VZCZCXRO0803
PP RUEHGI RUEHMA RUEHROV
DE RUEHKH #1994/01 3470915
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 130915Z DEC 07 ZDK
FM AMEMBASSY KHARTOUM
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 9551
INFO RUCNFUR/DARFUR COLLECTIVE
RHMFISS/CJTF HOA

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 KHARTOUM 001994 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPT FOR AF/SPG, S/CRS 
DEPT PLS PASS USAID FOR AFR/SUDAN 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PGOV PREL KPKO SOCI AU UNSC SU PHUM
SUBJECT: CORRECTED COPY - DEPUTY WALI AND POLICE COMMANDER WELCOME 
CDA IN SOUTH DARFUR 
 
¶1. (SBU) SUMMARY.  In a December 10 meeting with the Charg 
d'Affaires (CDA) and USAID Mission Director, South Darfur Deputy 
Wali (Governor) Farah and South Darfur Police Commander Mohamed 
encouraged the CDA and Mission Director to see the "reality" in 
South Darfur as the first step in solving Darfur's problems.  The 
Deputy Wali characterized the intensity of fighting between Arab 
tribes as having eclipsed that between the Government of Sudan (GoS) 
and the rebel movements.  He hoped that the USG would be able to 
assist in bringing Darfuri parties together to reconcile these 
differences.  The Deputy Wali was receptive to the Mission 
Director's plan to visit original home locations and possible 
resettlement locations around Darfur in January to assess security 
and developmental factors affecting prospects for IDP returns during 
the proposed visit of USAID Assistant Administrator Michael Hess 
(AA/DCHA).  On Kalma disarmament, the Police Commander agreed with 
the CDA that unilateral GoS action in the form of forcible 
disarmament was not the answer and instead indicated GoS concurrence 
with the latest disarmament plan put forward by UNAMID Joint Special 
Representative Adada. END SUMMARY. 
 
¶2. (SBU) Participants in December 10 meeting with South Darfur 
Deputy Wali (Governor) Farah and South Darfur Police Commander 
Mohamed were CDA Fernandez, USAID Sudan Mission Director Fleuret, 
USAID Darfur Team Leader Khandagle, USAID Nyala FieldOff Richer, 
USAID El Fasher FieldOff Stroschein and FieldOff (notetaker). 
 
NEED ASSISTANCE IN TRIBAL RECONCILIATION 
---------------------------------------- 
¶3. (SBU) The South Darfur Deputy Wali on December 10 encouraged the 
CDA and USAID Mission Director to see for themselves the "reality" 
of what was happening on the ground in South Darfur, particularly 
with regard to problems between and among Darfur tribes.  He said 
that although Darfur tribes "know themselves" and the differences 
between them, tribal lines in the current situation were blurred, as 
tribes were fractioning and fighting amongst themselves.  He 
asserted that inter-tribal fighting had resulted in more deaths in 
Darfur than had violence between the GoS and the rebel movements, 
thus disproving, in his estimation, the theory that the Darfur 
conflict was African versus Arab.  The Deputy Wali reminisced about 
traditional times when sheikhs sat together to resolve these types 
of tribal disputes, and he solicited the CDA's assistance, as well 
as that of the international community as a whole, in taking up the 
mantle to bring Darfuri parties together to reconcile these 
differences. 
 
SAKALI INDICATIVE OF GOS VISION OF RETURNS 
------------------------------------------ 
¶4. (SBU) Previewing the CDA's and USAID Mission Director's visit to 
Sakali Relocation Site, the Deputy Wali discussed four options on 
the table for dealing with the 200 families relocated there after 
October violence in Kalma IDP camp.  First, the Deputy Wali said 
that Sakali residents could return to their original villages prior 
to Kalma settlement; second, they could settle in Sakali Town; 
third, they could go to another IDP camp besides Kalma; or fourth, 
they could settle with relatives in Nyala Town.  The Deputy Wali 
indicated a GoS readiness to provide free land and basic services 
for those Sakali residents willing to settle around Nyala [NOTE: 
This offer could explain the scores of "squatters" in the areas 
immediately surrounding the Sakali South site who are attempting to 
get a piece of this GOS land-grab.  END NOTE]. 
 
¶5. (SBU) The CDA warned that incentivizing returns was not far 
removed from forcing returns, especially to areas where security 
concerns prevailed.  The Deputy Wali replied that no returns would 
occur without a GoS police presence, such as that which had been 
established in Sakali before the arrival of IDPs from Kalma.  The 
USAID Mission Director applauded this three-fold message linking 
returns to security and police presence and indicated that with 
effective security, in locations chosen by IDPs themselves for 
return, USAID could plan assistance to help make the plan a reality. 
 He mentioned the planned visit in January by USAID Assistant 
Administrator Michael Hess to tour original home locations and 
resettlement locations around Darfur to assess security and 
developmental possibilities.  Mission Director highlighted the need 
for this delegation to get beyond regional capitals and IDP camps 
and to access more remote locations.  The Deputy Wali assured that 
security permitting, this type of access would be granted. 
 
KALMA'S BIGGEST PROBLEM IS PRESENCE OF ARMS 
------------------------------------------- 
¶5. (SBU) Turning to the topic of Kalma IDP camp, the CDA referred to 
a letter sent to the USG alleging civilian deaths in the camp, which 
was the basis of his current visit to Nyala.  The CDA agreed with 
the Deputy Wali's assertion that the presence of arms in Kalma was 
the greatest threat to the camp, not least because of the 
potentially great collateral damage that could result from any 
outbreak of fire, whether from IDPs or from GoS police.  The CDA 
 
KHARTOUM 00001994  002 OF 002 
 
 
warned that any forcible disarmament of the camp could be construed 
as a GoS "invasion," for which the GoS police would ultimately be 
blamed.  To avoid this unintended consequence, the CDA urged the GoS 
to cooperate with the African Union (AU) and to let that 
organization take the lead on Kalma disarmament. 
 
¶6. (SBU) The Deputy Wali said the GoS police have a duty to address 
Kalma's problems, regardless of their "politicization," and to this 
end, the GoS police had conducted numerous meetings with IDP 
representatives, including the Kalma sheikhs.  He assured that the 
GoS police were proceeding in lockstep with the AU, even requesting 
in writing that the AU oversee and investigate Kalma weapons 
allegations.  The Deputy Wali and Police Commander confirmed GoS 
concurrence with the latest disarmament plan put forward by UNAMID 
JSR Adada, saying they had notified the Ministry of the Interior and 
the Khartoum Police Commissioner once the GoS police in Nyala had 
signed off. 
 
¶7. (SBU) Still, Kalma problems persisted, according to the Deputy 
Wali, due in large part to conflict between Darfur Peace Agreement 
signatories and non-signatories, especially supporters of 
Abdelwahid.  He added that "thieves" in Kalma who wreak havoc on the 
town seek refuge in the camp, a trend which he said the GoS was 
working with the AU and UNAMID to stem.  He reiterated the need for 
USG and international assistance to find a solution to this aspect 
of the Kalma problem as well. 
 
¶8. (SBU) Tripoli minimize considered. 
 
FERNANDEZ