VZCZCXRO8707
OO RUEHGI RUEHMA RUEHROV
DE RUEHKH #1964/01 3451103
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
O 111103Z DEC 07
FM AMEMBASSY KHARTOUM
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 9503
INFO RUCNFUR/DARFUR COLLECTIVE
RUEHTRO/AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI 0265
RHMFISS/CJTF HOA

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 KHARTOUM 001964 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SENSITIVE, SIPDIS 
 
DEPT FOR AF A/S FRAZER, AF S/E NATSIOS, AF/SPG 
ADDIS ABABA ALSO FOR USAU 
 
E.O. 12958:  N/A 
TAGS: PGOV PREL KPKO UN AU SU
 
SUBJECT: JEM DENIES RADICALISM, EXPLAINS UNAMID CONTROVERSY 
 
KHARTOUM 00001964  001.2 OF 002 
 
 
REFTEL: KHARTOUM 01918 
 
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Summary 
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¶1. (SBU) The NCP has falsely painted Khalil Ibrahim's JEM as an 
Islamist movement, two of the group's representatives told Poloff in 
a recent El Fasher meeting.  Rather than pursuing a radical agenda, 
they asserted, JEM seeks to transform the country through 
"revolution," end the marginalization of the peripheral regions, and 
maintain Sudanese unity.  The JEM leadership supports a peacekeeping 
force that can protect civilians, but some of the rank-and-file 
believe UNAMID is deploying to combat terrorism and will arrest them 
because of international misperceptions of JEM's aims.  Casting 
doubt on the credibility of the UN and AU peace process, JEM 
representatives underscored that negotiations will not succeed 
without the inclusion of SLM leader Abdulwahid al Nur and further 
unification of Darfur's rebels.  They also downplayed the 
significance of the breakaway JEM/Collective Leadership faction. 
End summary. 
 
--------------------- 
Misperceptions of JEM 
--------------------- 
 
¶2. (SBU) The Sudanese Government has distorted the international 
community's views of the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM), which 
is not Islamist and does not have ties to radical groups, two of 
Khalil Ibrahim's operatives in El Fasher told Poloff on December 5. 
They characterized Ibrahim's recent call for self-determination for 
Darfur as a tactic to pressure the National Congress Party (NCP) and 
to re-invigorate international focus on the crisis.  In fact, JEM is 
a movement "for all parts of Sudan," they said, and aimed to end 
Khartoum's exploitation of the other regions of the country, 
including the South. 
 
¶3. (SBU) "We don't have the resources, the development, or the 
infrastructure to be independent," said Abdullah Adam Ali, a JEM 
security operative from the Tunjur tribe who is charged with IDP 
mobilization and who admitted that he was imprisoned from 2004-2006 
for participation in a JEM-inspired coup plot in Khartoum.  "We will 
get lost if we ask for separation. We would be disconnected from the 
world." 
 
¶4. (SBU) Ali asserted that Sudan will only be transformed through 
"revolution," as the NCP will never willingly relinquish power. 
Even members of Hassan al Turabi's Popular Congress Party 
(PCP)--long viewed as the inspirational force behind JEM--had moved 
from the PCP ("a political movement") to JEM ("a military movement") 
as it became clear that "politics was not leading anywhere," said 
Ali. 
 
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JEM Controversy on UNAMID 
------------------------- 
 
¶5. (SBU) Ali acknowledged that the deployment of the UN-AU Mission 
in Darfur (UNAMID) is controversial within the JEM rank-and-file, 
blaming the controversy on the international community's "false 
perception" of the movement.  "We welcome any force that comes to 
protect civilians," he said, "but some believe that UNAMID is coming 
to combat terrorism and will arrest them, even though they are not 
radicals."  He continued that the apathy of African forces and the 
complicity of Arab nations and China in the conflict through their 
support for Khartoum required European troops for an effective 
peacekeeping mission. 
 
-------------------- 
JEM/CL Insignificant 
-------------------- 
 
¶6. (SBU) Ali downplayed the political and military significance of 
the JEM/Collective Leadership (JEM/CL) faction led by Bahar Idriss 
Abu Gharda.  They claimed that Ibrahim had engineered the expulsion 
of Abu Gharda and the movement's principal military commander, 
Abdallah Banda, after their ambitions had grown out of proportion 
and had interfered with JEM's "normal, internal consultative 
process." 
 
¶7. (SBU) The JEM representatives claimed JEM/CL is composed only of 
Abu Gharda and Banda's relatives, such as field commander Adam 
Bakhiet, who lack political sophistication and will never command 
the prestige of the mainstream JEM.  Despite recent assertions by 
JEM/CL (reftel), the diaspora remains supportive of Ibrahim's 
leadership, Abdulhamid stated, noting that his brother was the 
political secretary in JEM's London Bureau.  Robust fundraising 
 
KHARTOUM 00001964  002.2 OF 002 
 
 
efforts for JEM in the U.S. also continue. 
 
----------------------- 
Lacking Faith in UN, AU 
----------------------- 
 
¶8. (SBU) Both Ali and Abdulhamid had little faith in the UN/AU-led 
peace process.  "The UN and AU should not be on the side of the 
Government," said Ali, describing the UN as too weak to press the 
NCP to compromise.  In addition, they explained that the AU and 
Salim Ahmed Salim--who IDPs view as having "Arab origins"--support 
the agenda of the NCP and are therefore "not qualified to run the 
negotiations."  Libyan leader Moammar Qaddhafi's relationship with 
President Bashir and his remarks before and during the recent Sirte 
negotiations also necessitate a change in venue to a "neutral 
location." 
 
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Abdulwahid, Rebel Unity Essential for Peace 
------------------------------------------- 
 
¶9. (SBU) "There can be no peace without Abdulwahid," said Ali, 
referring to Sudan Liberation Movement (SLM) faction leader 
Abdulwahid al Nur.  Due to IDPs' support for his proposals on 
compensation and disarmament of the Arab militias, these issue now 
shape the agenda, and JEM supports Abdulwahid's policy positions, 
said Ali.  In addition, the UN/AU must give the splintered rebel 
movements more time to organize themselves and propose a more 
concrete agenda for talks that includes civilian voices and 
opposition parties. 
 
¶10. (SBU) Parroting past comments by Ibrahim, Ali said that 
negotiations can only include two factions--JEM and a re-united 
SLM--and should then involve a "step-by-step" review of the Darfur 
Peace Agreement (DPA).  "Political leaders" (a euphemism for the 
PCP) are trying to meet with Abdulwahid to support unification 
efforts, according to Ali.  Abdulhamid proposed that the 
international community organize a "comprehensive conference" of 
factions outside Sudan to press the rebel leaders toward 
unification. 
 
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Comment 
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¶11. (SBU) Irrespective of the degree of JEM's Islamist tendencies, 
the movement has given no indication that it has renounced regime 
change in Khartoum--though its rhetoric may be more subtle in recent 
months.  While Ali and Abdulhamid provided a more nuanced position 
on UNAMID than recent comments by Ibrahim, it is important to note 
that concern about the force's composition and whether the troop 
contributors are beholden to Khartoum is widespread through the 
rebel ranks (and IDPs) and not limited to JEM.  Despite their 
characterization of JEM/CL as insignificant, independent sources 
continue to indicate that a considerable part of Ibrahim's military 
strength has defected to the breakaway faction and left JEM in a 
weakened state--for now.  End comment. 
 
¶12. (U) Tripoli minimize considered. 
 
FERNANDEZ