VZCZCXRO0488
PP RUEHGI RUEHMA RUEHROV
DE RUEHKH #1986/01 3470509
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 130509Z DEC 07
FM AMEMBASSY KHARTOUM
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 9536
INFO RUCNFUR/DARFUR COLLECTIVE
RHMFISS/CJTF HOA

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 KHARTOUM 001986 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPT FOR AF/SPG, S/CRS 
DEPT PLS PASS USAID FOR AFR/SUDAN 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PGOV PREL KPKO SOCI AU UNSC SU PHUM
SUBJECT: AMIS SEES KALMA DISARMAMENT AS "GREATEST CHALLENGE" 
 
¶1. (SBU) SUMMARY.  In a December 11 meeting with the Charg 
d'Affaires and USAID Mission Director, Nyala AMIS Deputy Sector 
Commander and Deputy Chief Police Supervisor called the disarmament 
of Kalma IDP camp the "greatest challenge" facing the Mission.  The 
Deputy Sector Commander mentioned the possibility of establishing 
"safe corridors" and "buffer zones" to allow movement of arms from 
the camp, a proposal that has not as yet been shared with the 
humanitarian community (septel).  The CDA stressed the importance of 
the Government of Sudan (GoS) refraining from acting unilaterally 
and forcing disarmament, and the USAID Mission Director asked about 
UNAMID's role in securing IDP returns.  AMIS Civpol warned that 
forcible disarmament would serve only to erase the gains of the past 
and jeopardize success for the future.  END SUMMARY. 
 
¶2. (SBU) Participants in separate December 10 Nyala meetings with 
African Union Mission in the Sudan (AMIS) Nyala Deputy Sector 
Commander COL Dagabe and Deputy Chief Police Supervisor Sakoreed 
were CDA Fernandez, USAID Sudan Mission Director Fleuret, USAID 
Darfur Team Leader Khandagle, USAID Nyala FieldOff Richer, USAID El 
Fasher FieldOff Stroschein and FieldOff (notetaker). 
 
KALMA DISARMAMENT MUST FOLLOW ITS "NATURAL COURSE" 
--------------------------------------------- ----- 
¶3. (SBU) In a December 10 meeting with CDA and USAID Mission 
Director, AMIS Deputy Sector Commander (SC) reported the situation 
in Kalma IDP camp to be "very volatile" after the discovery of arms 
there.  The CDA noted that any unilateral action by the GoS (namely 
forcible disarmament by the Sudanese Armed Forces) that could give 
the impression of an invasion of the camp and that could accordingly 
inspire the rebel movements to retaliate must be avoided.  The CDA 
asked what AMIS' plan would be in the event that the African 
Union-United Nations plan for voluntary disarmament failed. 
 
¶4. (SBU) The Deputy SC responded that although the GoS had wanted to 
disarm Kalma independent of AMIS, Kalma disarmament must "follow its 
natural course," which should be in line the AU-UN plan and should 
include "safe corridors" through which arms could be removed from 
the camp in a given timeframe.  The Deputy SC agreed with the CDA's 
prediction that IDPs would hide their weapons in the camp during any 
search, adding that the IDPs considered these weapons a necessity 
against the threat posed by the continued presence of armed 
janjaweed elements outside Kalma. 
 
¶5. (SBU) The Civpol Deputy Supervisor added that the South Darfur 
Wali's own plan for disarmament had completely contradicted that of 
AMIS, labeling those with arms in the camp "criminals" to be 
forcibly disarmed.  He expressed hope that the GoS police would 
exercise restraint rather try to assert itself in Kalma without 
regard for collateral civilian damage: "Forcible disarmament only 
makes people more volatile," he said, "and we will lose the gains of 
the past" if this happens. 
 
AMIS PROPOSES UNVETTED SOLUTION 
------------------------------- 
¶6. (SBU) The Deputy SC went on to say that the establishment of 
"buffer zones" by UNAMID formed police units (FPUs) in which the 
janjaweed could not attack civilians would be one way to address the 
IDP fear of janjaweed reprisals.  These zones, already mapped, 
according to the Deputy SC, would be supplemented by 24/7 patrols by 
police units within the camp, although these units had not yet 
arrived.  The Deputy SC mentioned that the concept had been raised 
in a December 9 meeting with the Wali, who was uncomfortable with 
night patrols and who had not approved the idea.  In a separate 
meeting with the CDA, however, the AMIS Civpol Deputy Supervisor 
claimed no knowledge of this buffer zone plan, nor did 
representatives of the Nyala humanitarian community (septel), who 
are already leery of UN-AU intentions at Kalma. 
 
¶7. (SBU) In addition to the challenge of Kalma, both AMIS 
representatives agreed that other security risks in Nyala exist. 
The Deputy SC flagged carjackings, banditry and shootings as 
particularly problematic, resulting in a reduction of the curfew in 
the town to 6 p.m.  The Civpol Deputy Supervisor added that tribal 
attacks, the presence of National Redemption Front rebels in 
Haskanita and offensive GoS actions were taking their toll on the 
humanitarian community in the region.  The Civpol Deputy Supervisor 
expected the overall situation to markedly improve once UNAMID 
deployed, including resolution of the myriad logistical deficiencies 
currently faced by his office. 
 
¶8. (SBU) In the face of so insecure an environment and of unresolved 
disputes over IDP lands, USAID Mission Director asked about the 
likelihood of IDP returns and about UNAMID's protection role 
therein.  The Deputy SC expressed hope that the Mission would have 
the capabilities to provide for safe voluntary returns, stressing 
the importance of robustly implementing UNAMID's mandate in this 
regard.  He reiterated his belief that buffer zones would assist in 
this provision of security; however, it remains to be seen how this 
 
KHARTOUM 00001986  002 OF 002 
 
 
plan will materialize and fit into overall existing humanitarian 
operations. 
 
¶9. (U) Tripoli minimize considered. 
 
FERNANDEZ