VZCZCXRO8744
OO RUEHGI RUEHMA RUEHROV
DE RUEHKH #1965/01 3451130
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
O 111130Z DEC 07
FM AMEMBASSY KHARTOUM
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 9505
INFO RUCNFUR/DARFUR COLLECTIVE
RUEHTRO/AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI 0267
RHMFISS/CJTF HOA

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 KHARTOUM 001965 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SENSITIVE, SIPDIS 
 
DEPT FOR AF A/S FRAZER, AF S/E NATSIOS, AF/SPG 
ADDIS ABABA ALSO FOR USAU 
 
E.O. 12958:  N/A 
TAGS: PGOV PREL UN AU SU LY
 
SUBJECT: SLA/UNITY STRIVES FOR "GRAND ALLIANCE" 
 
 
KHARTOUM 00001965  001.2 OF 002 
 
 
REFTEL: KHARTOUM 01964 
KHARTOUM 01785 
TRIPOLI 01026 
 
------- 
Summary 
------- 
 
¶1. (SBU) SLA/Unity is striving to form a "grand alliance" with 
Khalil Ibrahim and Abdulwahid al Nur through mobilization of Fur and 
Zaghawa IDPs, according to several of its representatives in North 
Darfur.  Frustrated with the inertia of the UN/AU-led political 
process and doubtful that the NCP will honor an eventual peace 
agreement, SLA/Unity's focus is more on forging a credible political 
and military force to counter the Sudanese Government and transform 
Sudan rather than on preparing for negotiations.  In addition to the 
shifting allegiances of the Arab tribes, SLA/Unity's activities are 
having the most dynamic impact on the situation in Darfur at 
present.  End summary. 
 
------------------ 
A "Grand Alliance" 
------------------ 
 
¶2. (SBU) The Sudan Liberation Army (SLA)/Unity must forge a "grand 
alliance" with Khalil Ibrahim's Justice and Equality Movement (JEM) 
and the Fur IDPs led by SLA faction leader Abdulwahid al Nur to 
create a credible counterweight to the National Congress Party 
(NCP), six SLA/Unity representatives told Poloff in El Fasher during 
separate meetings from December 6-9.  Without a unified challenge to 
the NCP's policies, they believe Khartoum will continue to 
marginalize Darfur's population.  "The Government is like a 
colonizer," said one SLA/Unity cadre.  "We will never be allowed to 
be at the same level of the Arabs in Khartoum." 
 
¶3. (SBU) According to all six representatives of the movement, 
SLA/Unity shares Ibrahim and Abdulwahid's goals.  However, SLA/Unity 
members differed in their description of these goals.  While some 
cadres viewed Ibrahim and Abdulwahid as supporting 
self-determination for Darfur, others said that Ibrahim and 
Abulwahid seek autonomy within a federal system, as in Southern 
Sudan.  Another member of SLA/Unity asserted that the movement, 
Ibrahim, and Abdulwahid all aim for regime change.  "You can't have 
an agreement with this government," he opined.  (Note: Per Ref. A, 
JEM representatives deny that Ibrahim seeks self-determination for 
Darfur, focusing instead on transformation of the country's 
governing system within a unified Sudan.  End note.) 
 
----------------- 
Change From Below 
----------------- 
 
¶4. (SBU) While the SLA/Unity representatives predicted that Ibrahim 
will soon formalize an alliance with their movement, intensive 
consultations with the Fur IDPs are necessary to bring Abdulwahid 
into a coalition.  "A political shift must come from below," said 
one SLA/Unity member.  Another cadre cited some progress in 
mobilizing Fur IDPs to support SLA/Unity, saying that only a vocal 
minority are blindly in lock step with Abdulwahid.  The Fur are 
beginning to realize that Abdulwahid is militarily weak, he said, 
and that they must cooperate with SLA/Unity in order to achieve 
their goals.  "The Fur have land rights, not arms." 
 
¶5. (SBU) All of the SLA/Unity representatives conceded that 
Abdulwahid would be the chairman of a unified movement because a 
Zaghawa leader would undermine the group's credibility with the Fur. 
 One prestigious SLA/Unity representative acknowledged that Suleiman 
Jamous, Sharif Harir, and Abdullah Yehia were competing for the 
leadership of SLA/Unity but predicted that they could not rival 
Abdulwahid if he agreed to a coalition.  (Note: A UN official 
reported to Poloff that during UN Envoy Jan Eliasson's meeting with 
the SLA/Unity leadership in Um Rai on December 7, Sharif and Yehia 
were visibly at odds.  End note.) 
 
------------------------------------- 
Government, Minawi Behind Splintering 
------------------------------------- 
 
¶6. (SBU) SLA/Unity underscored that their efforts to mobilize the 
Fur must remain *secret* to avoid Government infiltration.  The NCP is 
active in creating splinter movements and preventing other factions 
from uniting, they said.  One example is JEM/Collective Leadership 
(JEM/CL) led by Bahar Idriss Abu Gharda.  SLA/Unity blamed Senior 
Assistant to the President Minni Minawi for orchestrating JEM/CL's 
split from Ibrahim's movement.  They claimed that Minawi receives 
financial backing from Khartoum and wants to consolidate his 
position as head of the Transitional Darfur Regional Authority 
 
KHARTOUM 00001965  002.2 OF 002 
 
 
(TDRA).  (Note: Per Ref. B, Minawi disclosed his outreach efforts to 
Abu Gharda prior to the Sirte talks, reporting that he had attempted 
to persuade him to adhere to a cessation of hostilities and 
participate in negotiations.  There is no indication that Minawi 
receives incentives from the NCP to implement their policy 
objectives, given the SLM's desperate financial situation and 
political isolation in Khartoum.  End note.) 
 
------------------------------ 
Limited Trust in Arab Militias 
------------------------------ 
 
¶7. (SBU) SLA/Unity's unification discussions center on bonds with 
other African tribes rather than with Arab militias, which SLA/Unity 
distrusts in spite of reports that these groups are opposed to the 
Sudanese Government.  SLA/Unity characterized Salah Abu Surra's 
Revolutionary Democratic Forces Front (RDFF) and the recently formed 
Sudanese Revolutionary Front affiliated with Mahariya commander 
Ahmed Humaidan (aka Hamati) as "agents of the Government."  (Note: 
The Zaghawa-Arab rivalry is more charged than the Fur-Arab 
relationship.  Given Zaghawa dominance of SLA/Unity, the movement 
may be more suspicious of an alliance with anti-Government Arab 
militias than Fur factions such as Abdulwahid's.  End note.) 
 
---------------------- 
Frustration with UN/AU 
---------------------- 
 
¶8. (SBU) SLA/Unity is frustrated with the pace of UN peace efforts 
and treated the UN/AU-led negotiating process as tangential to their 
principal aim: unification of the movements.  "We keep talking to 
the UN Secretary General, to Eliasson, to Salim, and nothing 
changes," one cadre stated.  Distrust of the AU runs deep, and 
SLA/Unity claimed that AU Special Envoy Salim Ahmed Salim is an Arab 
"working on the agenda of the Government."  According to one 
representative, "our confidence is only in the UN, the U.S. and our 
God."  They were also firm in rejecting negotiations in "any Arab 
country," including Libya. 
 
¶9. (SBU) The international community should focus on supporting the 
movement's unification efforts by facilitating consultations among 
the IDPs and the rebel factions, said SLA/Unity.  Without 
elaborating on the structure of this dialogue, they indicated that 
external mediation will ease the selection of a new rebel 
leadership.  "If the international community helps SLA/Unity to join 
Abdulwahid and Khalil, all problems will be solved," said one 
cadre. 
 
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Comment 
------- 
 
¶10. (SBU) SLA/Unity's focus on bringing Ibrahim and Abdulwahid into 
a peace process is similar to Libya's (Ref. C)--one of the faction's 
premier backers as of late summer 2007--and Tripoli's hand may be 
behind some of SLA/Unity's efforts to mobilize in the camps.  Given 
the level of previous Libyan financial support for SLA/Unity, 
objections to a Libyan venue for talks may be mere rhetoric designed 
to court IDPs.  SLA/Unity appears more agile with a wider reach than 
many of the more static and entrenched factions (including 
Abdulwahid's), in spite of their fluctuating political objectives 
(i.e. self-determination vs. a unified Sudan).  In addition to its 
formidable military concentration in North Darfur, SLA/Unity 
operatives continue to surface in all areas of rebel activity, from 
Tripoli to Juba, and are planning outreach campaigns in Jebal Marra 
and in camps throughout Darfur.  While the majority of Darfur's 
rebel factions view the UN/AU mediation as lumbering and too weak to 
move the NCP to compromise, SLA/Unity's efforts--in addition to the 
shifting allegiances of some Arab tribes (to be reported 
septel)--are having the most dynamic impact on the ground at 
present.  End comment. 
 
¶11. (U) Tripoli minimize considered. 
 
FERNANDEZ