P 241112Z DEC 07
FM AMEMBASSY NAIROBI
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 4015
INFO IGAD COLLECTIVE

UNCLAS NAIROBI 004830 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPT FOR AF/E S, D, P, G, DRL, and AF A/S Frazer from the 
Ambassador 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PGOV PREL PHUM KDEM KE
SUBJECT:  KENYA ON THE EVE OF NATIONAL ELECTIONS 
 
Subject:  Kenya on the Eve of National Elections 
 
REFS:  A. NARIOBI 2104, B. NAIROBI 4788, C. NAIROBI 4756 D. NAIROBI 
4745, E. NAIROBI 4827, F. NAIROBI 4826 
 
¶1. Summary: On balance, the Kenyan elections set for December 27 
will likely be credible, but determining this will require careful 
reading of what is likely to be a messy process.  Although President 
Kibaki and his Party of National Unity (PNU) could eek out victory, 
many observers see a win by opposition candidate Raila Odinga and 
his Orange Democratic Movement (ODM) as more likely.  The contest is 
too close to call. With Kenyan politics still tribally-based, the 
stakes are high, and influential members of the teams around each of 
the candidates are likely planning actions to undermine their 
opponent's chances.   While there are scenarios which could call 
into question the credibility of the outcome, the efforts that we 
and others are making - and the credibility of the Chairman of the 
Electoral Commission -- increase prospects for an acceptably free 
and fair result.  Both candidates are friendly toward the U.S. End 
Summary. 
 
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Tough Test for Kenyan Democracy 
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¶2. The elections will probably yield what most observers will view 
as an acceptably credible result.  The elections will be a tough 
test for Kenya's still fledgling democracy (multi-party elections 
were held under Moi, but they had no credibility given the 
authoritarian nature of his government).  There are serious concerns 
that we are addressing.  Significant flaws should be expected in 
what will be a messy process.  Putting the upcoming election in 
perspective, it is important to recall there has been only one truly 
democratic election in Kenya, which took place in 2002. 
 
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Tribal Politics and Issues 
--------------------------- 
 
¶3. The stakes are very high in the elections, particularly because 
Kenyan politics are still tribally-based.  The Kikuyu tribe of 
President Kibaki, Kenya's largest tribal community, has dominated 
Kenyan society since the departure of the British administration 44 
years ago.  The Kikuyu ruled Kenya under Kenyatta and Kibaki, in 
both instances ensuring that key ministries and the economy were in 
Kikuyu hands.  Although Moi was a Kalenjin, his vice presidents were 
Kikuyu, and the Kikuyus extended their presence in the professions 
and the private sector.  Kikuyus own land and run businesses 
throughout the country, engendering resentment in some quarters. 
Kibaki's main opponent, Raila Odinga, is the leader of the second 
largest tribal group, the Luo.  While it is generally assumed that 
the tribe of whoever wins will receive economic spoils, tribal 
politics in Kenya is, fortunately, not entirely a zero-sum game. 
Kikuyu represent only around a quarter of the population and Luo 
less than 15 percent of the population, so they must cultivate 
spport from several other significant communities, among the 42 in 
the country.  The prevailing anti-Kikuyu sentiment gives Odinga the 
advantage in that regard.  A not uncommon refrain from average 
Kenyans is that "it's time to give another tribe a chance." 
 
¶4. The third major presidential contender, Kalonzo Musyoka (who 
leads the Orange Democratic Party - Kenya), is from the Kamba tribe. 
 The Kamba have traditionally close ties to the Kikuyu.  Kibaki and 
his team have been working hard to persuade Musyoka to throw his 
support to Kibaki, even if at the last minute (including hinting at 
a deal in which Musyoka would become vice president and receive a 
promise of Kikuyu support for 2012).  In this close contest, winning 
Kamba support would assure Kibaki's victory.  Even without a signal 
from Musyoka, it is possible that a significant segment of Kambas 
may realize they are throwing away their vote on Musyoka (who cannot 
win more than about 10 percent of the total vote) and switch to 
Kibaki. 
 
¶5. Interestingly, the Parliament will likely be divided among the 
three parties regardless of the presidential outcome.  Musyoka at 
this point still believes maintaining his independence gives him the 
most credibility and positions him to be the kingmaker in the new 
Parliament. 
 
¶6. Tribalism and issues were both submerged in 2002, when Kibaki, 
with Odinga's support, led the National Rainbow Coalition - all 
united to bring down the long-ruling KANU party and to deny former 
President Moi his chosen successor, Uhuru Kenyatta (who now supports 
Kibaki).   It is positive that, alongside tribal politics, issues 
have been discussed at length during this campaign:  corruption, 
devolution of revenue and authority to the provinces, the issue of 
marginalized areas and groups (including the Muslim community that 
comprises 10 percent of the population), and infrastructure, among 
others.  Part of the focus on issues reflects the high literacy rate 
and intense popular interest. Kibaki has run on his impressive 
record, which includes making primary education free and universal, 
a 7 percent growth rate (compared with under 1 percent when he took 
 
over), anti-corruption efforts (Kenya won the UN award this year for 
best civil service reform in the world), affirmative action for 
women, and youth programs.  However, the strong anti-Kikuyu feeling 
tends to overshadow the record. 
 
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Too Close to Call As Campaign Teams Scheme 
---------------- ---------------------------- 
 
¶7. Kibaki, Odinga, and Musyoka are all members in good standing of 
the traditional political class - none of them with clean hands. 
Radical new departures are unlikely if Odinga wins.  Odinga is, 
however, younger than Kibaki (63 to Kibaki's 76) and a more 
effective orator and campaigner.  Many observers believe that the 
tide has swung inexorably in his direction.  Polls over the past 
several months have consistently put Odinga ahead, but recent polls 
show the race as too close to call.  The methodology of the various 
polls is also open to question, so too much weight should not be 
given to them.  Though the odds seem stacked against him, Kibaki 
could still pull out victory.  Odinga has made some crucial errors 
during the campaign, including signing a controversial secret 
memorandum of understanding with Muslim leaders; advocating radical 
devolution to local authorities; rigging the primaries of his Orange 
Democratic Movement Party to oust parliamentary candidates not 
hand-picked by him; and at one point showing that he apparently was 
relying on outside help by bringing in U.S. political consultant 
Dick Morris.  Odinga also appeared to peak relatively early in the 
campaign.  Kibaki, on the other hand, in recent weeks has shown 
himself to be an energized campaigner.  The impact of the Kibaki 
campaign's greater financial resources and organization are also 
being felt in the final days of the campaign.  (This undoubtedly 
involves some degree of mobilization of  provincial administrations 
and state resources, though this has not been so egregious as to 
have a significant effect on the campaigns or to call into question 
the nominal neutrality of civil servants.) Even given the intense 
scrutiny of a vibrant civil society and a remarkably free media, 
questions like alleged misuse of government resources and alleged 
vote-buying by both sides remain gray areas that are hard to prove. 
Public scrutiny has constructively exposed incidents of violence 
and, by spotlighting them, helped to restrain broader violence. 
 
¶8. In terms of Kenyan politics, unseating Kibaki after one term in 
office would be virtually revolutionary.  This makes many observers 
nervous.  That said, Kibaki himself has signaled publicly and 
privately that he will accept the results of the election.  Odinga 
has done the same, and both have presented the right messages to 
condemn violence and to emphasize respect for the democratic 
process. 
 
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Messy, But Probably Credible Elections 
-------------- ------------------------ 
 
¶9. Election day will almost certainly be messy, meaning some violent 
incidents, and a fair amount of allegations of interference with the 
voting process.  Both Kibaki and Odinga have senior people around 
them who are desperate to win, and who are willing to do whatever it 
takes to achieve that.  While the potential for dangerous actions 
must be taken seriously, the track record of the well-run elections 
in 2002 and the national constitutional referendum in 2005 (which 
the government lost) bodes well.  The Chairman of the Electoral 
Commission, Samuel Kivuitu, is highly respected and determined to 
run a clean election.  Elaborate procedures are in place to assure a 
credible and transparent process.  The large number of international 
observers will also help to limit misconduct.  The EU has about 120 
observers, the U.S. Mission is fielding almost 200 observers plus 
funding an observer mission of the International Republican 
Institute led by former A/S Connie Newman, and there will be over 
17,000 Kenyan domestic observers.  Finally, as we have traveled the 
country, average Kenyans have emphasized their determination to 
participate in a free and fair election (even if this is mixed with 
underlying tribal sentiment). 
 
¶10. If Kibaki loses, Odinga supporters will be riotously happy.  At 
the same time, most of the Kikuyu elite, with their business 
interests, will want to work out accommodation with the new 
government (many have already launched feelers).  The greater danger 
is if Odinga loses.  He and his supporters will be very tempted - 
even if the Electoral Commission and observers deem the process 
credible -- to declare the election fraudulent and to resort to 
violence.  In that case, there could be significant violence and 
several tense days while things calm down.  While there is no likely 
scenario that would lead to generalized instability, substantial 
violence along tribal lines would be a setback for Kenyan democracy. 
 
¶11. We have credible reports that some within the Kibaki camp could 
be trying to orchestrate a defeat of Odinga in his constituency of 
Langata, which includes the huge slum of Kibera.  This could involve 
some combination of causing disorder in order to disenfranchise some 
of his supporters and/or bringing in double-registered Kikuyu 
supporters of the PNU's candidate from outside.  To be elected 
 
President a candidate must fulfill three conditions:  have a 
plurality of the popular vote; have at least 25 percent in 5 of the 
8 provinces; and be an elected member of Parliament.  Thus, defeat 
of Odinga in his constituency is a tempting silver bullet.  The 
Ambassador, as well as the UK and German Ambassadors, will observe 
in the Langata constituency.  If Odinga were to lose Langata, Kibaki 
would become President if he has the next highest vote total and 25 
percent in 5 provinces (both candidates will likely meet the 25 
percent rule). 
 
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U.S. Efforts, Interests, and Impact 
---------------- ------------------- 
 
¶12. The outside chance that widespread fraud in the election process 
could force us to call into question the result would be enormously 
damaging to U.S. interests.  We hold Kenya up as a democratic model 
not only for the continent, but for the developing world, and we 
have a vast partnership with this country on key issues ranging from 
efforts against HIV/AIDS, to collaboration on Somalia and Sudan, to 
priority anti-terrorism activities. 
 
¶13. Because of these important interests, we have worked hard to 
support a transparent and credible electoral process.  Assistant 
Secretary's Frazer's constant support and the Secretary's calls to 
 
SIPDIS 
Kibaki and Odinga on December 22 have been very helpful. Reftels 
have reported on our support for specific programs and our 
leadership of donor efforts.  Last May I laid out in a major speech 
at the University of Nairobi the importance the U.S. attaches to 
free and fair elections.  I then joined with other ambassadors to 
present a non-paper of "principles for free and fair elections" to 
the government and publicly. My team and I have traveled throughout 
the country to get out this message, and I have used the media 
extensively to encourage a positive process.  (Our efforts have 
included specific support for the right of women candidates to 
compete without suffering violence and intimidation.) 
 
¶14. As long as the electoral process is credible, the U.S.-Kenyan 
partnership will continue to grow and serve mutual interests 
regardless of who is elected.  While Kibaki has a proven track 
record with us, Odinga is also a friend of the U.S.  We will seek an 
early meeting with the winner to review priorities in the bilateral 
agenda.  We have been in close touch with Kibaki and his team, and 
Odinga and his team, to hammer home the importance of credible 
elections and the need for the loser to work with the winner to 
facilitate a smooth transition in the interest of all Kenyans. 
 
¶15. It is likely that the winner will schedule a quick inauguration 
(consistent with past practice) to bless the result and, 
potentially, to forestall any serious challenge to the results. 
There is no credible mechanism to challenge the results, hence 
likely recourse to the streets if the result is questionable.  The 
courts are both inefficient and corrupt.  Pronouncements by the 
Chairman of the Electoral Commission and observers, particularly 
from the U.S., will therefore have be crucial in helping shape the 
judgment of the Kenyan people.  With an 87 percent approval rating 
in Kenya, our statements are closely watched and respected. I feel 
that we are well-prepared to meet this large responsibility and, in 
the process, to advance U.S. interests. 
RANNEBERGER