VZCZCXRO8473
OO RUEHGI RUEHMA RUEHROV
DE RUEHKH #1957/01 3450812
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
O 110812Z DEC 07
FM AMEMBASSY KHARTOUM
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 9494
INFO RUCNFUR/DARFUR COLLECTIVE
RHMFISS/CJTF HOA

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 KHARTOUM 001957 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPT FOR AF/SPG, S/CRS 
DEPT PLS PASS USAID FOR AFR/SUDAN 
 
E.O. 12958:  N/A 
TAGS: PGOV PREL KPKO SOCI AU UNSC SU
SUBJECT: MSA ISSUE MOVES TO RESOLUTION BUT PROBLEMS LINGER 
 
KHARTOUM 1892 
 
¶1. (SBU) SUMMARY: Payment of overdue Mission Subsistence Allowance 
(MSA) to CFC party representatives began in El Fasher December 6 and 
continues this week.  Donors appear willing to cover the entire 
US$4.6 million MSA estimated cost under certain conditions. 
Although the MSA arrears issue may be resolved for now, party reps 
to the Ceasefire Commission will likely still need some sort of 
financial/logistical assistance under UNAMID.  Text of MSA statement 
that has been distributed to party reps is included in para 12. END 
SUMMARY. 
 
¶2. (U) The issue of paying a monthly stipend or MSA to the party 
representatives has vexed the Ceasefire Commission (CFC) since its 
inception in 2004.  The MSA is authorized in the Ndjamena Ceasfire 
Agreement and the Darfur Peace Agreement and was originally funded 
by the EU and then by the UK and Netherlands. It was meant to assist 
movement representatives establish themselves at Field HQ in El 
Fasher and Sector HQs as they worked on CFC matters.  Field HQ reps 
received US$4,973 a month and Sector-based reps US$2,790 each.  As 
factions splintered, the number of party reps grew.  By March 2007, 
230 reps claimed MSA, costing AMIS over US$660,000 a month.  On 
March 12, AMIS met with the donor community agreed to reduce the MSA 
to US$1,000 for Field HQ reps and US$500 for the others.  AMIS 
communicated that decision to party and movement leaders the next 
day.  The GoS was the only party to accept the reduced payment. 
Other reps went on strike, refusing to assist AMIS units to go out 
on patrol or conduct ceasefire investigations.  The work of the CFC 
effectively ground to a halt.  The AU eventually found money to pay 
the March MSA at the old rates, but no MSA has been paid for April 
or subsequent months. 
 
¶3. (SBU) Upon assuming command in mid-2007, Force Commander (FC) GEN 
Agwai soon learned how important the party reps consider their 
"entitlement" to MSA.  Agwai and his troops were threatened by 
various factions because the MSA remained unpaid.  An armed CFC 
party rep entered AMIS Field HQ, threatened the AMIS Chief of Staff 
and fired a gun in the air.  In October, more than 90 armed party 
reps converged on El Fasher to demand MSA payment, causing GEN Agwai 
to increase security around Field HQ.  Party reps also disrupted 
distribution of MSA to AMIS military observers in the field during 
October and November.  On November 28, The FC told international CFC 
observers party reps had threatened to disrupt the AMIS/UNAMID 
transfer of authority (TOA) ceremony over the MSA issue.  Agwai 
considered the MSA the biggest issue facing AMIS and feared it would 
doom UNAMID if it remained unresolved.  He engaged the AU, Joint 
Special Representative Adada, the UN and donors to come up with 
money to fund continued payment of the MSA.  MSA costs are as 
follows: 
 
- US$4,243,425 for six months (April-September at old rates) 
- US$6,368,253 for nine months (April-December at old rates) 
- US$4,631,925 for nine months (April-September at old rates with 
October-December at new/post-February rates for all 230 reps). 
 
¶4. (SBU) On November 23, the Director of the AU Department of Peace 
and Stability (DPS) sent a memo to the AMIS Head of Mission saying 
the AU was transferring US$4 million to AMIS accounts to pay MSA for 
three months at the old rates.  The money came from other AU 
accounts; the AU was anticipating donors would provide adequate 
funding to recoup the transferred amount and cover all remaining MSA 
costs.  The $4 million would cover MSA arrears through August. 
 
¶5. (SBU) EU CFC observer Richard Ciaglinski (UK) said he had been 
assured by the UK Foreign Office that the UK, Netherlands and EU 
would provide the necessary MSA funds.  He told the Foreign Office 
it needed to raise approximately US$4.6 million.  The UK ambassador 
was to inform the AU of the MSA donation in Addis Ababa at a Liaison 
Group meeting on November 30.  Ciaglinski said the donors put the 
following conditions on the funds: 
 
- the AU needed to request an exact amount for MSA in writing from 
the donors; 
- the MSA could only be given to individuals who signed a receipt; 
and 
- the payment process needed to be verified. 
 
¶6. (SBU) On November 27 GEN Agwai convened a meeting of the party 
reps and laid out his plan for paying the MSA arrears: 
 
- Payment for April-June at the old rates to be initiated by 
December 5, with a CFC member observing the payment; 
- Payment for July-September at the old rates to be done by December 
15, with a CFC member observing the payment; party reps to return 
all AMIS property (computers, vehicles, cell phones, berets, IDs, 
shoulder badges, etc.) in order to receive MSA payment; and 
- Payment for October-December to be made at the new rates for only 
one representative per party at CFC HQ. 
 
KHARTOUM 00001957  002 OF 003 
 
 
 
He also pleaded with the party reps to put the MSA issue behind them 
finally and work together to make the CFC effective in order to 
bring peace to Darfur. 
 
¶7. (SBU) The party reps did not react to the MSA payment schedule, 
focusing instead on the areas where the FC appeared to be 
"unilaterally" changing CFC operations - reducing the 8 sectors to 
3; taking away the party reps' AMIS property; and reducing the 
number of CFC representatives.  Several claimed he was suspending 
the CFC and abrogating the DPA.  The reps also objected to the FC's 
lack of consultation.  The meeting ended without agreement. 
 
¶8. (SBU) On November 28, GEN Agwai met with the international CFC 
observers to discuss next steps.  Everyone agreed the previous day's 
meeting had confused the MSA issue with the need to reform the CFC. 
Visiting Embassy Poloff noted the party reps' concerns about the 
continued viability of the DPA (reftel).  Fieldoff recommended the 
FC provide each party rep with a statement of the MSA payment 
schedule, explaining the reason for the various changes and noting 
their compliance with the DPA (see para 12).  Also, in keeping with 
the DPA, AMIS should pay Sector party reps for October-December, not 
just HQ reps as originally planned.  The CFC agreed. 
 
¶9. (SBU) As the Field HQ prepared a schedule to distribute MSA 
payments to the reps in the field (four days of two teams, 
paymasters, military escorts and CFC observers, visiting 4-6 sites 
daily), the promised AMIS money disappeared.  DPS had sent another 
memo directing the funds be spent on troop rotation and other 
expenses.  When GEN Agwai learned of the problem December 1, he 
contacted Joint Special Representative (JSR) Adada and had further 
use of the funds halted.  GEN Agwai traveled to Khartoum December 3, 
returning December 5 with US$330,000 and the promise of another 
US$2.5 million (enough to cover the April-June arrears).  GEN Agwai 
told international CFC reps on December 6 he wanted MSA payment of 
some kind to start that day to maintain his credibility since he 
promised the party reps the first payment would occur by December 5. 
 He also said he had had a meeting with GoS officials while in 
Khartoum, who argued he was changing the DPA (septel) - charges 
similar to the ones party reps had made on November 27.  Agwai 
announced he had spoken to JSR Adada and suggested a Joint 
Commission meeting be convened before the AMIS/UNAMID transfer of 
authority to lay out plans for a new, more effective CFC under 
UNAMID before all interested parties. 
 
¶10. (SBU) On December 6, the Arab League announced it was donating 
US$1 million to AMIS to help pay for MSA arrears.  JSR Adada had 
requested the Arab League donation while at the Libyan peace talks 
in Sirte. 
 
¶11. (SBU) COMMENT: Even though money is still not in hand to pay off 
all the MSA arrears, it is possible the MSA arrears will be resolved 
by the time of the transition to UNAMID.  But the MSA legacy will 
not disappear, for several reasons. First, the MSA is authorized in 
the DPA (both the rebels and government now agree that not to pay 
represents an abrogation of the agreement) and there is a clear need 
for some sort of subsistence to ceasefire reps in the field. 
Second, GEN Agwai's credibility with the party reps has taken a 
beating as he has twice promised payment which has not materialized. 
 Third, AMIS and UNAMID failed to engage the parties and movements 
on ways to make the CFC more effective, showing a disturbing 
preference for making CFC changes unilaterally.  A Joint Commission 
meeting would be helpful, but there is not much time to organize one 
before the transfer of authority.  Sitting down with the reps and 
having an open discussion about the future of CFC, as well as 
defining exactly what UNAMID will be able to pay as subsistence to 
ceasefire reps in the field, would be a welcome first step. END 
COMMENT. 
 
¶12. (SBU) The following MSA statement was circulated among 
international and AMIS CFC members before it was approved and 
distributed to party reps on December 2.  GEN Agwai also shared it 
with the JSR, UN and AU.  On December 5, the UN suggested changes in 
the text to make clear UNAMID did not plan to provide any support to 
the party reps.  A synopsis of the UN changes are bracketed in the 
text. 
 
¶1. The AU, through the financial support of donor countries, 
initiated the Mission Subsistence Allowance (MSA) to help 
representatives of the DPA signatories pay for their food and 
lodging while serving on the CFC or in the Sectors.  Over the course 
of time, payment of the MSA was extended to representatives of 
non-signatory factions, and the number of Party Representatives grew 
significantly.  In February 2007, the AU, donor community and Party 
officials held a meeting in which a decision to reconsider amounts 
paid as MSA was discussed and a new rate agreed upon.  This decision 
drew the ire of Party Representatives.  Since March 2007, the MSA 
was not paid due to the lack of funds from the donors, and the 
 
KHARTOUM 00001957  003 OF 003 
 
 
flagrant refusal of Party Representatives to accept the new pay 
rates.  Subsequently, the Representatives embarked on strike action 
thereby paralyzing the activities of CFC and to a large extent AMIS 
operations.  The FC/Chairman CFC Gen ML Agwai inherited this 
stalemate and on assumption of office commenced frantic efforts 
aimed at resolving this vexed issue. 
¶2. After extensive discussions with all interested parties and 
members of the international community, the Chairman of the CFC is 
pleased to announce the following plan for offsetting the 
outstanding MSA payment based on an earlier agreement with Party 
Representatives: 
a. AU was compelled to source for money and pay the MSA for the 
month of March 2007 as part of her contribution to the quagmire. 
This action has been completed and all Party Representatives were 
paid at the old rate. 
b. MSA for the period April - June 2007 will be paid no later than 
December 5.  Payment will be made individually to Party 
Representative upon presentation of his/her AMIS ID-card.  CFC 
representatives will monitor the payment procedure. 
c. MSA for the period July - September 2007 will be paid no later 
than December 15.  Payment will also be made individually to Party 
Representative upon presentation of the AMIS ID-card and after 
return of all AMIS equipment (ID-card, computer, radio, mobile 
phone, vehicle, beret, sleeve badge, etc.) that has been issued to 
him/her.  The AMIS ID-card must also be turned in at the time of 
this payment.  The return of AMIS property and equipment by December 
15 is necessary to ensure proper accounting by AMIS, prior to the 
transition of the Mission to UNAMID at the end of the year.  CFC 
representatives will monitor the payment procedure. [SUGGESTED UN 
CHANGE: The party representative will sign a document that 
acknowledges he/she has received final payment of the MSA and 
neither AMIS nor UNAMID owes CFC members payment of any kind.] 
d. MSA for the period October - December 2007 will be paid at a time 
to be determined but to only one representative or observer per 
party at the following rate: $1000 US per month per individual 
observer at CFC HQ; $500 US per month per individual observer per 
party at the Sector level subject to approval by AU.  Party 
observers will serve as liaison officers between the parties and the 
CFC to facilitate monitoring, investigating and verifying efforts 
during this period.  Reduction in the number of eligible 
representatives and in the amount of money is necessitated by lack 
of funding.  All observers will be facilitated by AMIS in accordance 
with the DPA. 
¶3. It is to be noted that with effect from 1 January 2008, AMIS will 
be replaced by UNAMID, which will continue to monitor implementation 
of the DPA pending the outcome of Libyan Talks.  The AU cannot make 
any financial commitments on behalf of UNAMID.  The future 
arrangements for the detail operation of CFC in support of the DPA 
from 1 January 2008 will be spelt out by the AU/UN.  [SUGGESTED UN 
CHANGE: Delete para 3 and substitute instead "The plan outlined 
above confirms that final payment has been made, terminating all 
financial and logistical arrangements between the CFC and AMIS."] 
 
END TEXT. 
 
¶12. (U) Tripoli minimize considered. 
 
FERNANDEZ