VZCZCXRO8163
RR RUEHGR
DE RUEHKG #1770 3442017
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 102017Z DEC 07
FM AMEMBASSY KINGSTON
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 5718
INFO RUCNCOM/EC CARICOM COLLECTIVE

UNCLAS KINGSTON 001770 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
WHA/CAR FOR VDEPIRO, KWILLIAMS, JTILGHMAN 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: SOCI PHUM PREL KCRM SNAR JM
SUBJECT: JAMAICA: WAITING FOR A POLITICAL DECISION ON 
DEPORTEE REINTEGRATION PROGRAM 
 
REF: BRIDGETOWN 1499 
 
¶1. (SBU) on December 7, prompted by reports of the strident 
commentary from the Jamaican Ministry of National Security 
Special Advisor on Policy Anne-Marie Barnes (REFTEL), and by 
a continued lack of forward movement by the Government of 
Jamaica towards opening bilateral talks with the 
International Organization for Migration (IOM) on the pilot 
Deportee Reintegration Program, CDA sent Prime Minister 
Golding and Foreign Minister Baugh letters urging Jamaica to 
respond clearly and favorably to the USG proposal.  On 
December 10, NAS Director met with the Minister of National 
Security's Senior Advisor, Errol Strong, to seek his 
assistance in breaking the bureaucratic log jam to permit IOM 
to begin its work in Jamaica.  Strong agreed that Jamaica 
needs this program and he clearly understands that there is a 
bigger picture that has to be considered.  Strong promised to 
speak to the Minister of National Security and Prime Minister 
within the next few days to encourage them to remove this 
from the working level and take the political decision to 
accept the program. End Summary 
 
¶2. (SBU) On December 7, responding to a request for 
additional information made by Prime Minister Golding to 
Ambassador Johnson after she raised the pilot program with 
Golding at the CCA meeting in Miami on December 4, CDA sent a 
letter to both Golding and Jamaica's Foreign Minister, Dr. 
Kenneth Baugh outlining the USG position, and asking for a 
clear statement outlining Jamaica's position.  In addition, 
the letters laid out that if Jamaica can not accept the 
program at this time, the U.S. would seek other partners. 
Accompanying the letter was a WHA/CAR-provided non-paper 
detailing the program. 
 
¶3. (SBU) On December 10, NAS Director held a follow-up 
meeting with Errol Strong, Senior Advisor on Policy and 
Operations to the Minister of National Security, Derrick 
Smith.  (Note: Strong was brought in by Smith to act as his 
sounding board on both policy and operational matters.  He is 
not part of the regular bureaucratic structure of the 
Ministry, nor is he a hold over from the previous regime, and 
his experience in Washington at the Jamaican Embassy where he 
worked on deportee matters should prove to be an asset.) 
During the meeting, the NAS Director briefly outlined the 
circular conversation we seem to be stuck in with the working 
level at the Ministry, and laid out in rough detail the 
parameters for the program.  The NAS Director also expressed 
our growing concern at the counter-productive role being 
played by a member of the Ministry staff, Dr. Anne-Marie 
Barnes, whose recent comments on deportees in Barbados 
(REFTEL), and her insistence in quoting from her largely 
discredited non-public study on deportees, continues to show 
that she has neither moved beyond the tired rhetoric of 
blaming the U.S., nor is she willing to work with us on the 
Deportee Reintegration Program.  Finally, the NAS Director 
raised the looming possibility that Jamaica will lose out on 
this program if the GOJ does not provide the USG with a clear 
statement of its intentions to move forward and engage with 
the IOM to negotiate the program's parameters. 
 
¶4. (SBU)  Despite having "deportees" as part of his oversight 
portfolio, Strong was unaware of the pilot program.  After 
hearing it described, Strong agreed with the NAS Director 
that it was something that the Government of Jamaica needs 
and should not turn away from.  Addressing Dr. Barnes, Strong 
commented that "sometimes personalities get in the way of 
decision making."  He promised in the next few days to meet 
with both the Minister of National Security and Prime 
Minister to discuss the program and urge them to take the 
political decision to open up bilateral talks with the USG 
and IOM. 
 
¶5. (SBU) Comment: Strong can not take the decision for either 
Golding or Minister Smith, but he is the first senior staff 
member of the Ministry who has seen the big picture as more 
important than any back room wrangling that may still be 
going on within CARICOM.  He was clearly troubled by Dr. 
Barnes' behavior in Bridgetown (REFTEL) and as he is no fan 
of hers, it is unlikely he will be swayed during any future 
discussion by her rhetoric to oppose the program.  End Comment 
JOHNSON