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Viewing cable 07THEHAGUE2034, CWDEL IDEAS FOR THE SECOND REVIEW CONFERENCE -

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
07THEHAGUE2034 2007-12-05 15:03 2011-08-26 00:00 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Embassy The Hague
VZCZCXYZ0012
OO RUEHWEB

DE RUEHTC #2034/01 3391503
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
O 051503Z DEC 07 ZDK
FM AMEMBASSY THE HAGUE
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0778
INFO RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC PRIORITY
RUCPDOC/DEPT OF COMMERCE WASHDC PRIORITY
RHEBAAA/DEPT OF ENERGY WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC PRIORITY
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHDC PRIORITY
UNCLAS THE HAGUE 002034 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR ISN/CB, VCI/CCA, L/NPV, IO/MPR, 
SECDEF FOR OSD/GSA/CN,CP> 
JOINT STAFF FOR DD PMA-A FOR WTC 
COMMERCE FOR BIS (ROBERTS) 
NSC FOR SMITH 
WINPAC FOR WALTER 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PARM PREL CWC
SUBJECT: CWDEL IDEAS FOR THE SECOND REVIEW CONFERENCE - 
ISSUES AND STRATEGY 
 
This is CWC-91-07. 
SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED 
 
------- 
SUMMARY 
------- 
 
1. (U)  Now that the Conference of States 
Parties and the final Executive Council 
session have ended, OPCW delegations and the 
Technical Secretariat turn their attention 
more fully to the upcoming Review 
Conference.  The Director General,s ¬e8 
and lengthy TS annex have just been issued)a copy has been scanned to ISN/CB for 
distribution) and are on the OPCW external 
server.  Open Ended Working Group Chairman 
Parker has planned two meetings in December 
(4 and 12) to discuss the DG,s paper, to be 
followed in January by weekly sessions of 
the OEWG.  He has projected drafting the 
RevCon report by the end of February. 
France will host the next P-5 meeting 
January 15 to discuss the RevCon.  Del will 
need broad as well as specific guidance on 
priorities for the U.S. among th% iany 
agenda items for the RevCon. 
 
2. (SBU)  Ambassador Javits chaired a 
brainstorming session with the delegation 
following the CSP.  Below are our thoughts 
on both issues and pvncess, substance and 
strategy, to contribute to the thinking in 
Washington.  We would welcome an early 
response to these ideas, as well as more 
detailed guidance on key U.S. objectives as 
the RevCon preparations move forward. 
 
3. (SBU)  We should push very hard to clear 
away the EC &debris8 ) in particular, the 
thorny issues that are repeatedly deferred - 
before the RevCon so that they will not 
interfere with a serious look at the 
organization and its future.  Such 
longstanding issues as the Maradykovsky 
facility agreements and the Russian hold on 
the U.S. agreements, should be resolved in 
EC-52 so that their political overtones do 
not color the RevCon.  Del will work with 
WEOG and the expanded WEOG countries to 
cement traditional alliances and develop 
strategies on specific issues for the 
RevCon.  We will need very broad cooperation 
on issues of importance to us, and Del will 
reach beyond WEOG to find new like-minded 
allies on priority U.S. issues. 
 
4. (SBU) In general, del advocates a 
proactive approach to the RevCon.  Recent 
CSP and EC sessions have shown an increasing 
trend of the WEOG and other like-minded 
states defending against various NAM 
proposals while fighting to achieve even 
average progress on many issues due to the 
linkage (appropriate or not) between various 
articles of the Convention.  The question 
for the Review Conference is whether we want 
only to &do no harm8 or whether we want to 
pursue new initiatives for the future.  A 
clear U.S. strategy, including  critical 
priority objectives vs. those that would be 
nice to have, and even initiatives that 
could be traded off in the end game, could 
put the U.S. and others in a much stronger 
position going in to the drafting and 
negotiating process scheduled to begin early 
next year. 
 
--------------- 
INDUSTRY ISSUES 
--------------- 
 
5.  (SBU)  OCPF site selection: The First 
RevCon emphasized the importance of OCPF 
inspections, while noting the problems with 
the current methodology used by the TS for 
selection of sites for inspection.  Most 
delegations would acknowledge that the DG,s 
recent move to modify the selection 
methodology will go a long way toward 
resolving the perceived unfairness by 
allowing more OCPF inspections to go to 
States Parties with larger numbers of 
declared OCPF sites.  The NAM has asked that 
consultations be resumed as soon as possible 
on this matter.  It should be noted that 
this was done at the request of China, who 
is understandably concerned with the large 
increase in inspection numbers they can 
expect starting in 2008.  Even though many 
delegations refer to the DG,s recent efforts 
as an &interim solution,8 we should push for 
the consultation to (1) primarily focus on 
the remaining unapplied mechanism from VA 
Part IX (i.e., &Proposals by States 
Parties...8), and (2) agree to withhold 
judgment on the efficacy of the DG,s revised 
methodology for at least a year, at which 
time we may have sufficient experience and 
data in hand to know whether this needs to 
be revisited. 
 
6. (SBU) &Improved8 OCPF declarations: In 
parallel with the site selection discussion, 
the TS is preparing a paper (at the request 
of delegations) on ways that the current 
OCPF declaration process might be improved 
to provide more relevant 
&information...available to the Technical 
Secretariat...8  We have been careful to 
 
SIPDIS 
point out to the TS and other interested 
delegations that discussions on this topic 
need to be done within the parameters of 
existing declaration formats and procedures, 
so as to reduce the difficulty of States 
Parties in implementing them.  If done 
correctly, the DG could implement things 
like improved product group codes through 
relatively simple modifications to the 
Declarations Handbook, under his own 
authority.  This would also prevent 
unnecessarily stirring up some delegations 
(e.g., India) who clearly believe in the 
&hierarchy of riso8 and that OCPF sites are 
intended to declare less information than 
sites with Scheduled chemicals.  It could 
also be presented to delegations as an 
improvement in the tools available to their 
industry in making their declarations, 
overcoming some of the current frustration 
that industry often expresses with the 
current product group codes that do not fit 
their industry well.  The Del would 
encourage Washington to make the outcome of 
its current deliberations on this matter 
available to the TS as soon as possible in 
order for them to be given adequate 
consideration in the TS paper that is 
expected to be published in about a month,s 
time. 
 
7. (SBU) Schedule 3 transfers to States not 
Party: The First RevCon discussed the need 
for States Parties to take the necessary 
measures to fully implement end-use 
certificates for the transfer of Schedule 3 
 
chemicals to States not Party.  In that 
light, the EC adopted a &do little8 decision 
on this matter (EC-47/DEC.8, datet 8 
November 2006).  Part of the EC-47 decision 
recommends txat the RevCon review the matter 
and &consider the need to establish other 
measures in this regard.8  We should be 
prepared for a significant battle on this 
matter at the RevCon.  Iran clearly sees the 
language of VA Part VIII paragraph 27 as a 
clear call to not only consider but 
&establish other measures regarding 
transfers of Schedule 3 chemicals to States 
not Party8 and that we are late in doing so, 
given the five years after EIF timeline laid 
out.  Iran points out time and again that 
some large percentage (80-90 percent) of the 
Schedule 3 transfers to States not Party 
each year go to a single country in their 
region.  If it is possible, we ought to 
prepare whatever statistics and positions we 
may need to combat this.  Although it may 
not be possible, for sensitivity reasons, to 
lay out the details of the extensive system 
the U.S. has in place to ensure that these 
types of transfers are for purposes 
consistent with the Convention, we may still 
be able to make some reasoned statements in 
this regard as a counter. 
 
8. (SBU) Sampling and analysis during 
Schedule 2 inspections: Given that the 
experiences of the recent Schedule 2 
inspection involving sampling and analysis 
is still fresh in our minds, the Del is 
encouraged that discussions will occur in 
Washington soon on what we have learned and 
what matters need to be addressed further 
with the TS.  The Del would encourage 
holding these discussions with the TS as 
s/oj as possible.  More generally, the TS 
has committed to prepare a report on their 
experiences during the 18-month &trial 
period.8  However, it is important to keep 
in mind that (1) the TS has started 
referring to the &trial period8 as a &start- 
up period8, (2) the 2008 budget calls for 
carrying out a similar number of Schedule 2 
inspections with sampling and analysis in 
2008, and (3) the TS will carry out two or 
three more such inspections in the first 
quarter of 2008 before their trial period is 
completed.  We run the real risk that the TS 
report on their experiences from the trial 
period will come out too late to be given 
any real attention during the RevCon.  The 
TS and some delegations (e.g., UK) would 
 
SIPDIS 
probably argue that this timing is really 
not important, as sampling and analysis is 
mandated during Schedule 2 inspections and 
need not be discussed during the RevCon. 
We, along with other delegations (e.g., 
Germany) might0disagree, albeit for 
different reasons.  The Del sees it as 
significantly important that we have a well- 
established, unified position on sampling 
and analysis and its role, value, etc. 
during Schedule 2 inspections.  Also, we 
should probably approach the TS about the 
timing of their report and our thoughts on 
its value at the RevCon.  To miss the 
opportunity to have a significant discussion 
on this matter at the RevCon would be a 
shame. 
 
9. (SBU) General progress on industry 
issues:  In general, progress on industry 
issues has been painfully slow.  The recent 
 
EC decision on timely declarations was the 
first Industry Cluster decision reached in a 
year, the last being that on Schedule 3 
transfers in November 2006.  In many ways, 
this can be attributed to the fact that 
certain smaller delegations (e.g., Iran) 
just do not have the ability or will to 
focus on any matter outside their pet areas 
of interest (see the discussion on National 
Implementation below).  When the RevCon 
looks at the list of industry topics 
recommended for work by the First RevCon and 
determines how little progress has been 
made, it will be an embarrassment.  Some 
delegations have argued in private that 
perhaps this means that the truly important 
issues have been dealt with and that we are 
now just cleaning up the few items that are 
left.  However, the Del believes that we can 
expect some strong discussion on a number of 
outstanding industry issues.  We know from 
national papers and statements already made 
that the UK, Australia and Canada are going 
to make a fuss about Schedule 
2A/2A(asterisk) concentration thresholds, 
and that in their view it is unconscionable 
that we have left this group of highly toxic 
chemicals potentially unregulated.  We 
should expect to be put on the spot 
(together with Germany and Japan) as the 
ones who prevented consensus on this matter 
and as the ones who are ultimately 
responsible for finding a solution.  We 
should consider whether we need to consult 
intently with Germany and Japan on this 
matter and whether we can propose any way 
forward.  Guidance with new approaches or 
some flexybility would be useful going into 
such negotiations. 
 
------------------ 
DECLARATION ISSUES 
------------------ 
 
10. (SBU) Timely Declarations: The First 
RevCon pointed to concerns over timely and 
accurate declarations.  We should make sure 
that the RevCon points tk the recent EC 
decision on this matter (EC-M- 
27/DEC/CRP.4/Rev.2, dated 26 November 2007) 
and mentions the importance of continued EC 
monitoring of the impact of the decision and 
whether further measures may need to be 
taken in the future.  This seems to be 
important, given that the decision taken was 
an EC stand-alone decision (rather than a 
recommendation to the CSP) and, as such, is 
more open-ended as to next steps. 
 
11. (SBU) Electronic Declarations: The First 
RevCon discussed the importance of effective 
handling of declarations and the role that 
electronic declarations can play therein. 
We should ask that the significant progress 
made to date be pointed out at the RevCon. 
We should also push for even greater 
electronib reporting by States Partier to 
the TS, emphasizing how these types of 
efforts can contribute positively to the 
work of the Organization and individual 
States Parties.  We know that the TS has 
focused on certain States @erties where the 
impact of them shifting to electronic 
declara4ions could be of greatest impact to 
the TS (e.g., China).  We also know that the 
TS has given this topic a lot of attention 
 
SIPDIS 
in annual meetijgs of National Authorities< 
regional meetings, etc., and that they are 
 
encouraging State Party-to-State Party 
cooperation to promote bilateral assistance 
and the sharing of software tools.  We might 
want to consider asking the TS to prepare a 
paper or other presentation to the OEWG 
laying out the costs and benefits of 
completing the necessary work to get the 
remaining significant (i.e., larger- 
declaring) States Parties on board with 
electronic declarations ) data entry 
savings, efficiency improvements in 
verification activities, etc.  We might also 
find it helpful to find a vehicle (e.g., a 
national paper) to share U.S. thoughts on 
the matter to be considered by the TS in 
these preparations. 
 
12. (SBU) Article VI ) transfer 
discrepancies: The First RevCon discussed 
the importance of clarifying declaration 
ambiguities.  A consultation on the topic of 
transfer discrepancies has been active for 
quite some time.  The consultation group 
made a recommendation early this year to the 
TS to end the practice of defining transfer 
 
SIPDIS 
dywcrepancies as a percent difference and 
begin defining these discrepancies in 
accordance with the relevant declaration 
thresholds.  This new practice seems to have 
had a very positive impact on this issue, 
allowing States Parties to better focus on 
transfer discrepancies of real concern. 
Also, with the recently adopted decision on 
timely declarations, it is hoped that the TS 
will begin to gather more information about 
missing transfer declarations that can be 
used in the reconciliation process. 
Although the U.S. has expressed its opinion 
that the current efforts of this 
consultation are moving in an acceptable 
direction, it appears unlikely that real 
progress will be achieved in the near 
future.  We may want to consider the option 
of reevaluating the need fr further 
consultations on this matter at some point 
in the future, given the possible reductions 
in transfer discrepancies.  This would allow 
the facilitators to end the consultation at 
the appropriate time in the future basud!on 
the overall improvements that have been 
achieved, rather than the lack of progress 
on the very complicated (and somewhat 
controversial) matters that remain. 
 
----------------------- 
NATIONAL IMPLEMENTATION 
----------------------- 
 
13. (SBU) Article VII - the way forward: 
Despite the significant efforts the U.S. has 
made in the area of Article VII, 
particularly in outreach efforts, many 
delegations have looked at our limited 
visible efforts in 2007 and expressed 
confusion, particularly in light of the 
strong statement we made at CSP-11 about 
trying to close the loop on States Parties 
with declarable chemical industry 
activities.  The RevCon may be a chance for 
us to regroup and make a further push to 
include more States Parties in the efforts 
to assist others in meeting their Article 
VII obligations.  The other problem the 
delegation faces is that Iran and other NAM 
delegations clearly have issues that they 
consider of higher importance (e.g., 
Articles X and XI), and they see Article VII 
decisions just a bone they can throw Western 
 
delegations as the balance needed to get 
their issues forwarded.  They have made it 
clear that they do not consider Article VII 
as a priority anymore, and they are likely 
to use the RevCon as the chance to hammer 
that message home.  In practical terms, the 
annual fight with Iran over decisions on 
Article VII, Article X, Article XI, and 
Universality takes a considerable amount of 
time and resources.  Also, as each EC must 
address whatever progress has been made, the 
fight gets spread throughout the year.  The 
practical result is that, because these 
smaller delegations can only keep so many 
balls in the air at one time, little 
progress is made on any other matter.  We 
should discuss this internally in light of 
the overall efficiency of the Organization, 
particularly the EC, and what changes can be 
made. 
 
---------- 
ARTICLE XI 
---------- 
 
14. (SBU)  During CSP-12, the Non-Aligned 
Movement circulated its thoughts on what an 
action plan for Article XI might address. 
The NAM, most prominently Iran and Cuba, 
have already set the stage for a push for 
more concrete action on Abticle XI at the 
RevCon.  Del recommends a thorough review of 
the NAM paper distributed during CSP-12 to 
better gauge what specific measures may be 
proposed during discussions and drafting, to 
develop constructive responses and possible 
counterproposals, and to develop strategies 
to find common areas of interest that can be 
exploited with other delegations 
(particularly within the NAM). 
 
------------------------- 
SCIENTIFIC ADVISORY BOARD 
------------------------- 
15. (SBU)  The Scientific Advisory Board 
(SAB), which has presented its draft report 
to the RevCon Working Group, currently meets 
annually with additional med4ings or 
activities of Temporary Working Groups 
relying upon voluntary contributions to fund 
their work.  The EC routinely notes reports 
by the SAB with little to no discussion, and 
little real oversight.  Observations and 
recommendations from the SAB can generally 
be placed in one of two categories:  those 
that fall within the purview of the DG/TS to 
review and possibly implement, and those 
that have wider policy implications which 
would require the policy making organs to 
consider and recommend possible action.  Of 
course, in all cases, the States Parties 
look to the TS to serve as the first filter 
for recommendations coming from the SAB andQshould be willing to pick up those 
topics 
considered to be most appropriately 
discussed by the Policy Making Organs. 
Although establishing a more effective way 
to integrate the work of the SAB with that 
of the organization could have the undesired 
side effect of raising controversial issues 
for debapd, it could also make better use of 
the hif(ly specialized work of this body, 
particularly as the OPCW grapples with rapid 
advances in science and technology.  On 
several occasions, del has also advocated 
regularizing support for more than just one 
annual meeting of the SAB from the OPCW 
budget; the RevCon may provide an 
E 
 
appropriate forum for further discussions of 
this proposal. 
 
16. (SBU) Salts: In their preliminary report 
to the OEWG, the SAB discu3ces their ongoing 
&recommendation that all salts of scheduled 
chemicals be treated in the same way as 
their corresponding free bases.8  Del 
expects several delegetions to pick up on 
this recommendation again and insist on its 
discussion within the RevCon.  Knowing that 
this has been a frequent topic of discussion 
within the interagency, the del encourages 
the formalization (or, perhaps, repetition) 
of our jational positin!on the matte2 
within guidance. 
 
17. (SBU) CAS Registry numbers: In their 
preliminary report to the OEWG, the SAB 
discusses their position (which is 
consistent with U.S. position) that CAS 
numberw are &a useful identification aid8 
but not necessarily of regulatory value.  We 
have already heard in several fora from the 
Italian delegation that their legislation is 
list-based and, as such, is dependent on the 
TS continually providing updated lists of 
 
SIPDIS 
chemicals that are to be captured by the 
Convention.  This is clearly inconsistent 
with the way nearly all States Parties 
implement the treaty, as it has the 
potential to create significant gaps, 
particularly over time.  If`the Italians 
attempt to propagate their views at the 
RevCon, we should be prepared 4o intervene 
on this issue and encourage others to do 
likewise. 
 
----------------------------- 
REVIEW OF OPCW ADMINISTRATION 
----------------------------- 
 
18. (SBU) The 2008 budget reflected zero 
nominal growth for the third consecutive 
year, and the TS has repeatedly indicated 
that it cannot continue this trend. 
Especially with calls for more activities 
(roth in Chapter I and Chapter II), 
including increased inspections, the TS is 
likely to feel forced to introduce growth 
budgets. `Similarly, late payment by the 
U.S. of annual assessed contributions 
continues to draw attention and weaken our 
abihity to push for tighter budgeting. 
 
19. (SBU) Although this will become more 
relevant in future years, the TS needs to 
begin to come to grips with the eventual 
transition of the OPCW from a disarmament- 
priority organization to a nonproliferation- 
priority organization and how that impacts 
the staffing and structure of the TS.  There 
appears to be some level of internal 
organizational review underway within the 
TS, as indicated by the DG in his statements 
 
SIPDIS 
at recent ECs and efforts to align OPCW 
practices with those of the UN Common 
System.  We believe this type of review 
should spill over into the RevCon, with an 
eye to staffing patterns, numbers of 
positions in different branches, ranking of 
staff, recruiting (what OPCW neads to do to 
attract good people), retention, long-term 
use of short-term staff in de facto 
permanent po3ytions, etc., as well as the 
impact of policies such as tenure.  On 
tenure, the DG could be given additional 
flexibility in waiving tenure considerations 
(i.e., not capping extensions at 10 years) 
for key staff in highly specialized areas. 
With clear U.S. objectives, we could help 
shape the debate and the outcome on many of 
these issues. 
 
20. (SBU) In May, del held a brown bag lunch 
with AmCit TS staff.  Although drawn from a 
limited population, del believes that the 
thoughts expressed at this meeting are 
probably indicative of the wider view of TS 
staff.  In general, the theme was that good 
business practices are not applied 
consistently and, because of that, there is 
an expectation of continued departure by 
large numbers b staff, which can be 
attributed only partly to the tenure policy. 
The topics discussed, although not in every 
case appropriate for general discussion 
within the RevCon, should be considered more 
generally in our preparations: 
 
a. Training: Current priorities are centered 
on the Inspectorate, with little happening 
elsewhere.  Training for maintaining career- 
relevant certifications (e.g., medical 
personnel, accountants) is not supported. 
There is no standard process for bringing 
new personnel on board or capturing 
&institutional memory8 when someone leaves. 
Overall training and development of staff 
shouhd be reviewed with a view to 
ameliorating the present situation. 
 
b. Retention: Although HR collects data on 
why staff leave, nothing appears to be done 
with it.  Inspection deployment issues 
(e.g., low staffing levels for health and 
safety personnel mean higher deployment 
rates, lack of support for inspectors to 
keep in touch with family members during 
deployment) are contributing factors.  The 
threat of the tenure policy motivates many 
to stay silent about their concerns, even 
going so far as to suggest that inspection 
team members are afraid to seturn from an 
inspection with anything that lookw!remotely 
like a problem. 
 
c. Recruiting: Employment opportunities are 
not widely advertised.  No-cost advertising 
opportunities should be explored and used. 
Given that (1) the majority of experienced 
applicants in certain career fields (e.g., 
health and safety) come vvnm a limited 
number of countries (i.e., Western 
countries) and (2) the TS makes it a 
practice$to get general wide geographical 
distribution of new employees, the result 
may be that getting Western employees in 
certain fields (particularly technical) may 
be more difficult. 
 
d. Tenure: The selective or delayed 
implementation of tenure can be seen as 
favoring some employees and punishing 
others, and this can create an environment 
of fear.  There seem to be a number of 
methods for applying the policy, including 
extensions, and better communication and 
understanding of the policy could alleviate 
confusion. 
 
------------------------------------- 
&NON-LETHALS,8 INCAPACITANTS AND RIOT 
CONTROL AGENTS 
------------------------------------- 
 
21. (SBU) A common theme among many of the 
academic and NGO papers and presentations 
has begun to emerge:  a poorly defined 
desire to do something about what some 
believe to be an emerging, and alarming, new 
category of weapons that must somehow be 
dealt with in the context of the CWC. 
Several presentations at the OPCW Tenth 
Anniversary Academic Forum covered this 
topic, nne in unusual depth by presenting a 
spectrum of scenarios from domestic law 
enforcement to international armed conflict 
and an accompanying spectrum of chemicals 
from riot control agents (RCAs) to Schedule 
1.  The NGO meeting held November 19 in The 
Hague, specifically for RevCon preparations, 
continued this trend, with a number of 
papers on subjects such as &incapacitating 
biochemical weapons.8  Several of the 
presenters have admitted, however, that 
while the possibility of use (keying mainly 
off of the Moscow theater incident in which 
fentanyl or a derivative appears to have 
been used) is of concern, there does not at 
this time appear to be a specific threat. 
 
22. (SBU) Discussions have not been limited 
to NGO and academic circles.  The draft 
report of the Scientific Advisory Board to 
the RevCon recommends that the Organization 
consider &an extension of the Convention,s 
declaration requirements so that States 
Parties would have to declare all chemicals 
they have stockpiled for law enforcement 
purposes (types, quantities and delivery 
systems)8 and adds that &terminology 
surrounding so-called non-lethal 
incapacitants also needs further 
elaboration.8  The DG,s recently released 
paper on the RevCon (WGRC-2/S/1) also 
mentions that &in due course, there will 
also be a need to address questions suc( as 
what effect the introduction of &non-lethal8 
weapons for the purposes of law enforcement 
and of new means for their use will have on 
the Convention.8 
 
 
23. (SBU) Given a growing interest among 
British NGOs in discussing &non-lethals,8 
chemicals used for domestic law enforcement, 
and riot control agents at the RevCon, the 
UK in particular may be under considerably 
more pressure to demonstrate increased 
flexibility in entertaining discussions and 
possibly even report language.  With UK 
Ambassador Lyn Parker chairing the working 
group for RevCon preparations, the UK is 
also less likely to simply close out 
discussions on these topics.  From 
discussions over the past several months, it 
is clear that the UK is interested in coming 
up with an effective strategy to deal with 
this matter, and UK colleagues have on 
numerous occasions expressed a strong 
interest in early indications as to what the 
U.S. position at the RevCon might be. 
 
24. (SBU) Several other delegations have 
already expressed strong dissatisfaction 
with the U.S. decision to block ICRC 
participation (perceived to be motivated by 
a desire to avoid these discussions).  From 
past discussions, del also expects some 
delegations may express an interest in 
codifying certain situations in which riot 
control agents might be used, such as on UN 
peacekeeping missions.  At the RevCon 
 
Working Group on November 15, Iran also made 
vague references for the need to look at the 
use of RCAs by SPs beyond their 
jurisdiction, the use of RCAs in warfare, 
and developments in incapacitating agents. 
Although this may have$been a general 
statement of principle, it is also possible 
that this is an early attempt by Iran to set 
the stage for criticism of U.S. policy. 
 
25. (SBU) There are clear U.S. sensitivities 
regarding any attempt to &clarify8 related 
provisions in the Convention.  At this 
stage, we may be well served by the fact 
that few with an interest in these topics 
have gone so far as to propose specific 
measures.  To have a clear position on the 
matter, without forbidding discussions 
(which will frankly be impossible given the 
recurrence of the topics even in official 
OPCW documents), may be the best strategy in 
pushing back on unhelpful suggestions while 
avoiding the misperception that the U.S. is 
hiding a secret non-lethal chemical program. 
 
26. (SBU) As discussed internally and with 
the Close Allies, a significant first step 
in discussions, and particularly in 
drafting, will be to ensure that we do not 
stray beyond the terminology of the CWC. 
Generalizations about &non-lethals8 and 
&incapacitants8 have no place in CWC 
reporting, and should be avoided.  It may be 
useful, depending on the direction 
discussions take early next year, to begin 
quietly educating others on the importance 
of focusing on the provisions laid out in 
the Convention.  It will also be critical to 
focus on the General Purpose Criterion as 
providing a more than adequate safety net 
when it comes to chemicels not clearly 
captured in the Schedules. 
 
27. (SBU) As has also been raised internally, 
some part of these discussions can be 
appropriately redirected to existing 
provisions.  Declarations on national 
protective programs, for instance, remain 
sparse, with the facilitator for Article X 
calling at each consultation for complete, 
accurate submissions.  Effective national 
implementation measures specifically related 
to the General Purpose Criterion, as 
outlined by OPCW Legal Advisor SantiagoQ 
Onate at the November 15 meeting of the 
RevCon Working Group, could also be an 
avenue to constructively channel concerns. 
 
----------------------------------- 
2012 AND THE NEXT REVIEW CONFERENCE 
----------------------------m--,--- 
 
28. (SBU) Although discussions thus far in 
the RevCon Working Group have been 
surprisingly devoid of speculation about 
2012, calls to begin exploring what to do 
when the U.S. (and possibly Russia) fail to 
meet the final destruction deadline are 
almost inevitable at the RevCon.  As the DG 
himself has expressed concern that 
discussions of this nature not dominate the 
RevCon, del recommends that part of the 
RevCon guidance clearly articulate how such 
calls might be counteved.  While it is 
certainly true that 2008 is far too early to 
make any sort of pronouncement on 
ability/inability to meet the 2012 deadline, 
delegations are likely to ask whether the 
 
U.S. believes a separate conference or early 
RevCon closer to the date would be theQ 
appropriate venue for such discussions, 
and/or what action the policy making organs 
should take.  On the latter, reiterating our 
confidence i.0the policy making organs to 
take appropriate action should suffice.  On 
the former, it may be worth steering 
thinking toward simply evaluating the matter 
at the CSP in 2011, or at most convening a 
special session of the Conference closer to 
the deadline itself. 
 
---------------------------------- 
STRATEGY DEVELOPMENT AND TIMELINES 
---------------------------------- 
 
29. (U) From an administrative standpoint, 
del believes it will be useful not only to 
develop a list of RevCon &shoulds8 and 
&should nots,8 but also to take a 
comprehensive look at the wide range of 
issues that have been formally marked as 
&unresolved8 or have been discussed in some 
form of consultation since the last RevCon 
(and, in some cases, since the Prepcom). 
The spectrum runs from topics like the 
&unresolved8 Challenge Inspection issues 
(for several of which there is absolutely no 
need for resolution) to open ended working 
groups (e.g. the OEWG on Terrorism) to 
issues that are traditionally in more active 
facilitations (e.g. Article VII, Article 
XI).  To categorize these issuer and 
prioritize them according to our own 
interests and confidence in further progress 
rehng made might be helpful in evaluating 
progress made since the last RevCon and 
possible areas for increased efforts or 
improvement. 
 
30. (U) Del understands that RevCon 
discussions in Washington are to take place 
in the coming weeks.  Although RevCon 
strategy will certainly be a focal point of 
the next Close Allies, meeting (scheduled 
for March 2008 in Washington), the timing of 
the meeting may be too close to the RevCon 
to have sufficient impact.  Del recommends 
initial, informal guidance be drafted by the 
end of January to facilitate discussions 
with the Close Alliew here in The Hague that 
could be qsed to shape the drafting that is 
scheduled to begin in earnest with weekly 
meetings from mid-January on.  It will also 
be important to consider where it might be 
most effective to take the pen on drafting 
by offering text on certain topics early in 
dhe drafting process, and to discuss these 
efforts with the Allies. 
 
BEIK SENDS 
Arnall