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Viewing cable 07SANAA2300,

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
07SANAA2300 2007-12-12 05:48 2011-08-24 01:00 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Embassy Sanaa
VZCZCXRO9492
PP RUEHDE RUEHROV RUEHTRO
DE RUEHYN #2300 3460548
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 120548Z DEC 07
FM AMEMBASSY SANAA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 8621
RUEHEG/AMEMBASSY CAIRO 0838
INFO RUCNSOM/SOMALI COLLECTIVE
UNCLAS SANAA 002300 
 
SIPDIS 
 
NOFORN 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPARTMENT FOR NEA/ARP AND PRM 
CAIRO FOR REFCOORD MARY DOETSCH 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PREF PHUM PREL PGOV YM
SUBJ: YEMENI SEAS MORE DANGEROUS THAN EVER FOR EAST AFRICAN 
 
REFUGEES 
 
1. (SBU/NF) SUMMARY: The number of East African refugees who have 
died attempting to cross the Gulf of Aden to Yemen has nearly 
doubled in 2007. While Yemeni Navy actions appear to have 
contributed to the increase, a cooperative Yemen Coast Guard is 
working to ameliorate it. As the number of refugees to cross is 
unlikely to abate, the best way the USG can work to keep the number 
of deaths from rising is to support continuing cooperation with the 
YCG. END SUMMARY 
 
2. (SBU/NF) Although the numbers of East African refugees crossing 
the Gulf of Aden to Yemen from Somalia in 2007 are comparable to the 
28,319 who crossed in 2006, the number of dead and missing has 
almost doubled, from 630 in all of 2006 to 1116 as of the end of 
November 2007. As Saado Quol, the head of the UNHCR's Aden office, 
put it, "this is equivalent to the casualties of last summer's war 
in Lebanon, but every year." In a December 9 meeting in Sanaa, Quol 
told Conoff he believes there are two related reasons for the 
increased numbers of deaths. At the beginning of the year, there 
were more than ten incidents of the Yemeni Navy shooting at 
smugglers' boats to discourage them from approaching the shore, 
probably resulting in at least one refugee death by gunshot and far 
more when panicked smugglers threw their human cargo overboard. 
Later, to avoid the threat from the Yemeni Navy, smugglers adopted a 
strategy of forcing the refugees to swim the last portion of the 
journey, dumping them up to five miles from the shore. Often 
dehydrated and weakened by the long journey, many refugees never 
made it. 
 
3. (SBU/NF) Unlike the Yemeni Navy, the Yemeni Coast Guard (YCG) has 
shown real willingness to address the humanitarian concerns 
surrounding the refugees' journey (NOTE: The YCG is part of the 
Ministry of Interior, not the Ministry of Defense. END NOTE). The 
YCG's Gulf of Aden commander, Col. Abdulrahman Mousa, confirmed to 
Conoff during a November 26 meeting in Aden that the UNHCR has been 
addressing YCG training courses since October 2007. 
 
4. (SBU/NF) On the operational front, cooperation has also increased 
between the YCG and Combined Task Force 150 (CTF 150), operating in 
the Gulf of Aden and ultimately under the command of the Combined 
Forces Maritime Component Command (CFMCC) based in Bahrain. On the 
heels of a visit to Yemen by CFMCC Commander VADM Cosgriff, CTF 150 
and the YCG held a joint exercise from November 11-19. The exercise 
was designed to use CTF 150's deep water capability and remote 
tracking technology to provide the YCG with the real-time data 
necessary to follow smuggling ships covertly. One major goal of this 
exercise was to allow the refugees to disembark the smuggling ships 
before the YCG approached them to avoid the passengers being thrown 
overboard. During the exercise, the YCG apprehended two smuggler 
ships and 10 Somali smugglers as they began their return trip 
following the refugees' safe disembarkation. 
 
5. (SBU/NF) While lauding the exercise, Quol stressed that the goal 
of such efforts should not be to stop the flow of refugees, but to 
make the journey safer by "ending the culture of impunity" for 
ruthless smuggling gangs. He added that one key element of this was 
successful prosecution of captured smugglers. Quol told Conoff that 
smugglers often bribe their way out of jail, although the smugglers 
captured during the recent exercise were officially charged on 
November 28, and are expected to receive fines and short jail 
terms. 
 
6. (SBU/NF) COMMENT: The instability in Somalia that is driving most 
of the refugee traffic to Yemen is unlikely to change in the near 
term. The YCG takes the issue seriously, but its resources are 
limited and the growing responsibility of protecting oil and gas 
facilities along the Gulf of Aden promises to stretch them further. 
Since the Yemeni Navy does not appear to be a willing partner on the 
refugee issue, ongoing cooperation with the YCG (whether in terms of 
training or material assistance) is currently the best way to 
address the humanitarian issues involved with the crossings. A 
conference on regional maritime refugee issues currently being 
planned by CFMCC for early or mid-2008 is expected to include the 
YCG as a key participant, and should be a good next step towards 
expanding the relationship. END COMMENT. 
 
SECHE