VZCZCXRO4053
PP RUEHROV
DE RUEHNR #4652/01 3391058
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 051058Z DEC 07
FM AMEMBASSY NAIROBI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 3745
INFO RUCNIAD/IGAD COLLECTIVE
RUEHDR/AMEMBASSY DAR ES SALAAM 5612
RUEHKH/AMEMBASSY KHARTOUM 1716
RUEHDS/AMEMBASSY ADDIS ABABA 9728
RUEHKM/AMEMBASSY KAMPALA 2437
RUEHDJ/AMEMBASSY DJIBOUTI 4947

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 NAIROBI 004652 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPT FOR AF/E 
LONDON, PARIS FOR AFRICA WATCHER 
 
E.O.12958: N/A 
TAGS: PGOV KDEM KE
SUBJECT: Kenya Election: Role of Religious Institutions 
 
REF: A. NAIROBI 4423 
¶B. NAIROBI 3609 
 
Summary 
------- 
¶1. (SBU) Kenya's vibrant religious institutions play an 
active role in public life.  They have figured 
prominently in the run up to the 2007 general elections. 
From sponsoring civic education efforts to backing 
certain candidates, religious leaders from the Christian 
and Muslim communities have used the pulpit to achieve 
their interests.  Much of this activism -- such as 
denouncing violence and promoting voter education -- has 
been positive.  When religious leaders engage in partisan 
politics, however, controversy ensues, which only serves 
to highlight Kenya's ethnic and religious divisions. End 
Summary. 
 
Neutral Advocates for the Democratic Process 
-------------------------------------------- 
 
¶2. (SBU) In the run-up to the December 27 national 
elections, Kenya's diverse religious institutions have 
advocated vociferously for a range of interests.  Much of 
this advocacy centers on the integrity of the electoral 
process.  Prominent religious institutions, such as the 
National Council of Churches (NCCK) and the Supreme 
Council of Muslims (SUPKEM), routinely declare their 
neutrality and encourage members to make their own 
decisions. 
 
¶3. (SBU) Some institutions, such as the NCCK and the 
Kenya Council of Imams and Ulema (KCIU) also conduct 
civic education programs.  NCCK's program is specifically 
aimed at combating voter apathy and helping voters 
determine how to judge candidates against their 
priorities.  NCCK and SUPKEM also plan to participate as 
domestic election observers. 
 
¶4. (SBU) Religious organizations of all stripes have also 
implored political parties to refrain from violence.  In 
September, the Inter-Religious Forum (which includes 
Christians, Muslims, and Hindus) and UNDP brought 
political parties together to sign a pact against 
election violence. 
 
Advocating for Traditional 
Interests versus Taking Sides 
----------------------------- 
 
¶5. (SBU) Religious activism has taken on ecclesiastical 
and community interests as well.  While some positions 
are clearly in line with church doctrine -- such as the 
Catholic Bishops' Conference of Kenya calling for 
aspiring leaders to reject abortion, euthanasia, and the 
death penalty -- other leaders' declarations have been 
more political and have correspondingly sparked 
controversy. 
 
¶6. (SBU) Cardinal John Njue made headlines in October 
when he spoke out against the establishment of federalism 
(majimbo), for which opposition candidates Raila Odinga 
and Kalonzo Musyoka have both advocated (ref A).  Some 
accused Njue (a Kikuyu) of supporting President Kibaki 
(another Kikuyu) out of ethnic solidarity.  Other 
Catholic bishops later denied that Njue's comments 
reflected the position of the Catholic Church. 
 
¶7. (SBU) Apart from the majimbo debate, presidential 
aspirants' courting of the Muslim vote has caused the 
most controversy this year. Muslims represent only 10 
percent of the population and have never voted as a bloc, 
but the close presidential race has created an incentive 
for candidates to outline how they will address the 
community's grievances. 
 
¶8. (SBU) To show his sympathy with Muslim interests, 
President Kibaki established a Presidential Action 
Committee to investigate complaints that Muslims suffer 
unfair discrimination and declared the Islamic holy day 
of Eid ul Adha a national holiday.  Opposition Orange 
Democratic Movement (ODM) candidate Raila Odinga signed a 
Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) with the National 
 
NAIROBI 00004652  002 OF 002 
 
 
Muslim Leaders' Forum (NAMLEF) promising to attend to the 
community's needs in exchange for their support. 
 
Candidate Advocacy, Secrecy 
Lead to Fearmongering, Division 
------------------------------- 
 
¶9. (SBU) KCIU representative Musa Mwale told PolOff that 
NAMLEF wanted the contents of its MOU with Odinga to 
remain confidential because they believed it would 
encourage other presidential candidates to conclude 
similar agreements with them.  (Note: KCIU is one of 
NAMLEF's member organizations. End Note.) 
 
¶10. (SBU) If this is true, NAMLEF grossly miscalculated. 
Shortly after the agreement was concluded, a false 
version of the MOU (likely created by Kibaki supporters) 
was widely publicized, claiming that if elected, Odinga 
would "recognize Islam as the only true religion," 
require non-Islamic religious activities in Coast 
Province to be approved by an Islamic council, ban 
alcohol, and impose strict Islamic restrictions on 
women's dress. 
 
¶11. (SBU) While the fake MOU was inflammatory and hardly 
plausible (Odinga is Anglican), it generated negative 
publicity for Odinga and exposed ethnic rifts in both the 
Islamic and Christian communities.  In late November, 
Christian church leaders from Western, Nyanza, and Rift 
Valley Provinces (Luo, Luhya, and Kalenjin dominated 
areas) supported Odinga and implied that Christian 
leaders in Kikuyu-dominated areas of Central Province 
were promoting (or at least tolerating) a sectarian hate 
campaign against Odinga.  The leaders also accused groups 
in Kikuyu-dominated communities of holding "oathing 
ceremonies" to enforce Kikuyu electoral solidarity and 
rituals to curse political opponents - practices 
associated most recently with the organized crime 
syndicate Mungiki.  (In fact, there have been no credible 
reports of such practices in Kikuyu communities in recent 
times, outside the Mungiki.) 
 
¶12. (SBU) As for the Muslims, the MOU brought out 
divisions between coastal and ethnic Somali Muslims, who 
received perks in the MOU, and the rest of their brethren 
in faith.  "Upcountry Muslims" and various pro-Kibaki or 
neutral Muslim associations complained of the 
presumptiousness of NAMLEF to negotiate on behalf of the 
entire community. 
 
¶13. (SBU) In late November, ODM and NAMLEF belatedly 
released the real MOU, but it did little to unify Muslim 
leaders.  The contents were hardly inflammatory and 
closely matched Odinga's public promises to the Muslim 
community (e.g., redress historical marginalization with 
targeted development, end discrimination and human rights 
abuses, including the alleged rendition of Kenyans to 
Somalia, Ethiopia, and Guantanamo Bay, etc.).  SUPKEM 
officials rejected it, however, claiming that NAMLEF had 
no authority to speak on behalf of Kenya's Muslims. 
SUPKEM's rejection was perhaps understandable, as the 
group's Secretary General had already endorsed President 
Kibaki.  Perhaps more importantly, Odinga's MOU promise 
to "embrace NAMLEF as his partner of choice" and accord 
it an advisory role in his administration could 
significantly diminish SUPKEM's influence if Odinga wins. 
 
Comment 
------- 
 
¶14. (SBU) Ethnic identity has always commanded a stronger 
allegiance than religious affinity when Kenyans go to the 
ballot box.  At their best, Kenya's religious 
institutions have played a positive role, encouraging 
people to vote according to their principles rather than 
their fears.  This election season has also shown, 
however, that religious leaders who choose to engage in 
partisan politics risk entangling their institutions in 
highly charged and ethnically-driven campaign 
controversies, possibly to the detriment of their flock's 
unity. 
 
RANNEBERGER