Keep Us Strong WikiLeaks logo

Currently released so far... 64621 / 251,287

Articles

Browse latest releases

Browse by creation date

Browse by origin

A B C D F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V W Y Z

Browse by tag

A B C D E F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V W X Y Z

Browse by classification

Community resources

courage is contagious

Viewing cable 07PRETORIA4213, KOSOVO FINAL STATUS: NO POLICY GUIDANCE FOR NEW

If you are new to these pages, please read an introduction on the structure of a cable as well as how to discuss them with others. See also the FAQs

Understanding cables
Every cable message consists of three parts:
  • The top box shows each cables unique reference number, when and by whom it originally was sent, and what its initial classification was.
  • The middle box contains the header information that is associated with the cable. It includes information about the receiver(s) as well as a general subject.
  • The bottom box presents the body of the cable. The opening can contain a more specific subject, references to other cables (browse by origin to find them) or additional comment. This is followed by the main contents of the cable: a summary, a collection of specific topics and a comment section.
To understand the justification used for the classification of each cable, please use this WikiSource article as reference.

Discussing cables
If you find meaningful or important information in a cable, please link directly to its unique reference number. Linking to a specific paragraph in the body of a cable is also possible by copying the appropriate link (to be found at theparagraph symbol). Please mark messages for social networking services like Twitter with the hash tags #cablegate and a hash containing the reference ID e.g. #07PRETORIA4213.
Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
07PRETORIA4213 2007-12-18 13:36 2011-08-24 01:00 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Embassy Pretoria
VZCZCXRO4856
PP RUEHBZ
DE RUEHSA #4213 3521336
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 181336Z DEC 07
FM AMEMBASSY PRETORIA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 2984
INFO RUEHGG/UN SECURITY COUNCIL COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHBW/AMEMBASSY BELGRADE PRIORITY 0023
RUEHTN/AMCONSUL CAPE TOWN PRIORITY 5152
RUEHDU/AMCONSUL DURBAN PRIORITY 9436
RUEHVEN/USMISSION USOSCE PRIORITY 0012
RUEHPS/USOFFICE PRISTINA PRIORITY 0020
RUEHNO/USMISSION USNATO PRIORITY 0076
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK PRIORITY 0477
RUEHBS/USEU BRUSSELS PRIORITY
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RHMFISS/HQ USEUCOM VAIHINGEN GE PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHDC PRIORITY
UNCLAS PRETORIA 004213 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPT FOR EUR/SCE, IO/UNP, AF/S 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PREL PGOV MOPS AORC UNSC SF YI EU
SUBJECT: KOSOVO FINAL STATUS:  NO POLICY GUIDANCE FOR NEW 
YORK, YET 
 
REF: A. SECSTATE 167211 
 
     B. SECSTATE 166909 
 
1.  (SBU) A/PolCouns presented reftel non-paper to DFA Deputy 
Director: UN Security Council (Thematic Issues) Ilia du 
Buisson on 18 December.  Joining the meeting was UK Second 
Secretary David McNaught, who presented nearly identical 
 
SIPDIS 
points from London and, in the absence of a British 
non-paper, associated himself with the U.S one. 
 
2.  (SBU) An embarassed du Buisson admitted that she had 
"absolutely no instructions" on this issue, since all 
decision-makers (including PermRep Khumalo) were in 
Polokwane, Limpopo for ANC leadership elections.  She was 
grateful for the non-paper and said she would forward it 
immediately in the hopes that news of a clear U.S. and 
European position would provoke a discussion on the margins 
in Polokwane.  She said that SAG players were well informed 
on the issues, having met directly and repeatedly with 
representatives from both sides, and listed the factors that 
she expected would be considered in the decision-making 
process:  South Africa's successful experience with 
negotiations in ending apartheid; ideological questions 
regarding the role of the UN and especially the UN Security 
Council; absence of international consensus; and, to a lesser 
degree, others' attempts to claim this would set a precedent. 
 Du Buisson said she honestly had no idea what the leadership 
would decide, but agreed to inform the U.S. and UK once she 
had instructions from Polokwane. 
 
3.  (SBU) COMMENT: What the SAG really wants is for the two 
sides to follow the South African example and sit around a 
table talking things through until they come to a mutually 
acceptable solution.  This experience is central to the South 
African approach to conflict resolution, and it is difficult 
for the SAG to believe that it is unachievable in the current 
context.  That said, the SAG's worst fears are a unilateral 
declaration of independence by the Kosovars and/or renewed 
violence in the region -- they would certainly prefer 
Ahtisaari over either of those alternatives.  The UK High 
Commissioner and several other European Chiefs of Mission are 
currently on the ground in Polokwane.  McNaught will 
recommend they approach senior SAG officials there to further 
press the issue.  END COMMENT. 
 
BOST