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Viewing cable 07KHARTOUM2009, AL-SAMANI ON UNAMID DEPLOYMENT, KALMA CAMP

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
07KHARTOUM2009 2007-12-16 07:04 2011-08-24 16:30 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Embassy Khartoum
VZCZCXRO2848
PP RUEHGI RUEHMA RUEHROV
DE RUEHKH #2009 3500704
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 160704Z DEC 07
FM AMEMBASSY KHARTOUM
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 9575
INFO RUCNFUR/DARFUR COLLECTIVE
RHMFISS/CJTF HOA
UNCLAS KHARTOUM 002009 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPT FOR AF/SPG, S/CRS, AF SE NATSIOS 
ADDIS ABABA FOR USAU 
DEPT PLS PASS USAID FOR AFR/SUDAN 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PGOV PREL KPKO SOCI AU UNSC SU
SUBJECT: AL-SAMANI ON UNAMID DEPLOYMENT, KALMA CAMP 
 
1. (SBU) State Minister for Foreign Affairs Al-Samani al-Wasila told 
CDA Fernandez December 12 that Sudan has resolved all issues related 
to UNAMID deployment and will prepare a letter this week regarding 
troop contributions.  Al-Samani said Sudan would like to see the 
Egyptian and Ethiopian troops deploy first, but that "later on" the 
Asian (Thai and Nepalese) troops would be accepted.  Al-Samani noted 
that the UNAMID communications equipment had been released, the 
helicopter parking issue had been resolved, and the SOFA agreement 
was being negotiated based on the UN document.  Al-Samani claimed 
that night flying is a technical issue related to the capabilities 
of the airports, and the fact that it is not resolved reflects lack 
of full deployment of the hybrid mission. The Sudanese are not 
opposed in principle to night flying by UNAMID. He claimed that if 
the hybrid mission had upgraded the infrastructure at the airports 
in Darfur, this would not be an issue. 
 
2. (SBU) The Minister was very appreciative of the return of two 
Sudanese detainees from Guantanamo that same day and hope that there 
would be additional Sudanese detainees from Cuba returning soon. He 
offered to do anything the MFA needed to do to facilitate this to 
provide assurances needed by the Americans on this matter. He noted 
that the Sudanese Government had allowed a brief press conference by 
the two detainees but did not allow the press to wallow in 
gratuitous America-bashing about the issue.  CDA was appreciative of 
the low-key way the issue has been handled. 
 
3. (SBU) CDA Fernandez raised the issue of Kalma camp and warned 
that the ideas currently being floated at the Humanitarian Affairs 
Commission (HAC) would cause many problems for the Government. 
Forcible disarmament could be a disaster and would only bring more 
negative publicity to Sudan.  The best thing would be for the GOS to 
leave the camp alone and allow humanitarian access to the site 
unimpeded. CDA told Al-Samani about the proposed visit of USAID 
Deputy Administrator for Humanitarian Affairs Michael Hess, to visit 
sites that might be suitable for IDP returns.  Al-Samani responded 
favorably to the visit and claimed that reports of insecurity 
outside the camps were greatly exaggerated. The problems in the camp 
were caused by criminals and rebels who saw Kalma as a safehaven. 
 
4. (SBU) Comment: Al-Samani appeared to indicate that the Sudanese 
will allow night flights if t`e aibpOrts"are qpgradet.  CAs%d#onQt`s,agQUYMi@kiwur}|sQthM#tRopzoaxe8h Nnaszt3rzd e|QmQalha(pHar0`e!zoQq#no.-ic%#$jkvtBu kgr%0}i{QOl2Eqo`wPmhsGu8X0z(pQ`sTpoQQ+XnmQ,v1 GoXAong way but problems remain with deep Sudanese 
suspicion about the international community, bureaucratic inertia, 
and the UN/AU's own massive disorganization on the ground in Darfur 
slowing deployment. 
 
FERNANDEZ