VZCZCXYZ0002
PP RUEHWEB

DE RUEHC #3406 3390337
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 050318Z DEC 07
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK PRIORITY 0000
INFO RUEHGV/USMISSION GENEVA PRIORITY 0000

UNCLAS STATE 163406 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: MCAP MOPS PARM PREL AORC OTRA
SUBJECT: DEMARCHE TO SYG STAFF ON CCW 
 
REF: USMISSION GENEVA 2472 
 
¶1. The Department instructs USUN to demarche the Secretary 
General's staff at the appropriate level regarding the 
Secretary General's statement at the opening of the 2007 
 
SIPDIS 
Meeting of the High Contracting Parties to the Convention 
on Certain Conventional Weapons (CCW) in Geneva.  The 
statement, delivered by the High Representative for 
Disarmament Affairs, included several factual errors, and 
could be damaging to the effort to negotiate an instrument 
on cluster munitions. 
 
OBJECTIVES 
---------- 
 
¶2.  The Department instructs USUN to pursue the following 
objectives: 
 
-- The SYG should modify the extreme positions his 
representative expressed regarding cluster munitions, 
which are opposed by the permanent members of the Security 
Council and most other military powers. 
 
-- The SYG's representatives at the CCW talks should 
communicate his clarified position to the parties in order 
to facilitate negotiations on a new protocol for the CCW 
addressing the issue of cluster munitions. 
 
 -- The SYG should be aware that a future cluster 
munitions instrument that is not carefully tailored could 
undermine the ability of certain countries to cooperate 
militarily under UN mandates. 
 
 
REPORTING DEADLINE 
------------------ 
 
¶3. USUN should report the results of this demarche to John 
Mariz in IO/UNP by December 7. 
 
BACKGROUND 
---------- 
 
¶4. Mr. Sergio Duarte, the United Nations High 
Representative for Disarmament Affairs, on November 7 
delivered a message from the Secretary-General of the 
United Nations to the States Parties to the Convention on 
Conventional Weapons (CCW) at the opening plenary session 
of their annual meeting in Geneva. 
 
¶5.  The primary issue being discussed at the Meeting of 
States parties was whether to adopt a negotiating mandate 
that would lead to negotiations on a new protocol for the 
CCW addressing the issue of cluster munitions.  The United 
States has actively supported such a mandate, believing 
that the CCW is the best framework for addressing concerns 
associated with the use of cluster munitions, while 
balancing both humanitarian and military considerations. 
 
¶6.  The U.S. believes that cluster munitions continue to 
be legitimate weapons when employed properly and in 
accordance with existing international humanitarian law. 
In many instances, cluster munitions result in much less 
collateral damage than unitary weapons would if used for 
the same military mission.  If the use of cluster 
munitions were banned or unreasonably restricted, in some 
instances soldiers might have to fire many more non-cluster 
projectiles, potentially causing greater civilian 
casualties and damage to infrastructure. 
 
¶7.  The Secretary General's message was inaccurate and 
unhelpful on several specific points, including the 
following: 
 
 -- He referred to the "inherent inaccuracy" of cluster 
munitions.  This is simply incorrect.  Cluster munitions 
are not inherently more inaccurate than other munitions. 
They are weapons intended to attack area targets, as 
opposed to precision-guided weapons, but this does not 
make them "inherently inaccurate." 
 
-- He also referred to the "frequent malfunctioning" of 
cluster munitions.  This statement implies that most 
cluster munitions as a whole fail to work as designed, 
when the opposite is true.  There are also many other 
factors that impact upon malfunctioning rates, including 
weather, terrain, storage conditions that affect all 
weapons.  For the U.S., our policy is that future 
acquisitions of cluster munitions will have a 99% 
functioning rate in testing. 
 
-- The message described cluster munitions as 
"indiscriminate."  Cluster munitions are not 
indiscriminate if used properly, in accordance with 
existing principles of international humanitarian law. 
The discrimination is a result of targeting of military 
objectives and not the accuracy of the weapon. 
 
-- He also mentioned the "horrendous humanitarian... 
effects" of cluster munitions.  Cluster munitions do harm 
civilians in post-conflict situations.  However, they are 
only a small part of the broader problem of explosive 
remnants of war ("ERW"). 
 
-- The SG's message called for a new instrument 
prohibiting "the use, development, production, 
stockpiling, and transfer of cluster munitions that cause 
unacceptable harm to civilians."  This borrows the 
terminology used by those states and NGOs favoring a 
sweeping ban on cluster munitions.  We do not consider any 
category of cluster munitions by their nature to cause 
unacceptable harm to civilians - it is the manner in which 
they are used that can result in this effect. 
 
-- He also called for the new instrument to require 
"destruction of current stockpiles" of cluster munitions. 
Incorporating a destruction requirement in the instrument 
would not be a good idea because the huge resources 
involved in meeting such a requirement would likely be 
unacceptable to a number of countries.  In addition, 
a destruction requirement would not directly address the 
humanitarian issue. 
 
-- He also called for an "immediate freeze [on] the use 
and transfer of all cluster munitions."  This goes beyond 
even what he called for to be part of the instrument and 
is totally unacceptable. 
 
-- His message also called for provisions on "victim 
assistance" and "clearance."  These are not needed in an 
instrument on cluster munitions as there are existing 
mechanisms for addressing these issues.  They are 
explicitly addressed in the 5th Protocol to the CCW on 
ERW. 
 
¶8.  It was particularly unfortunate that the Secretary 
General chose to make these points at the outset of the 
Meeting of States Parties.  A number of countries at this 
meeting have serious concerns about embarking on a 
negotiation on cluster munitions.  Despite his unhelpful 
remarks, States Parties did agree to negotiate.  However, 
by taking an extreme view of the contents of an eventual 
CM instrument, the Secretary General may have complicated 
these negotiations by convincing countries like Russia 
that a cluster munitions instrument would likely amount to 
far-reaching ban on cluster munitions.  Moreover, by 
adopting the language of NGOs pushing an absolute ban on 
cluster munitions, the Secretary General has publicly 
aligned himself with extreme elements against the Perm 5 
and most other major military powers. 
 
¶9. A CM instrument with extreme positions on cluster 
munitions such as the "criminalization" of cooperation 
with states who do not adopt the same instrument could 
also impede cooperation between states that might 
otherwise cooperate militarily under UN mandates.  A more 
moderate and balanced approach taking into account the 
military requirements of states as well as humanitarian 
considerations will be required to protect the ability of 
states to fully contribute military assets to UN 
operations. 
RICE