VZCZCXRO7213
OO RUEHGI RUEHMA RUEHROV
DE RUEHKH #1950/01 3431334
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
O 091334Z DEC 07
FM AMEMBASSY KHARTOUM
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 9486
INFO RUCNFUR/DARFUR COLLECTIVE

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 KHARTOUM 001950 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPARTMENT FOR AF A/S FRAZER, AF S/E NATSIOS, AND AF/SPG 
DEPARTMENT PASS NSC FOR HUDSON AND PITTMAN 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PREL PGOV UN AU SU
SUBJECT: RIZEIGAT LEADER: PLANNING FOR A BAGGARA ALLIANCE 
 
¶1. (SBU) On December 6 CDA met with Waleed Madibbo, head of a local 
governance NGO and nephew of Rizeigat Nazir Said Madibbo. Speaking 
of his uncle, who has struggled to keep his tribe relatively neutral 
and above the fray encapsulating Darfur, Madibbo said that he was 
"honest, influential, but without initiative." Native administration 
in Darfur was becoming emasculated, he charged. The government had 
the reverse problem; it was effective, but had no popular 
representation. The combination resulted in a power vacuum on the 
ground with the possibility of a "new phase" in Darfur's conflict 
with the potential entry of South Darfur's largest tribe entering 
the fray - on both sides' - the GOS and some rebel movements. 
 
--------------------------------------------- - 
BOTTOM UP APPROACH AND ALLIANCE OF THE BAGGARA 
--------------------------------------------- - 
 
¶2. (SBU) Madibbo, who had requested to meet CDA to discuss potential 
projects, said he was having difficulty securing permission from the 
South Darfur wali to hold a proposed reconciliation conference. 
(Note: Madibbo, with OTI funding, held a traditional equestrian 
festival and conference in Ed Daein earlier this year, bringing 
together Arab tribes - and boosting his own political support - from 
throughout the area. End note.) He had been meeting with armed 
groups, native administration and elites, he said, but the native 
administration was the least interested of all in his ideas. "We 
need to create a bottom-up approach," he said. Agreeing with the 
importance of this, CDA noted that the government would undoubtedly 
find this type of approach terrifying. 
 
¶3. (SBU) Key was the creation of a Baggara/Massalit/Fur triangle, 
Madibbo said. The true criminals were those who had ordered the 
crimes in Darfur (the "idea brokers"), more so than those who had 
killed (the janjaweed themselves). CDA noted that Arab tribes in 
Darfur were victims of the government, and would ultimately get 
nothing from Khartoum (as the Misseriya didn't, who had fought the 
government's proxy war against the Dinka). Musa Hilal understood 
that he was also a victim, Madibbo said. Hilal was enthusiastic 
about Madibbo's plan to hold a strategic meeting bringing the 
Baggara, Massalit and Fur together, Madibbo said, though Hilal would 
not "extend his arms to the Zaghawa;" CDA cautioned that the Zaghawa 
must not be left out because of their military muscle. 
 
¶4. (SBU) Madibbo also noted that Darfuris and southerners were 
realizing that they must move beyond bitterness, or else they would 
all fall victim to the "jallaba" - the tiny minority of power 
brokers in Khartoum who rules Sudan. "The U.S. needs to promote 
relations between Darfuris and southerners," he said. CDA agreed, as 
long as it did not detract from the Sirte peace negotiations. Again 
raising the idea of a Baggara alliance, Medibbo assured CDA that 
such an alliance would not harm the "zurga" (a derogatory term used 
for non-Arabs, it literally means "the blue ones"). CDA said that 
the idea was favorable, and that it could help restore the torn 
traditional social fabric in Darfur. CDA also cautioned Madibbo, 
saying that if the Baggara allied themselves, the central government 
would likely suddenly take a pro-Zaghawa stance. "You're playing a 
dangerous game," he said. Madibbo urged the CDA to "build up" his 
idea of a Baggara alliance. CDA warned him that with too much 
obvious U.S. support, the project would undoubtedly lose 
credibility, but offered to gingerly explore the sensitive subject 
in his upcoming visit to Nyala. 
 
--------------------- 
U.S. NOT TAKING SIDES 
--------------------- 
 
¶5. (SBU) "We're realists," CDA said, stating that the U.S. almost 
always chose the relatively stable option to the unknown. The 
Sudanese regime harbored two false impressions of the U.S., he said 
- one camp was convinced that the U.S. wanted to overthrown the 
Khartoum regime, and the other, equally incorrect view was that the 
U.S. wanted the regime to remain in power and maintain stability at 
all costs. Neither was true. The U.S. would neither try to topple 
nor to save the regime, CDA continued. He cited the example of 
Yugoslavia, where the central government's own policies made it 
necessary for the U.S. to support Kosovan independence. "We prefer 
unity, but we're not going to take either side," he said. 
 
¶6. (SBU) If the violence in Darfur were to again reach 2003-2005 
levels, CDA told Madibbo, the U.S. would be under great pressure to 
intervene strongly. Madibbo said that the current death rate in 
Darfur was sixty-five per day (half what it was some years ago), and 
that Darfuri culture was being ghettoized. He criticized what he 
described as the U.S.'s "hands-off" policy in Darfur. CDA countered, 
reminding Madibbo that the U.S. contributed 25 percent of the hybrid 
force funding, fed two million people each year, funded all the AMIS 
camps and was instrumental in pushing through UNSCR 1769 with a 
Chapter 7 mandate. 
 
¶7. (SBU) Comment: A Baggara alliance, and especially one that joined 
 
KHARTOUM 00001950  002 OF 002 
 
 
with the Fur and Massalit, would undoubtedly be of grave concern to 
the Sudanese government, which has already lost much of its power 
and influence in South Darfur. With loyalties and allegiances in 
flux throughout the region, the decisions made by this large, 
well-armed and entrenched tribal alliance could lead to increased 
conflict, a weakened hold by the GOS on South Sudan, or GOS 
vengeance against "traitorous" Arab tribes. In such a volatile 
environment anything is possible: a new type of brutal war or a 
multi-ethnic alliance that could strengthen a move towards peace in 
Darfur.  End comment. 
 
FERNANDEZ