VZCZCXYZ0001
OO RUEHWEB

DE RUEHTC #2069/01 3511454
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
O 171454Z DEC 07
FM AMEMBASSY THE HAGUE
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0831
INFO RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON PRIORITY 1742
RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW PRIORITY 1767
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC PRIORITY
RUCPDOC/DEPT OF COMMERCE WASHDC PRIORITY
RHEBAAA/DEPT OF ENERGY WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC PRIORITY
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHDC PRIORITY

UNCLAS THE HAGUE 002069 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR ISN/CB, VCI/CCA, L/NPV, IO/MPR, 
SECDEF FOR OSD/GSA/CN,CP> 
JOINT STAFF FOR DD PMA-A FOR WTC 
COMMERCE FOR BIS (ROBERTS) 
NSC FOR SMITH 
WINPAC FOR WALTER 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PARM PREL RS UK CWC
SUBJECT: CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION (CWC): WRAP UP FOR THE 
WEEK ENDING DECEMBER 14, 2007 
 
REF: A) E-MAIL MIKULAK-CWC DEL 11 DEC 2007 
 
This is CWC-93-07. 
 
-------------- 
WEOG MEETING 
-------------- 
 
¶1. (SBU) The Western European and Others Group (WEOG) met on 
December 12 to discuss preparations for the Review Conference 
(RevCon).  The coordinator, Annie Mari (France), also 
proposed at the request of the Netherlands to hold an 
expanded WEOG meeting either January 22 or 20 to discuss 
voluntary contributions.  Several delegations asked for 
additional detail on who would be invited and what might be 
included in the agenda.  The coordinator suggested inviting 
EU members not in the WEOG, Japan and South Korea, and that 
depending on the timing, the agenda might well include topics 
like the RevCon chair.   A Dutch delegate noted that her 
government would like to share views on resource management, 
experience with OPCW projects, preferences of other donors to 
fund certain projects, and donor coordination in general. 
WEOG delegations seemed amenable to the idea but no date was 
set for the meeting. 
 
-------------------------- 
REVCON WORKING GROUP 
-------------------------- 
 
¶2. (U)  On December 12, UK Ambassador Lyn Parker chaired a 
meeting of the Working Group on Preparations for the Second 
Review Conference to continue discussing the recently 
distributed &Note by the Technical Secretariat: Review of 
the Operation of the Chemical Weapons Convention since the 
First Review Conference8 (WGRC-2/S/1).  Amb. Parker tried to 
organize the discussions into three large groupings of topics 
from the Note, but many delegations ignored this and gave 
their comments in single prepared statements.  U.S. Del made 
points from guidance (ref a) during discussion of two of the 
three groupings.  Nearly all who intervened said that these 
were their initial reactions only, given the recent release 
of the Note, and that further comments were likely to be 
submitted.  Amb. Parker reminded delegations that they should 
submit written comments by January 3, if possible, to ease 
further discussions and report drafting. 
 
¶3. (U) Early in the meeting, the Cuban ambassador made a 
comprehensive statement on behalf of the Non-Aligned Movement 
(NAM) States Parties (SPs) and China.  Some of the highlights 
and surprises were: 
-     The purpose of the RevCon is to solely review current 
functioning of the OPCW, not to look more broadly, and should 
focus on destruction. 
-     The current destruction pace is of concern, along with 
discussing old and abandoned chemical weapons (CW). 
-     It is too early to discuss the eventual shift in focus 
from destruction to nonproliferation, as the CWC itself is 
not a nonproliferation instrument. 
-     Verification efforts need to take into account the 
&hierarchy of risk8 and that a shift from this would be 
viewed as a significant change in CWC implementation. 
-     Industrial sites in developing SPs do not necessarily 
pose more of a risk to the object and purpose of the CWC. 
-     Open source information has no status in verification. 
-     Challenge inspections are seen as a last resort and, by 
the language of the CWC, must be preceded by consultation, 
etc.  Unresolved issues surrounding challenge inspection 
preparation need to be resolved. 
-     There is a need to review and make recommendations 
regarding &non-lethals8, to include riot control agents and 
incapacitants &already in use.8 
-     There needs to be a &convincing justification8 made 
regarding the general purpose criterion and its relevance, 
keeping a particular eye toward not hampering Articles VI and 
XI. 
-     Anti-terrorism efforts within the OPCW can be best 
 
achieved by full implementation of the CWC. 
 
¶4. (U) Several delegations (South Africa, China, Algeria, 
India) associated themselves with the NAM statement, giving 
particular emphasis to some points.  In an unusual move, the 
Iranian ambassador attended the meeting and made a painfully 
long intervention that repeated many items (usually 
word-for-word) from the NAM statement.  Iran went on to: 
highlight a review of CW destruction (stating that any 
failure to meet deadlines is non-compliance); refer to the 
Anniston visit and the DG,s observations from that visit; 
note that all of the OPCW,s interactions with the UN and 
other international organizations on terrorism must be 
brought to the Executive Council; indicate that the Industry 
and Protection Forum was a one-time event and not meant to 
have a life of its own; point to the lack of readiness under 
Article X (mentioning CW victims); and mention free-trade and 
regulatory considerations. 
 
¶5. (U) Japan made a lengthy intervention that highlighted a 
number of elements from the Note - general purpose criteria, 
national implementation and capacity-building, site safety 
and terrorism, importance of the Scientific Advisory Board 
and its temporary working groups, increased OCPF inspections. 
 On sampling and analysis (S&A), Japan made two points: (1) 
at Schedule 2 sites, there should be a two-tier approach for 
selection, in which S&A might be added as a last resort to 
address specific issues or to build necessary confidence, but 
not based blindly on certain site characteristics; and (2) at 
Schedule 3 and OCPF sites, consideration of S&A should be 
based on a cost/benefit analysis.  Japan also pointed out 
that transfers of Schedule 3 chemicals to States not Party 
should be left to the jurisdiction of SPs, the use of 
challenge inspections was something that was expected by 
those who gave the OPCW its responsibility, and the structure 
of the TS needs to continue to shift as it changes its 
emphasis from destruction to non-proliferation. 
 
¶6. (U) The UK made comments on a number of topics, including: 
the need to keep CW expertise within the Technical 
Secretariat (TS) after 2012 to deal with old chemical 
 
SIPDIS 
weapons, non-compliance, etc.; CW destruction, including 
conversion, as the sole responsibility of the possessor; a 
nod to the EC-51 decision on timely declarations; 
harmonization of low concentration limits and AND 
declarations; possibility of making the current voluntary 
notification of Schedule 2/3 sites ceasing of operations 
mandatory; no strict hierarchy of risk (e.g., Schedule 3 
sites producing large quantities using inflexible designs v. 
OCPFs with great flexibility); UK National Authority and 
industry support for continued S&A; continued Article VII 
efforts, including work with industry (e.g., Responsible 
Care); additional SAB meetings funded by the regular budget. 
 
¶7. (U) Canadian delegate requested that delegations, 
statements in this discussion be made available in writing. 
TS representative and other delegates specifically requested 
 
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copies of the U.S. points; del reps said we would be 
submitting a written paper soon. 
 
¶8. (U) The schedule for the meetings of the Working Group in 
2008, which will become more frequent, was also distributed 
(all meetings 10:30 ) 12:30): 
 
-     Thursday, January 17 
-     Thursday, January 24 
-     Monday, January 28 
-     February 4-5: S&A TWG meeting (tentative) 
-     February 6-7: Science and Technology TWG meeting 
(tentative) 
-     Friday, February 8 
-     February 11-13: Eleventh Session of the SAB 
-     Friday, February 15 
-     Thursday, February 21 
-     Thursday, February 28 
-     March 3: Destruction informals 
 
-     March 4-7: EC-52 
-     Thursday, March 13 
-     Wednesday, March 19 
-     Thursday, March 27 
-     Thursday, April 3 
-     April 7-18: Second RevCon 
 
------------------------------------- 
RUSSIAN CW DESTRUCTION DONORS MEETING 
------------------------------------- 
 
¶9. (SBU) The UK delegation called a relatively short-notice 
meeting for the afternoon of December 13 at their embassy. 
They made it very clear that the choice of venue was 
intentional because of the sensitivity of what they wanted to 
discuss.  Having said that, the information is not 
classified, and it is likely to become widely known 
eventually.  But, at the moment, they are asking that we keep 
this information very close-hold.  The others in attendance 
are those other States Parties that are part of the global 
partnership (i.e., donors) in support of Russian CW 
destruction - U.S., the Netherlands, Italy, Sweden, Germany, 
Canada, Czech Republic, Finland, Norway, New Zealand, Belgium. 
 
¶10. (SBU) James Harrison (UK MOD) led the discussion.  The 
main topic was Kizner.  He announced at this meeting the 
UK,s intention to NOT move forward with their efforts at 
Kizner.  He first explained the reasons they originally 
intended to support Kizner (e.g., the stockpile and 
destruction process is almost identical to that at Shchuch'e, 
hoping to apply lessons learned to ease moving forward, and 
welcoming the chance to again work successfully with Canada) 
and a brief history of the project since its announcement in 
summer 2006.  The reality, however, has been that their 
former work at Shchuch'e offered no real benefit to getting 
the Kizner effort off the ground.  It has proven difficult to 
work with the Russians to get the contracts/sub-contracts in 
place, as they have shown a desire to play a larger (i.e., 
equal) role in the process - insisting on trilateral 
agreements, breaking single contracts into multiple ones, 
moving from commercial contracts to state contracts, Russian 
final approval on all sub-contractors, etc.  The Russians 
also insisted on bilateral agreements with the UK, rather 
than agreements with a broader group of countries.  The 
Russians also insisted on firm timelines in the agreements; 
for example, they insisted that all equipment be delivered by 
the end of 2008, although there were some indications that 
this date could have slipped to March 2009.  Regardless, the 
UK would not make this commitment, particularly as the 
Russians have still not agreed to meet to discuss 
technical-level details of the equipment but rather have 
provided only a list of items. 
 
¶11. (SBU) Some recent developments with Kizner: 
-     Meetings were held in Moscow in October with Kholstav 
and his staff to try to move things along, but progress is 
still slow. 
-     An October 22 letter to Kholstav offered several dates 
for follow-up meetings.  Russia has not responded.  The UK 
was not informed that Kholstav would be here for the CSP and, 
as such, could not make arrangements to meet with him in The 
Hague. 
-     The UK feared that negotiations would continue on 
indefinitely, giving Russia even more control of the process. 
-     The UK acknowledges now that the Russians can do this 
work themselves much more quickly. 
-     The Russian feasibility study for Kizner was only 
recently approved. 
 
¶12. (SBU) All of this has led the UK to conclude that Russia 
would rather go ahead without the UK.  The UK informed their 
ministers of the internal deadline they had set to decide to 
end this effort, following about seven weeks of no-response 
from Russia.  This conclusion that Russia would rather 
proceed without the UK was to be reflected in a letter to 
Kholstav by the end of the week (December 14).   In addition, 
 
Amb. Parker (UK) planned to send a brief letter to the 
Russian ambassador in The Hague to inform him of this action, 
forward to him a copy of the Kholstav letter, and to express 
his regret - nothing more. 
 
¶13. (SBU) Harrison state that, in reality, this situation 
might have been predicted given how increasingly difficult 
work at Shchuch'e has become over the past 18 months.  All 
real progress during this time has been via direct letters to 
Kholstav.  Work in this arena has just become more difficult 
in Russia, in direct contrast to the UK's relatively smooth 
work with Russia on nuclear issues.  Harrison was quick to 
say that they feel these problems are "self-contained" and 
not related to any other strains in UK/Russia relations. 
 
¶14. (SBU) In response to questions from the other 
delegations, Harrison reviewed the fact that Kizner is not a 
part of the work needed by Russia to meet its 45-percent 
deadline.  Also, even with UK assistance, there are still 
serious doubts about achieving completion of destruction at 
Kizner by 2012, the August 2007 site approval being a 
significant indicator of this concern.  Harrison also made it 
clear that they see this week's letter to Kholstav as the end 
to this project and to their involvement at Kizner. 
 
¶15. (SBU) Harrison went on to give a brief report of the 
ongoing effort at Shchuch'e.  Difficulties similar to those 
at Kizner have started to creep into the workings at 
Shchuch'e, especially Russian insistence on more involvement 
in contracting.  Some of these difficulties go against 
previously agreed procedures and are causing significant 
delays.  Recently, FAI has questioned the UK's ability to 
make relatively minor changes to their prime contract without 
Russian approval.  If this position persists, the UK would 
not be able to move forward with its contract, and the work 
would have to cease.  If that were to occur, funds would be 
returned to donors.  The UK has proposed a meeting with 
Kholstav the week of December 17 for what the UK sees as a 
last chance to work this out.  Although he has not yet agreed 
to the timing of such a meeting, Kholstav has made a call for 
four-way meetings instead (to include the U.S. and Canada), 
something that has not been done for a couple of years now. 
 
¶16. (U) At the close of the meeting, the group confirmed that 
the next donors meeting will be held on March 3 at 10:30, on 
the margins of the EC meeting. 
 
---------------- 
ISN/EX VISIT 
---------------- 
¶17. (U)  Peggy Neerman and Rosetta Goode (ISN/EX) visited the 
delegation December 12-13 to discuss budget and management 
issues.  They met with the Financial Management staff and the 
Management Counselor at the Embassy, and with the 
Ambassador,s staff at the residence, as well as with del 
staff. 
 
¶18. (U) Beik sends. 
 
 
Schofer