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UNCLAS NAIROBI 004828 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
LONDON AND PARIS FOR AFRICA WATCHERS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: KDEM PREL KE PGOV
SUBJECT: KENYA ELECTIONS: ELECTORAL VIOLENCE - ECK AND 
POLICE RESPONSES 
 
REF: A. NAIROBI 4601 
 
     ¶B. NAIROBI 4567 
     ¶C. NAIROBI 4512 
     ¶D. NAIROBI 4402 
     ¶E. AND PREVIOUS 
 
¶1.  (SBU) SUMMARY:  The run up to the December 27 election is 
proving to be more violent than the last such contest in 
2002, but still much less violent than Kenya's first two 
multiparty elections in 1992 and 1997. The majority of 
campaign activity falls within the bounds of the Electoral 
Code of Conduct. That said, apparent violations of the Code 
have been frequent; violence against women political 
aspirants, clashes between supporters of different parties or 
factions, campaign speeches and materials that qualify as 
prohibited hate speech.  The ECK has been busy marshalling 
its limited resources to prepare the logistics of conducting 
the elections. It has not yet exercised its authority to 
sanction parties or candidates for violations of the Code of 
Conduct nor is it likely to do so.  The Kenyan Police Service 
has acted professionally and been non-partisan in its 
reaction to campaign violence. One weak spot in police 
response has been a lack of protection for women political 
aspirants from violence.  Although the Police Commissioner 
has offered increased protection to women candidates to 
combat violence and intimidation, implementation has been 
lacking, leading UNIFEM to criticize police response to 
violence against women aspirants.  Police have made several 
arrests related to distribution of hate literature and 
attempts to transport weapons, again acting in a non-partisan 
manner.  In an effort to stem hate speech, police have 
established media monitoring centers, but it is unclear what 
effect this initiative will have. Post is particularly 
concerned about the politically-motivated violence affecting 
Kuresoi and Molo constituencies in the central Rift Valley, 
where conflict between Kalenjin, Kikuyu, and Kisii 
communities in Kuresoi and Molo constituencies has displaced 
hundreds of families.  If not resolved, the violence could 
threaten the ability to conduct free and fair elections in 
these constituencies. END SUMMARY 
 
THE ELECTORAL CODE OF CONDUCT AND THE ECK'S ENFORCEMENT ROLE 
-------------------------------- --------------------------- 
 
2.(U) The Electoral Code of Conduct (the Code) requires 
registered parties and candidates to sign an oath pledging, 
among others, to condemn, avoid, and take steps to avoid 
violence and intimidation,  to affirm the right of all to 
express divergent political opinions, to canvas freely for 
membership and voters, to hold public meetings, to publish 
and distribute non-offensive campaign literature, banners, 
and other advertisements. Candidates and parties must ensure 
that no arms or weapons are carried or displayed at political 
meetings or marches, to refrain from vote-buying, and abuse 
of position in power, to avoid discrimination based on age, 
race, tribe, political opinion color, or gender.  Political 
parties are obliged to take reasonable steps to discipline 
and restrain all party officials, supporters, and candidates 
who infringe the Code of Conduct. 
 
¶3. (U) The ECK has the authority to enforce the Electoral 
Code of Conduct. It is empowered to issue warnings and fines. 
It may also bar parties from using allocated time on 
state-run media, or distribute campaign materials, placards, 
and other advertisements. If the ECK deems a violation of the 
Code of Conduct sufficiently severe, it may petition the High 
Court to ban an offending party or candidate from 
participating in the election. 
 
ELECTORAL VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN POLITICAL ASPIRANTS 
------------------------------------- -------------- 
 
¶4. (SBU) As previously reported, violence and intimidation 
against women political aspirants occurred frequently in the 
run-up to the political party nominations (reftels). In 
November, UNIFEM created a Gender Rapid Response Unit (GRRU) 
to provide resources to women political aspirants 
experiencing violence or intimidation.  GRRU has tracked over 
250 incidents of violence or intimidation aimed at women 
political aspirants. As the campaign moves into the general 
 
election, women continue to be threatened and subjected to 
violent attack.  An ODM woman political aspirant who lost at 
the nomination phase in Western province was shot and killed 
by gunmen while in Nairobi on December 1.  Civil society 
organizations were quick to attribute a political motive to 
the attack, but police investigations are ongoing and have 
not established a motive for the crime.  Alice Muthoni 
Wahome, a PNU woman parliamentary aspirant for Kandara 
constituency, Central Province, seemingly won the PNU 
nomination.   She went to collect her nomination certificate 
at the PNU secretariat, but was attacked by supporters of a 
rival candidate, sustaining injuries to her head and legs. 
Although she was issued a valid PNU nomination certificate, 
she had to be treated in a hospital for her injuries, 
allowing her opponent (who had also been issued a facially 
valid PNU nomination certificate) to present his certificate 
to the ECK first and was recognized as the legitimate PNU 
candidate. Because of the confusion surrounding the political 
party nominations (reftel B), ECK Chair Kivuitu announced 
that the ECK would not adjudicate intra-party disputes over 
whose nomination certificates were valid, but would recognize 
party candidates presenting facially valid certificate on a 
'first come, first served', basis, which encouraged 
machinations of all sorts and encouraged rival candidates to 
resort to violence of the sort Ms. Wahome experienced.  Ms. 
Wahome continues her campaign as the candidate of Safina, a 
PNU-affiliate party. 
 
¶5. (U) Women political aspirants are also frequently 
threatened, harassed, and intimidated by telephone or SMS 
messages. At a recent roundtable of women parliamentary 
candidates hosted by the Ambassador, tales of harassment and 
threats were depressingly commonplace. 
 
¶6. (SBU). Civil society organizations have also appealed to 
both police and political parties to act to curb violence 
aimed at women political aspirants. Political party leaders 
have made statements calling on contestants to abide by the 
Code of Conduct, but no political party has sanctioned 
candidates for intimidation or violence aimed at women. 
 
¶7. (SBU) Frustrated with uneven police response, a UNIFEM 
program officer recently accused the police of failing to 
respond to reports of women when they are attacked. 
 
CROSSING THE LINE: POLITICAL HATE SPEECH 
---------------------------------------- 
 
¶8. (SBU) Both major parties and their supporters have engaged 
in speech that occasionally crosses the line into hate 
speech.  This has taken the form of speeches at campaign 
rallies and, more often, pamphlets distributed by groups not 
directly traceable to political parties. Besides the 
traditional methods, both ODM and PNU supporters have been 
using more modern media, such as on-line chat rooms and SMS 
text messages. 
 
¶9. (SBU) The majority of arguable hate speech has been aimed 
at ODM presidential candidate Raila Odinga. It has been 
financed by Kibaki supporters, but is not directly 
attributable to PNU.   For example, in mid-November, a 
pamphlet was circulated in some Nairobi slums and Embu 
Province which inferred Raila was a devil worshipper. 
Playing on the ODM,s highest body of electoral advisors, 
known as the Pentagon, the pamphlet conflated pentagon with 
pentagram. One side stated, 'Did you know the Pentagon (sic) 
is a sign of Devil Worship?', and showed a pentagram. The 
other side contained a pentagram superimposed over a picture 
of Raila, posing the question 'What does this Man Worship?', 
with text below the picture stating, 'Kalonzo (Musyoka) is a 
Baptist. Kibaki is a Catholic. Raila is What?'. To counter 
these attacks, Raila has financed a series of ads reinforcing 
his Anglicanism and his respect for all religious 
persuasions.  President Kibaki has taken the high ground and 
condemned the use of hate speech. Apparently, these 
statements have fallen on deaf ears among his supporters. 
 
¶10. (SBU) ODM has not been without fault in the campaign. Its 
approach to build a successful coalition is to reach out to 
communities that traditionally harbor anti-Kikuyu 
 
resentments, often over land issues. (President Kibaki is a 
Kikuyu, as was Kenya's first President. The Kikuyu heartland 
is overpopulated. Kikuyu more than any other Kenyan ethnic 
community have spread throughout the country. In many areas 
they dominate business and the professions.). At times 
appeals to anti-Kikuyu sentiments crossed the line into hate 
speech. For example, Polcouns attended an ODM rally in 
Coastal Province in November where the anti-Kikuyu sentiments 
expressed by several figures bordered on hate speech (reftel 
D). 
 
¶11.  (U) Supporters of both sides have sent SMS messages 
containing highly inflammatory anti-Kikuyu and anti-Luo 
sentiments.  Some of these have attacked Raila by pointing 
out that a 'boy' is unfit to run the country. Odinga's Luo 
tribe is one of the few in Kenya that does not circumcise its 
men. Those tribes that do circumcise consider the 
uncircumcised as not being men. Others play on stereotypes of 
Luo as lazy and state that Raila will bring the country to 
ruin.  Likewise, President Kibaki and PNU have also come 
under attack in these fora. PNU has been accused of fomenting 
war in Kenya.  Other postings demonize the Kikuyu for 
monopolizing power and characterize Kikuyu as "hyenas' and an 
'evil tribe'. 
 
ELECTION-RELATED VIOLENCE IN KURESOI/MOLO 
----------------------------------------- 
 
¶12. (SBU) There are two glaring examples where police have 
not been able to maintain public order in the run-up to the 
election: Mount Elgon and Kuresoi/Molo. Conflict in Mount 
Elgon has been simmering for years and so can not be strictly 
considered election-related violence.  However, since late 
October, intercommunal violence between Kalenjin (including 
among Kalenjin sub-tribes), Kikuyu, and Kisii communities has 
plagued Kuresoi and Molo constituencies, in central Rift 
Valley Province. After the first round of house burnings and 
raids, GSU paramilitary police were brought in and 
temporarily calmed the situation, but violence flared in 
November after political parties nominations process resulted 
in allegations of a fixed ODM nomination.  On December 4, the 
Provincial Commissioner and a Provincial Security team 
visited the region to lead peace committee meetings and 
implore local leaders to become more involved in settling the 
conflict. That same day two schoolchildren were murdered. 
Police estimate that approximately 300 families have been 
displaced, however the local Red Cross office estimates that 
almost 16,000 people have been displaced during the recent 
conflict. 
 
¶13. (SBU) Christian and Islamic religious leaders and other 
local leaders have called on all the major presidential 
candidates to be more involved in finding a solution to the 
conflict. As a result, Raila Odinga visited affected areas on 
December 6, and presented relief supplies to the local Red 
Cross office.  For his part, President Kibaki has issued a 
non-specific call for tolerance and to show the world Kenyans 
are a peaceful nation. 
 
¶14. (SBU) Land ownership issues underlie the conflict, some 
dating back to colonial resettlement schemes. However, the 
Provincial Commissioner, during a recent visit to the area, 
stated that politicians were behind the current violence. 
Similar past instances of violence in 1992 and 1997 had 
strong political undertones as then-President Moi armed and 
organized pro-KANU Kalenjin raiders to attack pro-opposition 
Kikuyu homesteads to displace Kikuyu voters.  While the 
current violence is politically motivated it is more nuanced 
than in the past. As a general proposition, Kalenjin in the 
area support ODM. The well-organized raids have predominantly 
targeted local Kikuyu and Kisii populations who tend to 
support PNU and Ford-People (also pro-Kibaki), respectively. 
However, unlike in the past, there is an element of Kalenjin 
on Kalenjin violence to the conflict. This is the result of 
an intra-ODM struggle where the Tugen and Kipsigis clans are 
backing a different ODM factions with violence resulting. 
There is also a small section of the Tugen clan that, 
following Moi's endorsement of Kibaki, supports PNU. They 
have also been subject to attack by Kalenjin raiders. 
 
ECK RESPONSE TO VIOLATIONS OF THE CODE 
-------------------------------------- 
 
¶15. (SBU) All sides have called on the ECK to sanction 
opponents for putative violations of the Electoral Code of 
Conduct.  In most cases, the ECK has taken no action. 
However, on December 20th, the ECK  issued summonses to five 
persons (including an Assistant Minister and four 
parliamentary candidates) in connection with incidents of 
political violence in two constituencies. The ECK has also 
requested the presence of the Police Commissioner to explain 
police responses to political violence (see below). The 
hearings are set for December 21st, though it is not clear 
whether the ECK will punish anyone. The ECK's reluctance up 
till now to sanction candidates is understandable. It is 
focused on organizing the massive logistical operation 
required to conduct the elections. Despite its wide mandate 
to sanction campaign misconduct, insufficient resources make 
it unable to fulfill a more meaningful role in policing 
campaign behavior. 
 
POLICE RESPONSE TO CAMPAIGN VIOLENCE 
------------------------------------ 
 
¶16. (SBU) The Kenyan Police Service have taken pains to 
portray themselves as non-partisan guardians of public order. 
 For the most part they have restricted themselves to 
policing campaign activity when it results in public disorder 
or  threatens to do so. 
 
¶17. (SBU) Most campaign violence has been sporadic bouts 
between hired supporters of rival political candidates and, 
even more often, between competing factions of the same party 
or coalition. For the most part, the violence ends shortly 
after it starts and police have succeeded in restoring public 
order. Police action in combating police violence has been 
non-partisan. For example, three aides to ODM Pentagon 
Member/ex-Minister of Health Charity Ngilu were arrested by 
police for organizing attacks on ODM-K, Safina and PNU 
candidates in Kitui Central constituency, Eastern Province. 
In Naivasha, police confiscated machetes, clubs, and bows and 
arrows that were found in a car assigned to the Assistant 
Minister for Water. The Assistant Minister was not in the 
car, but police arrested the driver and later questioned the 
Assistant Minister for over 9 hours in Nairobi regarding his 
involvement in the incident. No charges have been filed 
against the Assistant Minister (reftel A). Police have 
reacted responsibly for the most part, and have frequently 
arrested perpetrators of election-related violence. 
 
¶17. (SBU) Police response to violence against women has been 
less effective.  As a result of repeated calls by women 
political aspirants and civil society groups for increased 
protection, Police Commissioner Hussein Ali made a public 
statement in mid-November that police would provide extra 
security to women aspirants.  However, follow up at the local 
level has been lacking. Post surveyed a large number of women 
aspirants as to whether they had requested or received extra 
security from local police officials.  In three cases, extra 
protection was provided - mostly for one-off campaign 
appearances.  The Center for Multi-Party Democracy, a civil 
society organization, also organized women candidates to 
approach local police to request increased security. CMD 
reported that police did not respond positively to most 
requests. 
 
¶18. (SBU) In most cases where women political aspirants 
requested enhanced security, local police offered to provide 
extra protection only if the candidate paid for the extra 
protection. According to candidates, the quoted price for 
extra police protection was in the range of 2000Ksh per day 
(approximately 32USD). As a general rule, women candidates 
are under-funded and are unable to pay for police protection. 
Therefore, they go without security, despite the dangerous 
environment in which they operate.  If they are able to pay 
for security, they more often opt for a cheaper security 
option:  paying gangs of unemployed (and untrained) youth for 
protection.  Commissioner Ali's statement aside, the 
determining factor on whether or not women aspirants get 
extra security is the assessment of the local police 
 
commissioner. If the police head is motivated, a candidate 
may receive protection for individual campaign events. 
 
¶19. (SBU) Police have taken concrete actions against the 
distribution of hate literature. In early December, four men 
in Keiyo District, Rift Valley Province were arrested on 
suspicion of distributing hate literature. The pamphlets 
allegedly contained a picture doctored so that Raila Odinga 
appearsto be hanging former president Daniel Arap Moi, with 
other prominent Kalenjin leaders await execution at the hands 
of Raila. The suspects were arrested by police after being 
chased by matatu drivers who had collected samples of the 
pamphlet and phoned the police to alert them.  News reports 
stated that two of the four were members of the Kenya 
Administrative Police, a separate institution that answers to 
the Ministry of Interior, not the Kenyan National Police 
Commissioner (reftel A). 
 
¶20. (SBU) To stem the flow of hate speech on the campaign 
trail, the police announced on December 1 the formation of a 
central media monitoring center to assess the content of 
speeches and campaign events. These centers are to be 
replicated at the Provincial level.  Police have threatened 
to press criminal charges where they find that certain speech 
threatens to cause civil unrest.  It is unclear whether this 
initiative will have teeth: it is likely that it is meant 
sending a signal to politicians to dampen their rhetoric and 
self-censor speech content. These monitoring efforts will not 
impede the use of hate speech disseminated on-line or through 
SMS. 
 
21.(SBU) In connection with electoral violence in Kuresoi and 
Molo constituencies, police have arrested 100 suspects and 
charged 60 in connection with the violence. After the first 
round of house burnings and raids, GSU paramilitary police 
were brought in and temporarily calmed the situation, but 
were unable to end the conflict. On December 6, Minister for 
Internal Security John Michuki visited the region and 
gathered leaders to broker a cease fire. At the conclusion of 
the day long talks, Michuki announced the deployment of a 
helicopter squad to the area to augment security forces 
already there.  While there are no indications that local 
police are involved in the attacks, we have heard that police 
effectiveness has been hampered because individual officer,s 
response has, at times, been colored by ethnic ties to 
affected communities (Kenyan police are normally not assigned 
to their local communities, but Kalenjin, Kikuyu and Kisii 
police officers from outside the area can serve in the area). 
 Some suggest that stationing of police from outside the area 
with no ethnic ties to any community will increase police 
effectiveness in containing the violence in Kuresoi and Molo. 
 
COMMENT 
------- 
 
¶22.  (SBU) Opinion polls show a close race between Kibaki and 
Raila Odinga, and we expect the campaign to be hard fought 
and tense, with sporadic conflict between rival supporters. 
The ECK has played an active role in bringing together 
political parties to reduce some of the tension around the 
elections, such as brokering agreements on the use of master 
registration lists to enable the widest possible franchise, 
but it has not until now punished violations of the Code of 
Conduct.  Given its limited resources,  ECK efforts to punish 
violations of the Code could not be comprehensive, and 
selective punishment could open it up to allegations of 
partiality. The ECK has instead focused on undertaking the 
logistical preparations necessary to conduct the elections. 
To their credit, the police have acted in a neutral and 
professional manner to instances of violence, although they 
have largely failed to protect women candidates.  Public 
outcry over electoral violence has lead to a public spat 
between the ECK Chairman, the Police Commissioner, and the 
Attorney General's office, with each stating that the other 
two institutions should be more active in punishing violators 
of the Code. We are concerned by the ongoing violence in the 
Mount Elgon and Kuresoi/Molo regions, which, if it remains 
unresolved, could impact the ability to conduct elections in 
these areas.  Minister Michuki's move to deploy a helicopter 
squad to Kuresoi, while welcome, is open to interpretation as 
 
government intervention to assist the afflicted Kikuyu 
community, in contrast to the more laissez faire approach in 
Mt. Elgon, which does not impact Kikuyu (both Kibaki and 
Michuki are Kikuyu).   But the fact remains that, thus far, 
the national police have performed their duties in a 
professional and neutral manner. This is a welcome sign that 
the campaign, though hard fought and occasionally violent, 
will not spin out of control. END COMMENT 
RANNEBERGER