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DE RUCNDT #1183/01 3522250
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O 182250Z DEC 07
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UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 USUN NEW YORK 001183 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
SENSITIVE 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PREL KUNR UNSC IN JA BR
SUBJECT: UNSC REFORM: LITTLE CHANGE IN SUBSTANCE BUT SOME 
MOVEMENT ON PROCESS 
 
REF: A. USUN 1142 
     ¶B. USUN 1032 
 
¶1. (SBU) Summary.  During a meeting of the Open-Ended Working 
Group (OEWG) on UNSC expansion on December 14, President of 
the General Assembly (PGA) Srgjan Kerim announced that he had 
created a three-PermRep "task force" to help him advance the 
upcoming inter-governmental negotiations on Council reform. 
But he emphasized that it would be up to member states to 
identify the "elements" and put forward a document that could 
serve as a basis for these negotiations.  While G-4 (Japan, 
India, Brazil, and Germany) and Uniting for Consensus (UFC -- 
led by Pakistan, Italy, and Egypt) delegations largely agreed 
on the categories of negotiables, they disagreed sharply 
about how these negotiations should proceed, with the G-4 
arguing that the OEWG has outlived its usefulness and UFC 
insisting that all negotiations must take place within the 
working group.  Amb Wolff underscored that delegations cannot 
disregard Kerim's principle that UNSC reform must go 
hand-in-hand with reform of the broader UN and joined China 
and Russia in reinforcing the importance of inclusive 
negotiations through the OEWG.  G-4 delegations, led by 
Germany, nevertheless forged ahead with a timeline that 
envisions inter-governmental negotiations beginning in 
February 2008.  The Germans convened on December 12 a meeting 
of an over-arching group, to which they did not/not invite 
USUN, to develop proposals on the six categories of elements 
to present to Kerim as a basis for negotiations.  End Summary. 
 
PGA Outlines General Process 
---------------------------- 
 
¶2. (U) As previewed in ref A, PGA Kerim announced that 
Bangladesh PR Ismat Jahan, Chilean PR Heraldo Munoz, and 
Portugese PR Joao Salgueiro had agreed to serve as 
Vice-Chairman of the OEWG, and that together with Kerim they 
would comprise a "task force" on UNSC reform.  The role of 
the task force would be to serve as focal points for 
communication with member states, in particular to identify 
"elements" for the inter-governmental negotiations on UNSC 
reform.  But Kerim emphasized that "it will be up to member 
states to identify and put forward a document to the task 
force that could serve as a basis for inter-governmental 
negotiations."  He expressed the intention to convene 
"focused meetings" in February, April, and June on UNSC 
reform, but said this timetable would be conditional on the 
progress achieved.  Kerim also reiterated that his "seven 
pillars" for UNSC reform (contained in ref B) should guide 
the process going forward.  In his concluding remarks, Kerim 
emphasized that member states proposing a textual basis for 
negotiations was not a substitute for the OEWG.  Rather, the 
working group would continue to exist until 
inter-governmental negotiations actually begin. 
 
Broad Agreement on Categories of "Negotiables" 
--------------------------------------------- - 
 
¶3. (U) Although G-4 and UFC countries repeated the same 
substantive positions on UNSC reform they expressed during 
the November 2007 plenary debate (ref B), they largely agreed 
on the list of categories of elements that should serve as a 
basis for inter-governmental negotiations called for in the 
UNGA resolution on UNSC reform adopted in September 2007. 
Drawing from the 2007 reports of the two facilitators, most 
delegations agreed the negotiations should cover the 
following areas:  the size of an enlarged Council, categories 
of membership (permanent vs. non-permanent), method of 
electing new members, the question of the veto (for both 
existing permanent members and new members), UNSC working 
methods, and a review mechanism.  Pakistan and Spain added 
the question of regional representation to the list, but 
India objected to this category on the grounds that neither 
Spain nor Italy had convinced EU leaders to embrace regional 
representation on the UNSC at the recent EU summit in Lisbon, 
so the idea would not work at the UN.  In his concluding 
remarks, Kerim noted that there appeared to be "considerable 
support for an intermediary approach" to UNSC reform, but he 
did not endorse any particular list of negotiable elements. 
 
¶4. (U) Within the P-5, while the U.S., China, and Russia 
 
USUN NEW Y 00001183  002 OF 003 
 
 
avoided comment on the set of negotiable elements, the UK and 
France appeared to endorse them.  Amb Wolff noted that while 
the U.S. has no specific proposal for Council expansion, it 
looked forward to reviewing new "realistic and reasonable" 
proposals for "modest expansion" of the Council.  But he 
emphasized that modest expansion of the Council is not a goal 
in itself, and in this regard, reminded delegations that they 
could not simply pay "lip service" to Kerim's first "pillar" 
that UNSC reform must go hand in hand with transformation of 
the wider UN system.  Amb Wolff urged Kerim to help establish 
mechanisms in parallel with the OEWG process to ensure broad 
UN reform, including in areas such as UN decision-making and 
financing.  China did not endorse the list of categories but 
did say UNSC reform should result in greater representation 
for developing countries, especially in Africa, and protect 
the interests of small countries.  Russia also did not 
comment on the list of negotiables, but said it was prepared 
to examine proposals based on "realism," warning against 
"excessive" expansion of the Council.  Most African 
delegations also endorsed the categories of negotiables 
outlined by the UFC and G-4. 
 
But Sharp Disagreement on Process 
--------------------------------- 
 
¶5. (U) Although they largely agreed on the categories of 
negotiables, G-4 and UFC delegations disagreed sharply about 
where and how these negotiations should take place.  G-4 
delegations, led by India and Germany, bemoaned the "lack of 
progress" within the OEWG over the past 14 years and argued 
that inter-governmental negotiations could not/not take place 
within the working group because of its reliance on consensus 
decision-making.  UFC delegations, led by Pakistan and Italy, 
insisted that the OEWG must remain the forum in which to 
begin inter-governmental negotiations, in order to ensure the 
transparency and inclusiveness of the process.  The rival 
camps also disagreed about the utility of the over-arching 
group meeting called by Germany (see para 7).  While Brazil 
and India endorsed the meeting called by Germany, Pakistan 
expressed "great concern" about "any exclusive, unilateral, 
or self-generated group" that seeks to "determine a course of 
action or make proposals on behalf of the rest of the 
membership."  Italy, acknowledging it had been invited to 
attend the German meeting but declined, implied that such 
meetings replicate the work of the OEWG and are redundant. 
 
¶6. (U) While the U.S., China, and Russia explicitly 
reaffirmed the role of the OEWG and by implication the need 
for the "broadest possible agreement" or even "consensus" on 
UNSC reform, the UK and France ducked the issue entirely. 
Amb Wolff argued the OEWG represents the "appropriate forum" 
in which to undertake inter-governmental negotiations and the 
best guarantee that the process will remain inclusive.  China 
said it was open to ideas like the PGA's task force, but the 
process should be "open, transparent, and ensure equal 
participation for all."  In this regard, it noted that the 
task force and any over-arching group convened to advise it 
would present only "informal advice" to be considered by the 
OEWG.  Russia underscored the need for "very broad" support 
for UNSC reform that goes beyond the two-thirds required for 
an amendment to the Charter.  Most African delegations 
refrained from comment on the utility of the OEWG, although 
Egypt argued that the working group constitutes the "only 
forum in which to discuss UNSC reform." 
 
G-4 Pushes Ahead (Maybe Without U.S.) 
------------------------------------- 
 
¶7. (SBU) Despite lack of agreement on the process moving 
forward on UNSC reform, Germany led G-4 delegations in 
outlining an ambitious timeline to begin inter-governmental 
negotiations.  The German PR announced that he had convened 
on December 12 a meeting of an over-arching group, "open to 
all" but about which only some were informed in advance, to 
begin drafting options for the six categories of negotiable 
elements.  Although USUN was not/not invited to the German 
meeting, we learned that of the roughly 25 delegations 
present, most were either G-4 members or their supporters. 
Representatives of the S-5 group on working methods were 
invited, as were France and the UK from the P-5.  Italy was 
 
USUN NEW Y 00001183  003 OF 003 
 
 
the only major UFC country invited, but it declined to 
attend.  According to participants at the meeting, the 
Germans asked six different countries to volunteer to draft 
six separate papers with options on the negotiable elements 
by early January.  If not enough volunteers come forward, the 
Germans would draft the papers themselves, with a view to 
presenting the PGA with a basis on which to begin 
inter-governmental negotiations in February.  The Japanese PR 
said during the OEWG meeting that he supported this timeframe. 
Khalilzad