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Viewing cable 07MANAGUA2618, NICARAGUA: CIVIL AVIATION UPDATE - DECEMBER 2007

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
07MANAGUA2618 2007-12-20 21:25 2011-06-23 08:00 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Embassy Managua
VZCZCXYZ0001
RR RUEHWEB

DE RUEHMU #2618/01 3542125
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 202125Z DEC 07 ZDK
FM AMEMBASSY MANAGUA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 1843
INFO RUEHZA/WHA CENTRAL AMERICAN COLLECTIVE
RHMCSUU/FAA NATIONAL HQ WASHINGTON DC
RHMFIUU/TSA HQ WASHINGTON DC
RUEAYVF/FAA MIAMI ARTCC MIAMI FL
UNCLAS MANAGUA 002618 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR WHA/CEN, WHA/EPSC, AND EEB/TRA 
FAA MIAMI FOR TSAR VGUARDIA 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: EAIR EINV ETRD PGOV NU
SUBJECT: NICARAGUA: CIVIL AVIATION UPDATE - DECEMBER 2007 
 
REF: MANAGUA 983 
 
1. (SBU) This cable contains an action request.  Please see 
paragraph 6. 
 
2. (SBU) Summary:  As a follow-up to an October 10-15 Transportation 
Security Administration (TSA) inspection, the Embassy hosted a 
roundtable with airline representatives on December 5.   While the 
TSA inspection was successful overall, thes5*2%fon over liquid, aerosol and 
gas (LAG) screening.  Since TSA's visit, airlines undertake to 
screen 100% of all luggage and passengers they carry.  On December 
5, airline representatives stated that they were able to reach an 
agreement with airport administrators on billing issues.  They are 
concerned, however, about an increase in luggage pilfering and the 
performance of overworked security guards supplied by the Nicaraguan 
army.  End Summary. 
 
TSA Inspection Mostly Positive 
------------------------------ 

3. (SBU) A TSA team conducted a full inspection of Managua's 
international airport, both passenger and cargo operations, from 
October 10-14.  During their inspection, they met frequently with 
the Nicaraguan airport administration authority (EAAI), the 
Nicaraguan Civil Aviation Institute (INAC), and airline 
representatives.  The TSA team reported mostly good cooperation from 
the Nicaraguan authorities, although protocol, procedure, and notice 
requirements were tighter than in previous visits. 
 
4. (SBU) TSA inspectors felt the visit and assessment went well, and 
set the groundwork for a new relationship with the new airport 
administration.  The military commander of airport security was open 
and responsive, sharing all operational documents requested by TSA. 
Security contingency plans met ICAO standards.  In the general 
aviation area, controls were in place with properly issued airport 
identification badges and background checks. 
 
5. (SBU) TSA pointed out four areas for improvement.  (1) Security 
and safety audits, tests, surveys and inspections need to be 
documented when conducted.  (2) Of sixteen functional airport 
surveillance cameras operated by the police, nine cameras needed 
repair or replacement.  (3) The airport grass is too tall, blocking 
perimeter surveillance.  (4) A squatter camp is situated next to one 
of the perimeter walls, making it easy for the wall to be climbed. 
EAAI promised the grass would be cut and the squatters removed. 
 
6. (SBU) Separately, a TSA team member recommended TSA instruction 
on basic, aviation, and cargo security, survey, inspection and 
testing techniques, as well as instructor training for INAC, 
airport, and aviation security personnel.  TSA instructors are 
available to provide on-site training, but funding may have to come 
from other agency or institutional sponsors.  Action request:  Post 
requests Department assistance in procuring such funding. 
 
7. (SBU) TSA also inspected air carriers flying into the United 
States.  American Airlines, American Airlines Cargo, and TACA fully 
complied with all requirements.  Continental Airlines and Delta 
Airlines had a few minor, unspecified issues.  Spirit Airlines had 
to implement some small procedural changes.  UPS Cargo had some 
paperwork issues. 
 
Liquids, Aerosols and Gels (LAG) 
-------------------------------- 

8. (SBU) During the inspection, the airport and airlines experienced 
some confusion regarding LAG passenger screening.  Just prior to 
TSA's inspection, the`\v[2Y%mX]s.,BQ