VZCZCXYZ0001
OO RUEHWEB

DE RUEHKH #1979 3461332
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
O 121332Z DEC 07
FM AMEMBASSY KHARTOUM
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 9526
INFO RUCNFUR/DARFUR COLLECTIVE
RHMFISS/CJTF HOA

UNCLAS KHARTOUM 001979 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPT FOR AF A/S FRAZER, AF S/E NATSIOS, AF/SPG 
NSC FOR PITTMAN AND HUDSON 
ADDIS ABABA ALSO FOR USAU 
 
E.O. 12958:  N/A 
TAGS: PGOV PREL KPKO UN AU SU LY
SUBJECT: REAL PROGRESS SEEN BUT SUDAN PREPARES ADADA FOR PROTRACTED 
SOFA TALKS 
 
¶1. (SBU) During a December 11 meeting with Joint Special 
Representative Rudolphe Adada, mid-ranking Sudanese officials from 
the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Ministry of Defense agreed 
to negotiate the UN-AU Mission in Darfur (UNAMID)'s Status of Forces 
Agreement (SOFA) based on the UN/AU draft but "promised it would be 
a long process," Adada's chief of staff, Abdulrahman Abubakar, told 
Poloff after the meeting.  The first negotiating session on the SOFA 
is scheduled for December 12.  Sudan reiterated its position that 
all discussions on UNAMID deployment be considered through the 
Tripartite Mechanism.  The Government also indicated that a team of 
its lawyers, including several from its overseas missions, will be 
present for the SOFA discussions.  Adada insisted that all UNAMID 
issues be addressed "bilaterally," as he represents both the UN and 
the AU. 
 
¶2. (SBU) Sudan admitted that unrestricted access for UNAMID, 
including night flights, is "enshrined" in UN Security Council 
Resolution 1769 but continues to demand that the UN/AU first upgrade 
the air facilities in Darfur, prior even to conducting medical 
evacuations.  The Government contended that current airports cannot 
accommodate night flights.  Adada tried to "de-link" the issue of 
airport capacity from the policy question of whether Sudan will 
allow night flights, given that UNAMID helicopters should have the 
technology to fly in the dark (once those choppers are actually 
identified and arrive). 
 
----------------- 
TCCs Still Sticky 
----------------- 
 
¶3. (SBU) Sudan maintained its rejection of Scandinavian 
contributions for UNAMID.  "They don't even want to hear about the 
Nordics," said Abubakar.  Sudanese officials said that they will 
wait for Egyptian and Ethiopian units to deploy before deciding on 
other troop contributors, suggesting that these two countries could 
compensate for a potential deficit in forces by increasing their 
contributions.  Recalling its participation in previous UN 
recruitment visits to potential TCCs, Sudan proposed a "partnership" 
and requested its officials be part of any future UN/AU assessment 
missions. 
 
------------- 
Some Progress 
------------- 
 
¶4. (SBU) The Government has made some real progress in critical 
issues effecting UNAMID transition in the next few weeks, according 
to Abubakar.  On December 10, Sudan released the communications 
equipment that had languished in bureaucratic red-tape.  In 
addition, the Government agreed that UNAMID troops can don blue 
helmets/berets, with the caveat that a "distinctive sign" on their 
uniforms acknowledges the AU's involvement in the mission.  Abubakar 
noted, however, that the UN and AU still need to agree on the 
insignia for the helmets. 
 
¶5. (SBU) Land issues for UNAMID facilities in Darfur have also been 
resolved, with one notable exception.  "There is absolutely no 
problem anywhere with land, except for El Geneina," said Abubakar. 
He attributed the delay to the local West Darfur authorities, who 
objected to the UN/AU's chosen site because it is near a Sudanese 
military camp.  In Nyala, Sudan agreed to allocate seven helicopter 
"parking spaces" to UNAMID. 
 
¶6. (SBU) Comment: Real progress, albeit painfully complex and 
involved at times, is being made in resolving issues related to 
UNAMID deployment in the past days. Aside from the major issue of 
TCC composition (where there seems to still be some flexibility on 
the possibility of Nepalese and Thai troops), Sudan has improved its 
support for this massive mission.  The challenge is to continue to 
encourage/pressure them towards cooperation with UN/AU effort which, 
aside from Sudanese policies, has its own major internal problems. 
End comment. 
 
FERNANDEZ