VZCZCXRO4962
OO RUEHIK RUEHPOD RUEHYG
DE RUEHTH #0020/01 0041743
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
O 041743Z JAN 08
FM AMEMBASSY ATHENS
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0976
INFO RUEHZG/NATO EU COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHSQ/AMEMBASSY SKOPJE PRIORITY 1128
RUEHPS/USOFFICE PRISTINA PRIORITY 0342

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 ATHENS 000020 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PREL PGOV ECON GR
SUBJECT: SCENESETTER FOR CODEL DAVIS 
 
¶1. (SBU) INTRODUCTION: Welcome to Athens.  We look forward to 
hosting your visit, which comes at an important time in the 
U.S.-Greece bilateral relationship.  Greece is a NATO ally 
and strategic partner of the U.S., as well as a member of the 
European Union.  The center-right New Democracy government of 
Prime Minister Kostas Karamanlis -- re-elected by a slim 
majority in September 2007 elections -- seeks to maintain 
good relations with the U.S., though the U.S.-Greece 
partnership is complex and at times tumultuous.  Greeks have 
a deep respect and affection for American culture and 
Americans in general dating to the Marshall Plan and earlier, 
but there also exists an anti-U.S. bias in the Greek media 
and body politic, stemming from, among other things, 
perceived U.S. support of the Greek military junta (1967-74). 
 Similarly, Greek-U.S. military-to-military cooperation is 
good, particularly at the U.S. Navy base at Souda Bay on 
Crete, which plays a key role in supporting U.S. military 
operations in the eastern Mediterranean and Middle East, 
including Iraq.  Greece also is among the largest purchasers 
of U.S. military equipment.  At the same time, Greece's 
participation in NATO is politically sensitive with weak 
public support for NATO operations. 
 
¶2. (SBU) You are likely to find the Greeks to be warm and 
hospitable hosts but also staunch defenders of their 
interests, particularly on issues touching on national 
identity and territory.  Some of the Embassy's priority goals 
include: 1) promoting stbility in the Balkans, given 
Kosovo's imminent declaration of independence and the 
Republic of Macedonia's hoped-for invitation to join NATO 
this spring; 2) further cooperation in combating Greek 
domestic and international terrorist threats and in 
strengthening Greek borders against transiting jihadists; 3) 
increasing Greek-Turkish cooperation and stability in the 
Aegean and on Cyprus; and 4) expanding trade with the U.S. 
and encouraging Greece to contribute to European energy 
diversity as it develops as an energy transit hub.  The 
following are several current issues that may come up in your 
discussions with Greek officials and others. 
 
MACEDONIA NAME ISSUE 
-------------------- 
 
¶3. (SBU) Following the breakup of Yugoslavia, Greece objected 
to the Republic of Macedonia's name.  Greeks consider the 
unmodified use of "Macedonia" a usurpation of their heritage 
and warn that it could encourage irredentism towards Greece's 
northern province of the same name.  In 1995, the U.S. helped 
broker an "Interim Accord" between Greece and Macedonia 
positing that Greece would not object to the use of the name, 
"the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia" (FYROM) until the 
two countries could decide on a mutually acceptable solution 
through UN-led negotiations.  The U.S. decision in November 
2004 to recognize the Republic of Macedonia by its 
constitutional name in bilateral relations touched off a 
storm of controversy in Greece.  We have repeatedly urged 
both sides to lower the rhetoric and engage in negotiations 
led by Matthew Nimetz under the auspices of the United 
Nations and have stated that the U.S. would accept whatever 
solution Athens and Skopje agreed upon through the 
negotiations.  Positions have hardened as the April 2008 NATO 
Summit approaches with the possibility of a NATO invitation 
to Macedonia.  Greece has threatened to veto the invitation 
absent a settlement of the name issue.  We continue to urge 
both countries to work for a mutually agreeable solution 
through the UN/Nimetz process, and we emphasize the 
importance of full compliance with the 1995 Interim Accord. 
 
KOSOVO 
------ 
 
¶4. (SBU) Kosovar Albanians desire independence from Serbia; 
Serbia insists on maintaining sovereign control, while 
granting extensive autonomy to Kosovo.  In January 2006, the 
UN appointed former Finnish President Martti Ahtisaari to 
lead negotiations between the two sides.   Unable to reach a 
negotiated settlement, he presented his proposal to the UN 
Security Council in April 2007.  His plan calls for a 
multiethnic Kosovo with the language, education, and cultural 
aspects of all communities protected and promoted and the 
Serbian Orthodox Church to be safeguarded.  The NATO-led 
Kosovo force would continue to provide security and an 
international civilian representative would oversee the 
settlement.  Belgrade objects to the plan.  The Security 
Council was unable to take action because of divisions within 
the Council.  (Russia has actively and Greece passively 
supported the Serbs; the U.S. believes Kosovar independence 
is inevitable given the failure by December 10 of the 
U.S./EU/Russia "Troika" negotiations to find an agreed 
solution.)  We, therefore, support the Ahtisaari plan as the 
best way of avoiding further destabilization of the region 
 
ATHENS 00000020  002 OF 002 
 
 
that could follow an indefinite postponement.  We anticipae 
elections in Serbia in January followed shotly thereafter by 
a declaration of independence by Kosovo.  The EU and many 
member-states are likely to recognize an independent Kosovo, 
though a number of EU members, including Greece, have shown 
hesitation. 
 
ENERGY ISSUES 
------------- 
 
¶5. (SBU) Greece is seeking to play a prominent new role as an 
energy pipeline hub to western Europe.  We see the most 
significant development as the Turkey-Greece-Italy 
Interconnecter (TGI), which could be the first pipeline to 
carry Caspian gas to Europe without going through Russia or 
through Russian-controlled pipelines.  It is an important 
step in realizing our Southern Corridor strategy of 
increasing energy diversity and security, and we have 
actively encouraged Greece to contract for gas from 
Azerbaijan.  Greece has found itself in the cross hairs of an 
intense effort by Russian Gazprom to reach a long-term 
contract with the GOG for Russian natural gas, effectively 
blocking out Azeri gas from the pipeline.  Although Greece 
relies on natural gas for less than 5 percent of its energy 
needs (but plans to expand this amount significantly under EU 
greenhouse gas guidelines), 80 percent comes from Gazprom, 
making Greece reliant on continued Russian goodwill in the 
short-medium term. 
 
¶6. (SBU) Meanwhile, Greece, Bulgaria, and Russia have agreed 
to support the Burgas-Alexandroupolis Bosporus Oil Bypass 
Pipeline (BAP) and share ownership.  We support this 
initiative insofar as it is commercially feasible.  The 
Embassy and Washington agencies have been actively promoting 
with Greece the need for increased European energy security 
and diversification.  It will be useful for you to reinforce 
U.S. appreciation for Greece,s courage in standing up to 
Russian pressure on gas issues and to build contacts with 
Central Asian suppliers. 
 
VISA WAIVER PROGRAM 
------------------- 
 
¶7. (SBU) Greece is the only one of the original EU 15 not 
participating in the U.S. Visa Waiver Program (VWP).  The 
Attorney General approved Greece for inclusion in the VWP in 
1999, subject to Greece's completing reforms of its passport 
security and accountability procedures.  But Greece failed to 
meet the deadline, and no new countries have been admitted 
since 9/11.  Greece has since introduced a new biometric 
passport that meets all ICAO standards and recalled all those 
previously issued.  On August 31, 2007, Secretary Rice sent a 
letter to DHS Secretary Chertoff officially nominating Greece 
for the program.  A DHS-led team of technical experts visited 
Greece in November to assess eligibility.  The team is now 
preparing its formal report, and we expect the findings to be 
positive.  A final decision is likely during 200`n in the VWP would boost e. 
The program wouldavel to Greek 
citize.ports and thfer on issues 
such as Aegean air/seaspace demarcation and Greece often 
complains of alleged Turkish air incursions in the Aegean, 
rapprochement remains a leitmotif of their bilateral 
relations.  Against the sway of public opinion, the GOG 
remains supportive of Turkey's EU accession hopes and 
understands that a Turkey in the EU is in Greece's long-term 
strategic interest.  The Cyprus issue, however, is the 
sticking point.  The issue has been stymied since the Greek 
Cypriots rejected the Annan plan to reunify the island in a 
2004 referendum (Turkish-Cypriots accepted the Plan).  While 
Athens quietly backed the Annan Plan, the Greek Government 
also believed it should stand by the Government of Cyprus and 
the vote of the Greek Cypriots.  There has been little 
progress to date on the issue and discussions remain stalled. 
SPECKHARD