VZCZCXYZ0000
OO RUEHWEB

DE RUEHKI #1340/01 3391532
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
O 051532Z DEC 07
FM AMEMBASSY KINSHASA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 7199

UNCLAS KINSHASA 001340 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SENSTIVE 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PGOV KDEM MOPS PREL PREF KPKO CG
SUBJECT:  Ambassador Garvelink in Goma December 3 
 
SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED - PROTECT ACCORDINGLY 
 
 
 
¶1.  (SBU) Summary:  Ambassador Garvelink's introductory 
trip to Goma December 3 coincided with commencement of military 
action in the Mushaki area (west of Sake) by the FARDC against 
Nkunda's forces.  MONUC/North Kivu commander General Narayan told 
the Ambassador that, the previous day, Nkunda's forces had pushed 
north from their zone of control, seizing Kikuku and Nyanzale 
(northwestern Rutshura Territory) along with six tons of arms and 
several months' pay for the 15th Brigade, which fled.  Narayan 
predicted that, though Nkunda had been boosted by these new arms, 
the FARDC (with considerable MONUC logistical help) ought to prevail 
in its campaign against Nkunda within a month and a half.  North 
Kivu Governor Paluku, who had just survived a censure motion in the 
provincial assembly, lamented that Nkunda was producing increased 
anti-Tutsi sentiment among the populace.  OCHA chief Lavand'homme 
told the Ambassador that people from Nyanzale and Kikuku were being 
displaced northward, into an area ever more difficult to access from 
Goma.  With the onset of fighting, all UN humanitarian missions 
outside the Goma area had been canceled for the time being. 
Fighting could potentially add 160,000 displaced persons to the 
present 800-900,000 in the "Petit Nord" (the populous part of North 
Kivu within 60 miles of Goma).  End Summary. 
 
MONUC/North Kivu 
---------------- 
 
¶2.  (SBU) General Narayan said that FARDC had planned to begin its 
campaign against Nkunda December 5 but had moved up the start date 
two days because of Nkunda's attack on Kikuku and Nyanzale December 
¶1.  Nkunda seized six tons of arms and ammunition as well as pay for 
the 15th Brigade, which fled the scene.  Narayan surmised that 
Nkunda had good intelligence on the arrival of this pay packet (the 
15th Brigade had not been paid since August 15) and that he well 
knew the weakness of this brigade, as it had similarly fled during 
fighting near Sake in August and thereafter been moved to the less 
strategic Nyanzale area.  Narayan said that prior to Nkunda's attack 
on Nyanzale/Kikuku, MONUC had concluded that his forces were 
suffering from lower morale and diminishing supplies.  Through 
October and November, Nkunda had made probes in the Rushuru area and 
even on the approach to Goma, but these had gained him nothing. 
 
¶3.  (SBU) Narayan said that FARDC was sticking to its plan, 
concentrating first on completely clearing the Sake-Masisi road of 
Nkunda's forces and then turning north into the heartland of 
Nkunda-held territory (centered around Kirolirwe and Kitchanga, 
along the western border of Virunga Park).  FARDC had commenced 
heavy firing on the morning of December 3 with artillery, mortars, 
and two attack helicopters (with Russian pilots).  Two brigades (14 
and 81) had now taken the height of a strategic ridge ("Celtel" 
ridge) and would form two pincers to try to take the town of 
Mushaki, five miles northwest of Sake, on the road to Masisi.  MONUC 
was providing full logistical support.  In Narayan's analysis -- a 
point emphatically seconded by MONUC Head of Office in a subsequent 
conversation -- the population of North Kivu was overwhelmingly in 
favor of military action to eliminate Nkunda and felt that the FDLR 
problem was secondary. 
 
¶4.  (SBU) The Ambassador asked how the next days would unfold. 
Narayan said the FARDC was commencing an "all-out offensive" on 
Nkunda.  There was pressure from headquarters for a quick 
resolution, but Narayan expected the campaign would last a month and 
a half.  There were only 3,000 soldiers with Nkunda but they were 
relatively good and their leaders (including Bosco) would push them 
to fight to the last; however, Narayan said, a few significant 
battlefield reverses might net significant desertions.  The FARDC 
campaign would concentrate on the Sake-Kitchanga corridor rather 
than on the Nkunda pocket between Rutshura and the Rwandan border, 
as Nkunda's forces in that pocket would be extremely difficult to 
root out.  Narayan said that there was now an increased threat to 
the northern part of North Kivu ("Grand Nord") following Nkunda's 
triumph at Nyanzale and Kikuku, but Narayan said that he doubted 
Nkunda would move north, even though the FARDC was now extremely 
thin there.  USAID Nash asked whether MONUC was prepared to assure 
the safety of thousands of mainly Tutsi displaced persons in 
Kirolirwe, to which Narayan responded that FARDC was well aware of 
the problem and that MONUC was poised to move those IDP's out of 
harm's way. 
 
OCHA and NGO's 
--------------- 
 
¶5.  (SBU) OCHA chief Patrick Lavand'home told the Ambassador that 
there was a movement of displaced persons north from Nyanzale and 
Kikuku toward Kibirizi and Kanyabonga (no precision on numbers).  He 
said he had "signals" that Nkunda and FARDC were reinforcing near 
Rutshuru (Nkoko). The UN had canceled all its humanitarian missions 
outside the Goma area, even recommending against anyone taking the 
road north to Rutshuru.  A few NGO's had not heeded the call to come 
into Goma, particularly in the Rutshuru area where MONUC was thought 
to be committed staunchly to defend the city.  He had learned that 
Medecins Sans Frontieres/France (MSF/France) had now safely removed 
itself from Nyanzale, having decided to stay in the days prior to 
Nkunda's attack. 
 
¶6.  (SBU) Reviewing the IDP presence in North Kivu, Lavand'homme 
said that there were close to 400,000 IDP's confirmed since December 
¶2006.  He said that there were an additional 100,000 unconfirmed in 
inaccessible areas.  In addition to these recent IDP's, there were 
400,000 long-term IDP's dating from conflict in 1996-2000, who were 
registered but did not receive assistance.  Lavand'homme said that 
the displacements since August 2007 had shown a greater trend toward 
ethnic division, with Tutsis tending to move into Nkunda-held 
territory and others toward government-held territory, especially 
the Kivu coast. The last three weeks had seen an increase of Tutsi 
IDP's fleeing into Nkunda territory from west and east, due to FDLR 
and Mai Mai harassment.  The UN community had decided to provide 
equal service to the Kirolirwe IDP camp in the heart of Nkunda 
territory, even though it was mainly made up of women and children 
and seemed a recruiting ground for Nkunda; indeed, the government 
had recommended such assistance, wanting to show even-handedness 
toward Tutsis.  USAID Nash noted that he had observed, in a WFP trip 
to Kirolirwe November 29, that at least half of Nkunda's soldiers 
appeared to be non-Tutsi, presumably Hutu.  Lavand'homme suggested 
that Nkunda's hold on these Hutus was partly due to a long, habitual 
interrelationship dating from the time the two groups fought 
together during the 1998-2003 war on the side of the rebel 
Rassamblement Congolais pour la Democracie (RCD) movement, and 
partly to fear of FARDC.  He said that defections from Nkunda had 
been relatively neglible. 
 
¶7.  (SBU) Lavand'homme calculated that the present fighting could 
add 160,000 IDP's in the Petit Nord, in addition to IDP's who would 
be undergoing multiple displacement.  Lavand'home said that the 
Nyanzale area had earlier been projected as a zone of likely refuge 
for IDP's, as the UN community had not expected that the 15th 
Brigade to fall to Nkunda; now it had become a zone of displacement. 
 There was no airport in the Nyanzale area to facilitate transport 
of assistance to these IDP's, but the road from Goma to Kanyabayonga 
was serviceable. 
 
¶8.  (SBU) In a following meeting with NGO's, the Ambassador asked 
for thoughts on where the international community should put 
humanitarian emphasis in North Kivu.  UNHCR noted FARDC harassment 
in IDP camps as a very serious issue, along with lack of access to 
significant swathes of territory and, now, the problem of ensuring 
safe passage for Tutsis and others now to be displaced and 
redisplaced.  ICRC highlighted the notorious lack of discipline in 
the FARDC.  WFP emphasized the scale of killing, sexual violence, 
and looting, and the intractable problems of land tenure ("all of 
North Kivu is owned by five people") and impunity/absence of a 
system of justice.  UNDP said that planning for a possible era when 
fighting ended would need to emphasize income-generating for farmers 
and fishermen, rehabilitation of infrastructure and social services, 
and a push for peace and reconciliation among the ethnic 
communities.  OCHA put in a plea for diplomacy rather than military 
action, noting that MONUC had its hands tied, being unable to talk 
directly to Nkunda. 
 
Call on Governor 
---------------- 
 
¶9.  (SBU) The Ambassador's first call was on Governor Julien Paluku 
(a Nande from the Grand Nord), who focused on Nkunda.  In a long 
review of recent history, Paluku said that the government had tried 
a diplomatic approach with Nkunda, which had failed.  Nkunda 
attempted to justify himself as a protector of the Tutsi community 
and a champion of the return of Congolese Tutsi refugees now in 
Rwanda.  In fact, there had been no traditional animosity toward 
Tutsis in Congo, a country where every ethnic group is a minority. 
Nkunda had been a key military commander during Rwanda's "imperium" 
over eastern Congo 1998-2003 and done nothing to repatriate Tutsi 
refugees at that time.  In Paluku's view, the worrying trend was 
that Nkunda was bringing about an antagonism to Tutsis that had not 
previously existed.  No Tutsi had been elected to the provincial 
assembly during the recent elections, but it had in turn selected a 
Tutsi as a senator.  Paluku had chosen a Tutsi as his provincial 
planning/budget minister, as well as several staff members.  The 
Ambassador inquired what Nkunda's real objectives were, to which 
Paluku responded that he did not know.   Whatever they were, Nkunda 
had to be eradicated. His presence was sowing instability. 
 
¶10.  (SBU) The Ambassador asked what impact the fighting that was 
just getting under way would have on the civilian population. 
Paluku said if the military campaign were not carefully executed, it 
would be likely to see the number of IDP's in the area exceed one 
million.  He feared that there would even be a threat to food 
adequacy in Goma itself. 
Paluku regretted that the government had not been effective in 
getting out the message of the real situation on the ground.  The 
Ambassador, introducing political officer Haywood Rankin, said that 
accurate information-gathering was one of the principal reasons that 
the United States had wanted a presence in Goma.  Paluku welcomed 
Rankin, apologizing that he had not received him in the five days 
since he had arrived in Goma.  He explained that he had had to fight 
a censure motion in the provincial assembly, on spurious grounds of 
embezzling public funds.  He had spent most of December 1 defending 
himself - successfully it turned out - in the assembly against this 
motion.  He was pleased to report the vote on the motion of censure 
was 27 to 15 in his favor, while he had been elected by the assembly 
several months ago by a vote of 25 to 17. 
 
¶11.  (SBU) Paluku exclaimed, "If the United States is involved in 
anything, a week is enough to solve it."  The Ambassador said that 
he only wished it were so.  Paluku concluded if the United States 
succeeded, it would be the greatest news for the people of North 
Kivu. 
 
Garvelink