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OO RUEHCHI RUEHCN RUEHDT RUEHHM
DE RUEHML #3994/01 3540852
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
O 200852Z DEC 07
FM AMEMBASSY MANILA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 9241
INFO RUEHZS/ASSOCIATION OF SOUTHEAST ASIAN NATIONS IMMEDIATE
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC IMMEDIATE
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
RHHMUNA/CDRUSPACOM HONOLULU HI IMMEDIATE

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 04 MANILA 003994 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR S/CT (RHONDA SHORE), EAP/MTS, 
DS/IP/ATA,DS/IP/EAP, DS/IT/ATA 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PTER ASEC RP
SUBJECT: PHILIPPINES: 2007 COUNTRY REPORT ON TERRORISM 
 
¶1.  (U) Summary:  The Philippines, one of the earliest 
supporters in the global coalition against terrorism, 
continues to cooperate with the United States on bilateral 
and multilateral counterterrorism efforts.  In 2007, eight of 
140 bombings that occurred in the Philippines were ascribed 
to terrorism, while the motive for 78 bombings is unknown. 
Intensive civil-military and internal security operations 
were conducted to eliminate terrorist safehavens in the Sulu 
Archipelago and central Mindanao.  Thirty-eight Abu Sayyaf 
Group members were captured and arrested and 127 were killed 
by Philippine military and law enforcement authorities in 
¶2007.  Fourteen members of the Abu Sayyaf Group were 
sentenced to life imprisonment for their role in the May 2001 
Dos Palmas kidnapping of 20 persons, including three 
Americans.  President Arroyo signed landmark anti-terrorism 
legislation to improve the Philippine government's ability to 
investigate and prosecute terrorism crimes.  End Summary. 
 
 
------------------ 
GENERAL ASSESSMENT 
------------------ 
 
¶2.  (U) The Philippines, one of the earliest supporters in 
the global coalition against terrorism, continues to 
cooperate closely with the United States on bilateral and 
multilateral counterterrorism efforts. 
 
¶3.  (U) The Philippines faces numerous threats from 
terrorism.  Operating within the country are the Abu Sayyaf 
Group (ASG), Communist Party of the Philippines/New Peoples 
Army (CPP/NPA), and Jemaah Islamiyah (JI), all of which the 
U.S. Government has designated as Foreign Terrorist 
Organizations (FTOs).  In addition, the Alex Boncayao Brigade 
(ABB) and the Pentagon Gang are on the U.S. Terrorist 
Exclusion List. 
 
¶4.  (U) In 2007, 140 bombings and 46 explosions left 142 dead 
and 534 injured in the Philippines, according to the 
Philippine National Police (PNP) Bomb Data Center.  According 
to PNP, 44 bombings were the result of improvised explosive 
devices (IEDs), 63 from grenades, 3 from landmines, and 30 
from other ordnance/explosives.  PNP investigations 
established the motives for eight of the 140 bombings as 
terrorism, while 15 bombings were election related, 13 were 
extortion, 10 stemmed from revenge, four from "harassment," 
three for "emotional reasons," two for "political" reasons, 
two for "personal gain," two were accidental, two were 
"ideological," and one was vandalism.  The motives for the 
remaining 78 bombings remain unknown. 
 
¶5.  (U) In January, five bombs exploded in Tacurong, 
Cotabato, General Santos, and Kidapawan cities in Mindanao 
killing eight people and injuring over 20.  In May, two bombs 
exploded in Tacurong and Cotabato cities killing six people 
and injuring 43.  In June, two bombs exploded inside of 
commuter buses in central Mindanao killing eleven people.  In 
September, a bomb exploded in Cotabato City injuring one 
person.  Also in September, three bombs exploded in a market 
area and public square in Zamboanga City, western Mindanao 
injuring one person.  In November, a bomb exploded within a 
shopping mall in Kidapawan City killing one person and 
injuring eight. 
 
¶6.  (U) Philippine authorities recovered 18 improvised 
explosive devices, 33 grenades, and 49 military 
ordnance/vintage bombs.  Thirteen bomb threats/hoaxes also 
occurred in 2007, according to PNP data. 
 
¶7.  (U) Philippine authorities had numerous successes against 
terrorists in 2007.  According to the Philippines Department 
of Justice, thirty-eight ASG members were captured or 
apprehended.  On January 13, Philippine law enforcement 
authorities arrested Kule Mamagong in North Cotabato for his 
involvement in three bombings that left six dead and 36 
injured.  On March 11, Philippine military officials captured 
ASG member Abu Usman for his role in a January 2001 
kidnapping in Lantawan, Basilan.  On March 16, Philippine 
security forces on Basilan captured ASG member Merang Abate 
for his involvement in several kidnappings.  In late March, 
the Philippine police arrested Pentagon Gang members, Alimona 
Cali and Beru Mendoza, for their role in a 1997 kidnapping of 
five civilians.  On May 9, the Philippine police arrested 
Taya Kulat for his involvement in a bombing in Tacurong City. 
 On May 11, Philippine security forces raided an ASG 
safehouse on Simunul Island, Tawi Tawi, and arrested four 
children of fugitive JI bomber, Dulmatin, and deported them 
 
MANILA 00003994  002 OF 004 
 
 
to Indonesia.  In September, Philippine security officials 
arrested eight ASG members on Palawan Island and in 
Zamboanga.  On November 12, Philippine security officials 
arrested Demaatol Guialal in Sultan Kudarat for his 
involvement in two bombings that left six dead and over 20 
injured.  On December 6, 14 ASG members were sentenced to 
life imprisonment for the May 2001 Dos Palmas kidnapping of 
20 people, including three Americans.  On December 10, 
Philippine authorities arrested ASG member Abdel Kamala in 
Zamboanga City for his role in the 2001 Dos Palmas kidnapping 
and June 2001 attack on Lamitan, Basilan. 
 
¶8.  (U)  Philippine security forces killed 127 ASG members 
during armed encounters in 2007, according to the 
Anti-Terrorism Council.  On January 6, the Philippine 
military killed five ASG terrorists and one suspected JI 
operative near the southern island of Tawi-Tawi.  On January 
7, the Philippine military killed ASG bomb expert, Binang 
Sali, in a firefight on Jolo.  On January 16, Philippine 
military forces killed ASG spokesman Jainal Sali a.k.a. Abu 
Solaiman during an armed encounter on Jolo.  On August 18, 
the Philippine military killed ASG members, Furuji and Umair 
Indama, who were involved in the 2001 beheading of U.S. 
citizen Guillermo Sobero, an October 2002 bombing that killed 
a U.S. serviceman, and the July 10 beheadings of 10 
Philippine Marines on Basilan.  In the aftermath of a 
November 13 bombing at Congress that left five dead and nine 
injured, Philippine law enforcement authorities killed ASG 
member, Abu Jandal, during a raid of a safehouse in Manila. 
On December 15, Philippine security forces killed ASG member 
Mubin Sakandal in Tawi-Tawi. 
 
¶9.  (U) U.S. and Philippine authorities worked closely during 
2007 on rewards programs targeting terrorist groups.  The 
U.S. Department of State paid $5 million in June through its 
Rewards for Justice Program to informants who provided 
information that led to the killing and later recovery of the 
remains of ASG leader Khadaffy Janjalani.  Also in June, the 
U.S. Department of State Rewards for Justice Program paid $5 
million to several informants for information leading to the 
killing of ASG leader Jainal Sali a.k.a Abu Solaiman.  Using 
its rewards program, the U.S. Department of Defense made 
payments to informants whose information led to the capture 
of: Khair Malvan Mundos ($10,000, April), Mohammad Yusuf 
Karim ($30,000, April), Redendo Dellosa ($35,000, April), 
Mariano Lomarda ($7,500, April), Abubakar Delos Reyes 
($5,000, April), Binang Andang Sali ($35,000, April), Jundam 
Jamalul ($50,000 April), Ismin Sahiron ($50,000, June), 
Alnaser Parad ($30,000, June), and Itting and Omar Sailani 
(November, $50,000).  In total, the U.S. paid out $10,302,500 
for information leading to the arrest or killing of 13 ASG 
members. 
 
¶10.  (U) The passage of the Human Security Act (HSA) during 
2007 was a major step forward in the modernization of 
Philippine law enforcement tools for use against terrorists. 
It permits wiretapping of members of judicially designated 
terrorist organizations, as well as financial investigations 
of individuals connected to terrorist organizations. 
However, the Human Security Act has yet to be used in actual 
cases, as the Anti-Terrorism Council develops procedures and 
protocols to comply with strict restrictions specified in the 
new law. 
 
¶11.  (U) Problems in the law enforcement system still hamper 
bringing terrorists to justice in the Philippines, including 
limited financial resources, inadequate salaries, corruption, 
low morale, and limited cooperation between police and 
prosecutors.  The Philippine government is working to improve 
the situation with U.S. and other foreign assistance.  In 
December, OPDAT-funded training was provided in Manila by 
U.S. prosecutors and FBI agents to 34 representatives of the 
Philippine Anti-Terrorism Council.  The training was directed 
at assisting the Philippines in the implementation of the 
HSA.  The training focused on ways to use electronic 
surveillance authority contained in the HSA, and on 
procedures that could be used to obtain judicial designation 
of organizations as terrorist under the HSA. 
 
¶12.  (U) The Philippine government contributed fully to 
regional and international efforts to combat terrorist 
financing and strives to fulfill its responsibilities through 
the United Nations to detect and block the flow of funding to 
individuals and entities that support terrorism.  The 
implementation of the Human Security Act will facilitate 
these efforts. 
 
 
MANILA 00003994  003 OF 004 
 
 
¶13.  (U) The Anti-Money Laundering Council (AMLC), operating 
under the Philippine Anti-Money Laundering Act of 2001 
(AMLA), as amended in 2003, pursues the investigation and 
prosecution of money laundering and is the lead agency 
responsible for implementing the asset freeze measures called 
for by the UN Security Council 1267 Sanctions Committee.  The 
Philippine government has signed and ratified all 12 
international conventions and protocols related to terrorism, 
including those pertaining to the suppression of terrorist 
financing.  The AMLA is the legislative basis for the 
implementation of the financial actions against al-Qaida and 
the Taliban.  Under the current law, however, the AMLC cannot 
take direct action against suspected terrorists or those 
supporting terrorism, but must apply for a court order to 
inquire into bank accounts and direct the freezing of assets 
and transactions. 
 
¶14.  (U) The United States and the Philippines government 
signed a bilateral Extradition Treaty in 1996.  The treaty 
gives precedence to the Philippine government for the 
prosecution, conviction, and imprisonment of Filipino 
criminals apprehended in the Philippines, but the Philippine 
government has routinely issued arrest warrants for Filipino 
nationals whom the U.S. has sought on terrorism charges.  The 
Philippine government did not extradite or request 
extradition of terrorists for prosecution during 2007. 
 
¶15.  (U) The Philippine government does not offer any support 
for terrorists either within or outside its borders. 
 
¶16.  (U) The Philippine government consistently supports the 
United States in the United Nations General Assembly and 
United Nations Security Council on matters related to 
terrorism. 
 
--------------------------------- 
SANCTUARY (SAFE HAVEN) ASSESSMENT 
--------------------------------- 
 
¶17.  (U) The Philippine government conducted intensive 
civil-military and internal security operations during 2007 
to eliminate terrorist safehavens within the Sulu Archipelago 
and central Mindanao.  Joint U.S. - Philippines military 
exercises ("Balikatan") and visits by the USS Peleliu, USS 
Blue Ridge, USS Jarrett, USS Harpers Ferry, USS Reuben James, 
and USS Ford supported the Philippine government's campaign 
to separate terrorists from the general population and 
diminish support for their cause. 
 
¶18.  (U) The Armed Forces of the Philippines, with U.S. 
intelligence, reconnaissance, and surveillance support, 
conducted operations to capture ASG and JI leaders on the 
island of Jolo: Isnilon Hapilon, Omar Patek, and Dulmatin. 
The Philippine government is aware that some JI members have 
obtained safe haven in Mindanao and is actively engaged in 
efforts to capture them.  There is an Ad Hoc Joint Action 
Group in which the Philippine government and the Moro Islamic 
Liberation Front cooperate against terrorists and criminals 
in Mindanao. 
 
¶19.  (U) Philippine military and law enforcement at the 
regional and provincial level work closely with U.S. Embassy 
counterparts and visiting military personnel to ensure 
counterterrorism force protection for more than 25 annual 
bilateral military events.  In 2007, U.S. and Philippine 
military and law enforcement officials cooperated against JI 
and ASG targets, with U.S. officials actively assisting in 
the investigation of terrorist attacks.  Members of Joint 
Special Operations Task Force - Philippines in the southern 
Philippines are involved in civil-military operations and 
intelligence fusion to help the AFP develop a sustained 
counter terrorism capability.  The Embassy's law enforcement 
team maintains regular contact with police and security 
counterparts.  The Mission received excellent levels of 
cooperation from Philippine law enforcement officials in 
obtaining access to terrorist detainees and witnesses for FBI 
interviews, and access to criminal, immigration, financial, 
and biographic records via the mechanisms established in the 
U.S. - Philippine Mutual Legal Assistance Treaty.  The U.S. 
Department of State's Bureau of Diplomatic Security is 
improving the capability of Philippine agencies to respond to 
terrorist threats through an in-country Anti-Terrorism 
Program. 
 
¶20.  (U) Neither the proliferation nor the trafficking of 
weapons of mass destruction plays a role in terrorism in the 
Philippines, though the Philippine National Intelligence 
 
MANILA 00003994  004 OF 004 
 
 
Coordinating Agency remains concerned about possible future 
developments. 
 
---------------- 
TERRORIST GROUPS 
---------------- 
 
¶21.  (U) The Embassy has no information suggesting that any 
foreign government provides financial support, military or 
paramilitary training, weapons, diplomatic recognition, or 
sanctuary from prosecution to terrorist groups operating in 
the Philippines. 
 
¶22.  (U) The Philippines government considers the New 
People's Army as the greatest threat to the security of the 
Philippines, and is continuing a campaign to render the 
39-year old communist insurgency "inconsequential" by 2010. 
 
 
------------------------------ 
FOREIGN GOVERNMENT COOPERATION 
------------------------------ 
 
¶23.  (U) The Philippines cooperates fully with the United 
States on bilateral and multilateral counterterrorism 
efforts.  The Philippine Security Engagement Board is the 
primary mechanism for planning and coordination on 
non-traditional security issues, including counterterrorism 
and maritime security.  This watershed agreement serves as 
the foundation for the "Kapit Bisig" (Arm-In-Arm) 
counterterrorism framework that focuses on civil affairs, 
capability upgrades, and support for AFP operations. 
 
¶24.  (U) The United States is assisting the Philippines in 
the establishment of interagency intelligence fusion centers 
to support maritime interdictions against transnational 
criminal/terrorist organizations as well as a "Coast Watch" 
system in Mindanao.  A U.S. built facility, the Maritime Drug 
Enforcement Center; is located at the Philippines Drug 
Enforcement Agency Headquarters in Quezon City.  Three 
satellite centers, called Maritime Information Coordination 
Centers, are located at the headquarters of the Philippine 
Naval Forces - Western Mindanao in Zamboanga del Sur 
(southwestern Mindanao), the Coast Guard Station in General 
Santos City (south-central Mindanao), and at Poro Point, San 
Fernando, La Union (northwestern Luzon). 
 
¶25.  (U) The Philippine Department of Foreign Affairs (DFA) 
began issuing digitized, machine-readable passports in June. 
While the Philippines cooperates with USG requests for 
prosecutions for persons who tamper or alter travel 
documents, the prosecutions carry low level penalties.  In 
addition, there is a reluctance to investigate or charge 
vendors or users of false documents when the Philippine 
government is not the issuing authority. 
 
¶26.  (U) Embassy Manila's POC for the 2007 Terrorism Report 
is Political Officer Stephen Worobec (worobecSF@state.gov), 
telephone 301-2000, ext. 2288. 
 
 
KENNEY