2007.  The ministries 
assessed in 2007 were Agriculture, Education, Electricity, 
Finance, Health, Justice, Municipalities and Public Works, 
Oil, Planning and Development, Water Resources, and Trade. 
 
¶3. (U) Methodology: In almost all cases ministerial capacity 
assessment models assume regular access to the ministries and 
that the structure of an assessment system is already in 
place.  The models also suggest yardsticks to measure the 
progress of ministerial capacity building.  To carry out 
these assessments in a methodologically rigorous manner 
usually means assembling a team of assessors who are trained 
to assess to a common standard.  When the assessment is 
repeated, the same or similar team needs to be assembled to 
meet the same common standard.  For environments like Iraq, 
where it is unlikely that the same specialist team will be 
assembled for successive assessments, the criteria must be 
simple so an ad-hoc team can assess with the minimum of 
training time.  This also means that some measures will be 
left out, despite the desirability of their being assessed. 
 
DEVELOPING THE METRICS USED IN THE ASSESSMENT 
 
¶4. (U) Ideally, the metrics should act as a benchmark, 
allowing comparison with other governments.  Organizational 
Excellence models (EFQM Model and Malcolm Baldridge) and 
Capability Maturity Models should be able to give a benchmark 
against international standards; however, it is obvious that 
the GoI cannot yet be meaningfully measured to these 
standards.  However, there are available tools that can be 
used to identify a trend.  By surveying with the same 
questions annually, a general description of how the GoI is 
developing could be produced, but cannot be used as a 
comparison with other organizations or governments. 
 
¶5. (U)  In developing a tool to measure ministerial 
performance in Iraq, the Mission identified the source 
objectives and goals for Ministerial Capacity Development, 
using the Effective Government and Essential Services Annex 
to the Joint Campaign Plan.  The US intent -- to help the GoI 
create the capacity to govern effectively and to provide 
essential services -- leads to the overall objectives of 
capacity development and ministerial engagement with the GoI. 
 The Embassy Performance Plan for 2007 was also used in 
developing the assessment tool, as it sets out the goal for 
Management and Organizational Excellence and added two 
 
BAGHDAD 00000176  002 OF 003 
 
 
additional objectives of Communication and Consultation 
within Iraq and with the customers of the Ministries, and the 
Use of Information Technology (IT) and Web-based Information 
Management. 
 
¶6. (U) We have tried to develop metrics that are as objective 
as possible while also being specific, measurable, 
achievable, relevant, and time related.  The guidance 
provided to Ministerial Engagement Leads by the Chair of the 
Ministerial Engagement Coordination Committee (MECC), the 
Coordinator for Economic Transition in Iraq (CETI), was to 
"call it as you see it," without reference to the baseline 
2006 assessment.  As a result, caution should be used in 
comparing this data to the 2006 results. 
 
¶7. (U) The degree of precision of any of the metrics used in 
2006 and 2007 was affected by the security situation and, in 
some cases, lack of access and limited opportunity to observe 
development within the ministries. 
 
CHALLENGES OF MEASURING INSTITUTIONAL CAPACITY IN IRAQ 
 
¶8. (U) Assessment Criteria and Measurement Indicators.  The 
assessments were based upon a four-point measurement, with 
ratings ranging from ineffective (one point), partially 
effective (two points), largely effective (three points), and 
fully effective (four points).  The review examined 53 
metrics distributed among the following nine areas of 
interest: 
(1) Can the Ministry sustain its outputs? 
(2) Does the Ministry have sufficient long term plans and 
processes? 
(3) Are there appropriate, transparent financial systems in 
the Ministry? 
(4) Has the Ministry adopted procedures to counter 
corruption? 
(5) Has the Ministry developed a professional civil service? 
(6) Does the Ministry use technology effectively? 
(7) Does the Ministry have an effective information 
management system? 
(8) Does the Ministry reach out to its customers and Iraqi 
society? 
(9) Does the Ministry manage its resources effectively? 
 
¶9. (U) Despite the appearance of precision in this assessment 
tool, post advises caution on considering the assessment data 
as definitive.  The comparisons of data and findings are 
offered with this disclaimer: The results confirm the 
impressions and understanding of the MET leads and others at 
post who deal with their Iraqi colleagues on a daily basis in 
the ministries.  However, it is based on limited data. 
Furthermore, the sensitivity of this undertaking (which did 
not include full disclosure to the ministries assessed) 
requires that the findings be treated with discretion.  The 
conduct of this informal assessment by the MET leads might be 
interrupted as less than fully independent, as the leads work 
closely with the ministries they assessed and the outcome of 
the assessments could be viewed as an assessment of their own 
performance.  An outside, independent assessment would be 
neither cost effective nor feasible at this time.  The GoI 
ministries are undertaking an initial round of 
self-assessments, a good step toward effective public 
administration. 
 
THE RESULTS 
 
¶10. (SBU) 2006 Data.  The 2006 cumulative data points 
indicated that institutional capacity was mixed.  Three 
percent of the government functions were fully effective, 14 
percent largely effective, 28 percent partly effective, 28 
percent ineffective, and 27 percent of the functions could 
not be evaluated due to lack of access, limited information, 
or poor security. 
 
¶11. (SBU) 2007 Data.  The 2007 cumulative data points 
indicated institutional capacity distributed across the GoI 
as follows: 
-- 5 percent of the government functions were fully effective 
-- 23 percent largely effective 
-- 45 percent partly effective 
-- 25 percent ineffective 
-- 2 percent of the functions could not be evaluated due to 
lack of access, limited information, or low security. 
 
BAGHDAD 00000176  003 OF 003 
 
 
 
¶12. (SBU) Assessment of Trend from 2006 to 2007.  There was 
an across-the-board improvement in all ministries, with an 
estimated 12 percent overall average improvement from 2006 to 
¶2007.  Significant improvements reflected in the data in 
budget execution, contracting and procurement metrics are 
confirmed by increased national spending rates.  The GoI is 
poised to capitalize on this increased capacity development 
in 2008 if its political will supports continued development 
in key public administration processes, targeted technical 
training, and increased improvements to the civil service. 
Weaknesses were identified in the use and development of 
technology, strategic planning, and human resource and 
workforce management.  The USG has existing programs that 
will continue to focus on capacity development in these 
areas.  USG and other donor representatives continue to 
encourage the GoI to invest its national resources in these 
areas in addition to support provided by foreign assistance. 
 
¶13. (SBU) Summary of Capacity Development Progress.  The 
overall progress in the nine areas of interest of ministerial 
capacity was mixed among the ministries.  Three ministries 
(Oil, Electricity, and Water Resources) showed significant 
improvement overall.  An equal number of ministries were 
generally unchanged in the aggregate (Municipalities and 
Public Works, Health, and Planning), while the ministries of 
Environment, Education, Trade, Agriculture, and Finance 
declined slightly overall.  Most of these ministries have 
progressed from near paralysis to moderately effective. 
 
¶14. (SBU) Overall, the Ministries of Water and Electricity 
exhibited the highest degree of capacity in accomplishing the 
mission of their ministry.  The effectiveness of the Ministry 
of Municipalities and Public Works has not increased despite 
considerable efforts by the USG, GoI, and donors. 
 
¶15. (SBU) The progress of all ministries in managing their 
resources showed a modest upward slope.  They have slowly 
graduated to slightly functioning with the exception of the 
Ministry of Oil, which is hampered by its inability to 
counter corruption.  Ministries that improved in reaching out 
to their customers and Iraqi society were Electricity, 
Health, and Education. 
 
¶16. (SBU) Across the board, all the ministries are 
ineffective in the use of information management systems due 
to the lack of communication infrastructure.  Immediate 
assistance efforts were targeted using satellite technology, 
and ongoing efforts include IT assistance, but this only 
meets a small percentage of the needs.  The GoI must make 
significant investments in communication infrastructure over 
many years to develop the necessary tools to improve 
government efficiency and to be competitive in the 
international markets. 
 
¶17. (SBU) Progress in long term planning was uneven, with 
marginal advancement in the Planning, Education, Trade, 
Environment, and Finance ministries.  Progress declined in 
the Public Works ministry due to leadership issues. 
 
¶18. (SBU) COMMENT:  The findings of the assessment and 
comparative analysis with the 2006 survey were shared 
throughout the MECC and relevant USG agencies working on 
capacity development at post.  Just as the findings on 
weaknesses in budget execution in 2006 contributed to that 
focus in 2007, the findings from this year will help to guide 
ongoing assistance to the ministries assessed.  The MECC 
Chair has directed the ministry leads to gauge their 
respective ministries, reactions to the identified areas of 
weakness, without going into detail on the assessment and its 
results.  The MECC provides a forum for such information 
sharing and cross-ministerial direction to be provided to 
agencies at post engaged with the GoI, and to ensure that 
consistent priorities direct our ongoing engagement with the 
ministries. 
CROCKER