VZCZCXRO4787
OO RUEHGI RUEHMA RUEHROV
DE RUEHKH #2028/01 3521309
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
O 181309Z DEC 07
FM AMEMBASSY KHARTOUM
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 9599
INFO RUCNFUR/DARFUR COLLECTIVE
RHMFISS/CJTF HOA

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 KHARTOUM 002028 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPT FOR AF/SPG, S/CRS 
DEPT PLS PASS USAID FOR AFR/SUDAN 
 
E.O. 12958:  N/A 
TAGS: PGOV PREL KPKO SOCI AU SU
SUBJECT: CONVERSATIONS ABOUT DARFUR'S "GREATEST WARLORD" 
 
¶1. (SBU) The United Nations Department of Safety and Security (UN 
DSS) told FieldOff in late November that the threat it feared most 
in Darfur comes from a Mahariya Arab called Mohamed Hamdan, aka 
"Hamety."  He is at the helm of a Darfur Peace Agreement 
non-signatory group which includes disaffected janjaweed and whose 
ties to the Government of Sudan (GoS), its traditional means of 
support, are currently reported to be in flux.  Hamety has been 
making the rounds with high-profile Darfur players to inform them of 
his plans for his own movement, but whether his capacities and his 
sincerity match his rhetoric remains to be seen.  Despite these 
ambiguities, he is not for the moment a force to be ignored. 
 
¶2. (SBU) Hamety has been active over the past month throughout 
Darfur: his group has been accused of carjacking INGO vehicles in 
the north and reportedly engaged the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) 
November 29 in a show of defiance against what Hamety considers the 
GoS' broken promises of money and power in exchange for the crimes 
Hamety exacted against Darfur African tribes on the GoS' behalf. 
However, skeptics, not least among them prominent Fur leaders in 
North and South Darfur, sniff at this alleged confrontation between 
Hamety and the GoS that had armed him, calling the incident an 
"imaginary battle," as it resulted in no casualties on Hamety's 
side, despite heavy aerial bombardments by the GoS.  These leaders 
consider that GoS-janjaweed ties are not so easily broken and 
suspect that this alleged hostility between the sides is part of an 
elaborate ruse to further overwhelm Darfur populations. 
 
¶3. (SBU) UNDSS in Nyala, however, is not so quick to dismiss 
Hamety's sincerity in his bid to assert himself as independent from 
the GoS.  UNDSS believes that the GoS would not waste the time, 
money, effort and potential troop losses fighting Hamety if there 
were indeed some sort of collusion between the sides.  UNDSS, which 
has contact with Hamety, reported that 14 of Hamety's vehicles were 
in fact destroyed in the November 29 bombing, and point out that 
Hamety's group suffered enough casualties for Hamety himself to 
report the figures to the International Committee of the Red Cross. 
 
¶4. (SBU) According to UNDSS, Hamety is actively consolidating his 
support on the ground.  In late October/early November, Hamety 
reportedly signed a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) with the Sudan 
Liberation Army of Abdelwahid, providing for, among other things, 
treatment of each side's respective wounded and safe passage of each 
side's personnel through respective areas of control.  The MOU also 
contained a provision under which Hamety assured safe passage for 
other organized armed elements to travel from Kalma to Jebel Marra. 
"No one in the SLA would have signed an MOU with Hamety if this were 
a Government conspiracy," UNDSS asserted. 
 
¶5. (SBU) UNDSS believes Hamety when he says that he is now planning 
to bring his struggle to El Daein, noting that 15 of Hamety's 
vehicles were spotted 30 km south of Abu Matariq (site of an IDP 
camp) within the past week.  Hamety may enjoy the support of the 
Popular Defense Forces in Asalaya, as they hail from the same 
Mahariya tribe and as they are similarly disillusioned with the GoS 
for failing to fulfill its monetary promises to them (in the Asalaya 
PDF case, they have been seeking compensation since July for their 
role in the GoS' conflict with the Sudan People's Liberation Army). 
Finally, UNDSS considers that a link exists between Hamety and the 
United Revolutionary Force Front (who represent Arab-led groups 
opposed to the GoS), the Sudanese Revolutionary Front and the 
Oppressed/Unknown Soldiers of Sudan (a group of disaffected former 
Arab soldiers) in the Kass region of South Darfur, all of whom 
Hamety has allegedly begun referring to as "my brothers" after they 
incurred losses in the "imaginary battle" of November 29. 
 
¶6. (SBU) UNDSS Nyala further considers that Hamety is working to 
consolidate support from South Darfur tribal leaders, namely the 
Zaghawa, the Mahariya and the Sa'ara.  He is reportedly having 
discussions with sheikhs of these tribes about helping them if the 
South Darfur Wali fails to deliver on promised services in the 
region, including education and free passage from one area to 
another. 
 
¶7. (SBU) Not all are so easily won over by Hamety, however.  A JEM 
Commander in El Fasher reports that Hamety contacted him personally 
within the past days as part of an overall outreach effort to the 
main Darfur rebel movements, informing that Hamety had no intentions 
of joining their movements but rather of forming one of his own. 
The JEM rep noted that Hamety's strength (estimated as 52 vehicles 
and heavy arms) was procured entirely from the GoS, a channel which 
Hamety, who the JEM rep said had no political aspirations, would 
never sacrifice.  The JEM rep predicts that the GoS will indeed 
honor the demands Hamety is seeking and that once that happens, 
Hamety will abandon his struggle against the GoS. 
 
¶8. (SBU) COMMENT. Over the course of the past year, much has been 
reported on the phenomenon of fluctuating allegiances among former 
janjaweed and about their loyalty (or lack thereof) to the GoS.  The 
 
KHARTOUM 00002028  002 OF 002 
 
 
GoS has tried throughout these cases to woo its footsoldiers back, 
and more often than not, has done so successfully.  However, what 
makes Hamety significant so far is that to date he has not succumbed 
to the GoS' incentives, which, if Hamety proves sincere, could be a 
first for this supposed janjaweed conversion trend.  Furthermore, 
Hamety commands a significant military presence against the GoS, not 
typically the case with such splinter groups.  It is not therefore 
out of the realm of possibility for him to seek a "partnership" with 
Abdelwahid in an attempt to bring Hamety's military weight and 
Abdelwahid's political agenda collectively to bear against the GoS. 
 
POWERS