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Viewing cable 07OTTAWA2255, CRITICAL MEDICAL RADIOISOTOPE PRODUCTION MAY

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
07OTTAWA2255 2007-12-12 21:45 2011-04-28 00:00 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Embassy Ottawa
VZCZCXRO0249
PP RUEHGA RUEHHA RUEHQU RUEHVC
DE RUEHOT #2255/01 3462145
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 122145Z DEC 07
FM AMEMBASSY OTTAWA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 7025
INFO RUCNCAN/ALL CANADIAN POSTS COLLECTIVE
RUEHBS/AMEMBASSY BRUSSELS 0717
RUEHFR/AMEMBASSY PARIS 0977
RUEHSA/AMEMBASSY PRETORIA 0289
RUEHTC/AMEMBASSY THE HAGUE 3465
RUEAUSA/DEPT OF HHS WASHDC
RHEBAAA/DEPT OF ENERGY WASHDC
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 OTTAWA 002255 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR WHA, OES AND ISN 
HHS FOR OFFICE OF GLOBAL HEALTH AFFAIRS 
DOE FOR NE 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: TBIO ECON KSCA CA
SUBJECT: CRITICAL MEDICAL RADIOISOTOPE PRODUCTION MAY 
RESUME SOON 
 
1. (U) Summary: In the face of a growing shortage of medical 
radioisotopes, the Canadian House of Commons passed emergency 
legislation late on December 11 to exempt the nuclear reactor 
where much of the world's supply of medical radioisotopes is 
produced from regulatory oversight (for a very narrow 
exception) for 120 days in order to facilitate a rapid 
restart of the reactor and resumed production of medical 
radioisotopes.  Once the legislation passes through the 
Senate, expected later today (December 12), and it receives 
Royal Assent, perhaps by the end of this week, reactor 
operator Atomic Energy of Canada Limited (AECL) will commence 
restarting the reactor, which has been shut down since 
November 18.  Barring unforeseen events, AECL anticipates it 
will take several days to ramp up to normal operations and 
several days after that before the medical radioisotope 
supply chain can return to normal.  End summary. 
 
2. (U) On the evening of December 11, in the face of a 
growing shortage of radioisotopes for medical use, the 
Conservative government introduced and then pushed through 
the House of Commons emergency legislation, Bill C-38, that 
would allow Atomic Energy of Canada Limited (AECL), the 
operator of the 50 year-old National Research Universal 
reactor at Chalk River, Ontario, to resume operations and 
radioisotope production without complying with nuclear 
regulator Canadian Nuclear Safety Commission (CNSC) orders to 
modify and upgrade certain of its components.  Essentially 
the bill removes CNSC oversight for 120 days for this 
specific aspect of AECL's operations.  In addition to its 
Chalk River laboratory, AECL also operates a variety of other 
atomic facilities, such as nuclear waste sites, throughout 
Canada.  Presently a Crown Corporation whose privatization 
has been discussed, AECL is the designer and builder of CANDU 
technology. 
 
3. (U) The NRU was shut down for routine maintenance on 
November 18, at which time CNSC inspectors became aware that 
modifications to the reactor's cooling system called for in 
an August 2006 licensing review had not been installed, and 
notified AECL that they were not in compliance with the NRU 
operating license and could not therefore restart the 
reactor.  AECL of course complied with the CNSC order to not 
restart the reactor, but claimed the modifications were 
upgrades, not mission critical, and could be accomplished 
over a longer period of time during regular maintenance. 
AECL claimed it could continue to operate the NRU safely 
without complete installation of the additional equipment, at 
least as an interim measure.  The impasse between the 
regulator and AECL has extended NRU's scheduled shutdown from 
one week to over three weeks, at this point, and global 
supplies of critical medical radioisotopes have dwindled. 
Since only four other reactors around the world (one each in 
France, Belgium, South Africa, and the Netherlands) produce 
these basic radioisotopes, many of which have half-lives 
measured in hours, any unplanned reactor shutdown quickly 
leads to supply disruption.  The NRU alone accounts for about 
50 percent of global supply of molybdenum-90 the source of 
technetium-99m, the most widely used isotope for diagnosing 
disease. 
 
4. (U) On December 11 in the House of Commons Prime Minister 
Q4. (U) On December 11 in the House of Commons Prime Minister 
Harper noted the shortage of medical radioisotopes presented 
a very clear danger to hundreds if not thousands of people 
around the world, whereas the risk to be mitigated by the 
CNSC-mandated upgrades was significantly more remote and less 
certain.  The Bloc Quebecois and New Democratic Party 
supported the measure immediately, but the Liberal Party fell 
in line, and by 11:30 pm Bill C-38 had passed with all party 
support through all three stages of debate in the House of 
Commons.  It now will go to the Senate, where the government 
believes it will also pass quickly.  The government 
anticipates the bill could receive Royal Assent by Thursday, 
December 13.  (In fact, we've heard reports the government 
leader in the Senate thought she would receive the bill from 
the Commons last night and had maintained a quorum until it 
became clear the House would not be able to conclude its 
business until near midnight.) 
 
5. (U) Once Royal Assent is received, making Bill C-38 law, 
CNSC's authority and licensing conditions in this matter will 
 
OTTAWA 00002255  002 OF 002 
 
 
be suspended for 120 days, and AECL can begin to restart the 
reactor, which may take several days.  AECL and CNSC will 
nevertheless be working closely together during this 120 day 
period.  Government relations executives for MDS Nordion, the 
company that actually refines and processes the medical 
radioisotopes from NRU, told embassy the company will only be 
able to estimate when the medical radioisotope supply chain 
will return to normal once reactor operations have 
recommenced successfully.  AECL had earlier said it could not 
return NRU to service before December 20 if had to comply 
with all of the upgrades mandated by CNSC. 
 
6. (SBU) Comment: Canada,s nuclear regulator, the CNSC, was 
only formed in 2000 from the former Atomic Energy Control 
Board (AECB).  Where AECB had non-proliferation as its 
primary focus, CNSC has as its principal mandate to "protect 
people and the environment from licensed sources of man-made 
radiation resulting from the use of nuclear energy and 
materials".  Given this focus on human health and safety some 
observers have commented that it is odd that the regulator 
may not have anticipated that an extended shutdown of NRU 
would have immediate and far-reaching health impacts 
downstream.  While these second-order health effects may not 
formally be the concern of the regulator, CNSC's decision on 
this occasion suggests the capacity to assess the impact of 
its decisions more broadly may have been lacking. End comment. 
 
 
Visit our shared North American Partnership blog (Canada & Mexico) at 
http://www.intelink.gov/communities/state/nap 
 
WILKINS