VZCZCXRO7750
OO RUEHGI RUEHMA RUEHROV
DE RUEHKH #2031/01 3551225
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
O 211225Z DEC 07
FM AMEMBASSY KHARTOUM
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 9603
INFO RUCNFUR/DARFUR COLLECTIVE
RHMFISS/CJTF HOA

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 KHARTOUM 002031 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPT FOR AF/SPG, S/CRS 
DEPT PLS PASS USAID FOR AFR/SUDAN 
 
E.O. 12958:  N/A 
TAGS: PGOV PREL KPKO SOCI AU SU CD
SUBJECT: MORE TO COME WITH JEM-GOS IN WEST DARFUR 
 
¶1. (SBU) SUMMARY. In a December 20 conversation with FieldOff, a 
commander of the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM) in El Fasher 
assessed that Government of Sudan (GoS) frustration with JEM for a 
December 16 attack on a GoS convoy in West Darfur was to blame for 
the GoS' continued detention of a JEM leader.  The JEM commander 
reported that Chadian rebels recently routed by President Deby in 
eastern Chad were in El Geneina and on the move, along with GoS 
troops and janjaweed militias, toward Silea, where he predicted 
there would be another attack in the coming days against JEM forces. 
 As in previous conversations, the JEM rep assured FieldOff that JEM 
statements in the press against the Chinese contingent of the United 
Nations-African Union Mission in Darfur (UNAMID) were exaggerated, 
and he added they could be allayed altogether if the Chinese were to 
address the movements directly.  END SUMMARY. 
 
¶2. (SBU) In a December 20 conversation with FieldOff, a JEM 
commander in El Fasher described his December 18 travel to El 
Geneina, West Darfur, in the wake of a JEM attack on a GoS convoy 
near Jebel Mun.  The attack resulted in the capture by the JEM of 29 
Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) soldiers, 32 vehicles and a stock of 
heavy weapons, as well as in the deaths of three JEM soldiers and 
the severe injury of two others.  The JEM rep complained that the 
GoS had blocked his entering El Geneina on the basis that he had no 
clearance to travel to the area, despite his having obtained 
permission from the AU Mission in the Sudan (AMIS) to do so.  [NOTE: 
The JEM rep had traveled to El Geneina on a special AMIS flight, one 
which required express AMIS permission to go to the region. END 
NOTE].  Upon his return to El Fasher, the JEM complained to the AMIS 
Deputy Force Commander (FC), who recommended registering his 
complaint with Khartoum authorities, but so far no action has been 
taken. 
¶3. (SBU) The JEM commander reported the movement of large numbers of 
SAF and Chadian rebel troops from El Geneina toward Silea in what he 
considered a precursor for a new attack against JEM positions in the 
coming days.  He said that the troops included Chadian rebels 
recently routed in fighting in eastern Chad by President Deby and 
the Chadian National Army (ANT).  The JEM rep put the count of 
troops moving from El Geneina at 63 Chadian rebel vehicles, 55 SAF 
vehicles and 23 janjaweed vehicles.  The JEM rep confirmed that JEM 
leader Khalil Ibrahim was still in Jebel Mun ahead of the planned 
attacks.  On the presence of Chadian rebels in El Geneina, the JEM 
rep noted they had suffered heavy losses against the ANT and were 
flooding El Geneina hospitals, filling every bed, lining the floors 
and even occupying space in locals' homes.  Once recovered, the JEM 
rep expected these rebels to be re-armed and re-supplied by the GoS, 
used in its impending campaign against the JEM, and then returned to 
Chad.  "If I were the Chadian Government," the JEM rep said, "I 
would come to El Geneina and attack, because it's now a [Chadian] 
rebel town." 
 
¶4. (SBU) According to the JEM rep, another indication of the GoS' 
"displeasure" with the movement was in the arrest and continued 
detention of JEM member COL Hamad Hasan Mohamed, who was arrested in 
Kulbus on December 14 while allegedly traveling as part of an AU 
Ceasefire Commission (CFC) delegation to the area.  The JEM rep 
acknowledged that Hamad was not an inconspicuous target, his JEM 
membership notwithstanding: he was reportedly carrying $75,000 worth 
of cash, computers, Thurayas and other equipment with him. 
Nevertheless, there has been no word of Hamad's whereabouts, despite 
repeated complaints from the JEM rep in El Fasher, who considers 
this continued detention as GoS payback for the December 16 attack. 
The rep added that it could also be the GoS' way of testing the AU's 
mettle with regard to its willingness to protect CFC members. 
[NOTE: The JEM insists that Hamad was in possession of his AU ID 
card at the time of his arrest.  END NOTE]. 
 
¶5. (SBU) In response to FieldOff's mention of the December 17 
meeting between UNAMID Joint Special Representative Adada and GoS 
Darfur Advisor Nafie (in which Nafie reiterated the GoS preference 
for dissolving the CFC Chamber for the Darfur Peace Agreement 
non-signatories), the JEM rep pledged that he would return to the 
field if such a dissolution occurred.  On UNAMID deployment, the JEM 
rep reiterated what he had said in previous conversations: that the 
JEM's anti-China rhetoric was just empty words.  He advised it would 
go a long way with the movements if the Chinese were to confront 
head-on allegations of collusion with the GoS, allegations shared 
not only by the rebel movements but by IDPs and community leaders as 
well.  He mentioned the possibility of a meeting with the Chinese 
Ambassador as a first step in this "reconciliation," something also 
discussed in a December 19 meeting between FieldOff and AMIS Deputy 
FC. 
 
¶6. (SBU) COMMENT. It is hard to dispute the links between the GoS 
military defeat in West Darfur with its current campaign against the 
JEM, including its detention of Hamad.  It is similarly difficult to 
dispute the JEM's defensiveness in the face of provocative actions 
it has taken lately against the GoS, both on the battlefield and in 
the media.  While JEM-GoS conflicts will no doubt continue to rise 
 
KHARTOUM 00002031  002 OF 002 
 
 
in the immediate future (with involvement of Chadian rebels), steps 
could be taken to assuage JEM-UNAMID tensions, particularly with 
Transfer of Authority a mere 11 days away.  The idea of trying to 
counter propaganda against the Chinese component of UNAMID should 
not be discounted.  A similar, if not less politically charged, 
"familiarization" campaign was undertaken when the Bangladeshi 
Formed Police Units (FPUs) first arrived in Nyala and were 
introduced at Kalma IDP camp.  While admittedly a token gesture, 
such a step with the Chinese could nonetheless have a hand in 
silencing UNAMID naysayers among the Darfur rebel groups, help 
establish UNAMID credibility from the outset, and would be a 
positive step toward winning over those populations that UNAMID is 
mandated to protect.  END COMMENT. 
 
¶7. (SBU) Tripoli minimize considered. 
 
POWERS