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UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 ADDIS ABABA 000086 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PGOV PREL PBTS ET
SUBJECT: UTDS -- A TIGREAN OPPOSITION EMERGES 
 
SUMMARY 
------- 
 
¶1. (SBU) Sixteen years after coming to power as part of the 
Tigrean People's Liberation Front (TPLF), six years after 
being ejected from the party, and two years after seeking 
formal registration, the Union of Tigreans for Democracy and 
Sovereignty (UTDS) emerged in November as Ethiopia's first 
recognized Tigrean opposition party.  While the party has 
only limited formal support, mostly among Tigrean youth, and 
does not intend to participate in the coming local elections 
in April, the emergence of an opposition from the ruling 
TPLF's core base and composed of former TPLF Central 
Committee members poses a credible challenge that could 
potentially threaten the governing regime.  Although UTDS 
leaders talk a good game about representational democracy and 
strong national institutions, their ability to gain broader, 
and overt, support from within Tigray and from other regions 
will be the best indicator of their appeal as Ethiopia moves 
toward national elections in 2010.  UTDS Chairman -- and 
former regional president of Tigray -- Ato Gebru Asrat and 
UTDS Executive Committee member -- and former Ethiopian 
Ambassador to Eritrea -- Ato Awalom Weldu introduced their 
new party to Ambassador and PolOffs on December 28.  End 
Summary. 
 
UTDS'S STRUCTURE, PLATFORM, AND SUPPORT 
--------------------------------------- 
 
¶2. (U) Ato Gebru and Ato Awalom claim that they initially 
split from the TPLF during the Ethiopia-Eritrea war because 
of their different perspectives toward Eritrea, including 
their perception that the Ethiopian Government (GoE) made 
mistakes which led to the war and its poor planning and 
implementation of the war.  Still, they argue that their 
differences today reach far beyond those lines.  Democracy, 
the UTDS argues, is "not on the right track" in Ethiopia 
today; civil society and the media remain severely impeded 
while institutions of governance, including the judiciary and 
National Elections Board (NEB), are not independent from the 
government or party.  They noted the lack of any 
differentiation between the state, government, and ruling 
party in Ethiopia under the EPRDF's reign.  The UTDS officers 
complained that the EPRDF maintained a heavy hand in all 
sectors of society and the economy throughout Ethiopia and 
particularly objected to the "endowment" funds, or 
party-statals, contributing benefits only to the EPRDF and 
not to the public.  The plank that most set the UTDS's 
platform apart from those of other opposition groups in 
Ethiopia, however, was their position that Ethiopia should 
regain sovereign territorial access to the sea.  UTDS claims 
that gaining seats in Parliament is not its objective in the 
immediate term, but rather that it aims to increase public 
awareness of an alternative view to TPLF/EPRDF rule. 
 
¶3. (SBU) The UTDS officers do not claim widespread public 
support.  Upon registering, UTDS was only able to present 
1,200 signatures of supporters, who were mostly youth and 
only few of whom were former TPLF members.  Still, its 
officials are emphatic that Tigray is ready for an opposition 
party, particularly in urban areas.  Organizationally, UTDS 
has a Central Committee composed of 13 individuals, but only 
three of these are former TPLF officials.  The officials 
argued that the focus on "new blood" will help counter other 
opposition groups' concerns about the UTDS as solely a 
disgruntled cadre of unreformed former TPLF officials who 
would govern how the TPLF has.  While the officials 
acknowledged still being acquaintances with some military and 
TPLF officials, they do not claim their support.  They do, 
however, claim that they have been approached by some Tigrean 
civil servants expressing support, but asking to be 
"clandestine" members of UTDS for fear of losing their jobs 
if they are officially associated with UTDS. 
 
OPERATIONAL CHALLENGES 
---------------------- 
 
¶4. (SBU) The officials reported that while they recognize the 
value of establishing an opposition party with country-wide 
support, their attempted outreach to other ethnic groups and 
parties before the 2005 elections failed as partners became 
either incarcerated or focused on their own survival. 
Ultimately, the UTDS chose to register solely as a Tigrean 
party to focus on its core constituency while prospects for 
 
ADDIS ABAB 00000086  002 OF 002 
 
 
broader partnership looked poor.  Despite UTDS efforts to 
register, it consistently encountered bureaucratic 
impediments from the NEB.  While the UTDS sought, in its 
view, to present key elements of its platform in its official 
registration documents, the NEB refused to consider the 
application that presented what it saw as criticism of the 
government (GoE).  According to the UTDS, NEB objections to 
the inclusion of platform elements that called for reforming 
GoE deficiencies -- such as the lack of voting independence 
of EPRDF MPs, the lack of NEB independence, the absence of 
recognized rights of nations and nationalities in practice, 
and objections to the distribution of government resources to 
the regions by the House of Federation -- allowed the NEB to 
prolong delays in UTDS' registration. 
 
¶5. (SBU) Due to its late registration, UTDS has decided to 
refrain from participating in the coming April local 
elections.  Instead, its officials argue that the party will 
focus initially on its internal organization form its sole 
office in Mekele with an eye toward holding a General 
Assembly to strategize on its future.  The officials argue 
that they will not repeat the error of the TPLF in seeking to 
create for themselves partner parties allied with other 
ethnic groups that are not genuinely representative of the 
will of the people they claim to represent.  Instead, the 
UTDS will focus on outreach to existent opposition parties 
from other regions.  The officials acknowledge that they will 
likely face significant scrutiny from other opposition 
parties who perceive them as just an off-shoot of unreformed 
TPLF members, but argue that the strong role of "new blood" 
in the party combined with sincere outreach will overcome 
this challenge. 
 
COMMENT 
------- 
 
¶6. (SBU) While the UTDS -- as evidenced by its two 
soft-spoken, middle aged, former party leaders -- does not 
present itself as a robust or dynamic party of new ideas, its 
leadership team of ex-TPLF Central Committee members and 
freedom fighters certainly poses a strong threat to the 
ruling TPLF-based coalition and represents a potentially 
attractive alternative option to Tigreans who have grown 
disenchanted with TPLF.  Its leaders were striking in their 
humility and sober assessments of their own levels of support 
and acknowledgment of other opposition parties' likely 
skepticism on partnership possibilities.  UTDS's desire for 
sovereign territorial access to the sea, further poses a 
potential hurdle which potential partner opposition parties 
(who seek international community support) are unlikely to 
embrace.  Ultimately, in light of UTDS's audacity in 
establishing a Tigrean opposition and avoidance of the coming 
local elections in favor of coalescing into a vocal alternate 
voice, the GoE's reaction toward UTDS will ultimately prove 
yet another strong indicator of the government's willingness 
to tolerate a vocal opposition. 
 
 
YAMAMOTO