VZCZCXRO6248
OO RUEHGI RUEHMA RUEHROV
DE RUEHKH #1939/01 3411130
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
O 071130Z DEC 07
FM AMEMBASSY KHARTOUM
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 9476
INFO RUCNFUR/DARFUR COLLECTIVE
RUEHTRO/AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI 0263
RHMFISS/CJTF HOA

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 KHARTOUM 001939 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPARTMENT FOR AF A/S FRAZER, AF S/E NATSIOS, AF/SPG, ADDIS 
ABABA ALSO FOR USAU 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PGOV PREL US AU SU
SUBJECT: SLA/UNITY: CHALLENGING KHARTOUM REQUIRES BOTH 
MILITARY, POLITICAL POWER 
 
REF: KHARTOUM 01889 
 
KHARTOUM 00001939  001.2 OF 002 
 
 
--------- 
SUMMARY 
--------- 
 
¶1. (SBU) The lesson of the DPA is that the Sudanese 
Government will only compromise when challenged by a movement 
with both political and military strength, and SLA/Unity is 
the only group among Darfur's numerous rebel factions that 
combines these two elements, SLA/Unity operatives told Poloff 
in a recent meeting.  They contended that popular support for 
Abdulwahid al Nur is superficial and that SLA/Unity cadres, 
working in *secret* to avoid Government retribution, are 
gaining Fur support for the movement.  Before peace talks 
resume, they said that the UN must provide a neutral forum 
for civil society to air its views without fear of 
repercussions and assist SLA/Unity to solidify its internal 
consolidation and its alliance with the other major rebel 
movements, including JEM/Collective leadership.  End summary. 
 
------------------------------------ 
SLA/Unity:  Only Viable Rival to NCP 
------------------------------------ 
 
¶2. (SBU) The Sudan Liberation Army/Unity (SLA/Unity) is the 
only rebel movement with the political and military strength 
to gain concessions from the Sudanese Government, two of its 
supporters told Poloff on December 4 in El Fasher.  While 
SLA/Unity's military influence is well documented, they 
insisted that its support within the IDP camps is also 
formidable.  They characterized public backing among the Fur 
for Abdulwahid Nur as superficial, and the Sudanese 
Government does nothing to minimize his influence because 
Abdulwahid lacks any credible military capacity, rendering 
him impotent.  However, SLA/Unity's potent combination of 
political and military clout poses a credible threat to the 
National Congress Party's (NCP) policies in Darfur, they 
claimed.  Fearing arrest, SLA/Unity cadres must conduct their 
civilian mobilization activities in secret. 
 
-------------- 
Anti-Demagogue 
-------------- 
 
¶3. (SBU) In contrast to the cult of personality that 
surrounds Abdulwahid, the SLA/Unity leadership operates by 
consensus and does not need a single leader, said Ahmed 
Abdullah Wadi, who hails from the Al Salaam IDP camp on the 
outskirts of El Fasher.  He denied reports that Suleiman 
Jamous, Sharif Harir, and Abdullah Yehia are jostling for 
control of the movement.  "This is not personal," he 
explained.  "This is about common aims." 
 
¶4. (SBU) The goal should be a "comprehensive peace," not one 
that involves only a single ethnic or tribal group, said 
Mohammed Jaffar Himidi, a resident of the Abu Shook camp 
outside El Fasher.  The Darfur Peace Agreement (DPA) 
collapsed because the militarily powerful signatory 
represented only a single minority tribe (the Zaghawa) while 
the politically astute non-signatory (Abdulwahid) rejected 
the accord.  A lasting settlement will require both elements, 
according to Himidi.  "Abdulwahid's mind was strong, but he 
had no power on the ground (i.e. military force).  Minni was 
strong on the ground, but his mind was weak." 
 
------------------------------ 
Fur Will Join to Achieve Goals 
------------------------------ 
 
¶5. (SBU) While acknowledging that SLA/Unity is at present 
dominated by the Zaghawa, both representatives contended that 
underground efforts to garner support among the Fur are 
succeeding. "The issue is not politicians or parties." said 
Himidi, referring to the various faction leaders and splinter 
movements.  "The issue is unity."  As the conflict endures, 
Fur desperation increases, making them more open to 
coordinate across tribal lines, Himidi said.  The Fur only 
support Abdulwahid because of "family relations" but will 
back the strongest military movement once they recognize it 
is capable of extracting compromises from the Government on 
the IDP's priority issues, including compensation, 
reconstruction/development, and disarmament of the Arab 
militias.  "The solution--unity of the tribes--is before 
their eyes," said Himidi. 
 
 
KHARTOUM 00001939  002.2 OF 002 
 
 
------------------------------------------- 
Next Step in Peace Process: UN Engage IDPs 
------------------------------------------- 
 
¶6. (SBU) To advance the Darfur peace process and steer it 
toward a "comprehensive peace," Wadi said that the UN must 
bring IDP and civil society leaders to a venue where they can 
speak "freely."  He and Himidi predicted that in a neutral 
venue, the IDPs from both North and South Darfur will express 
open support for SLA/Unity and the weakness of Abdulwahid's 
position would be exposed.  They underscored that these 
discussions with civil society--involving workshops sponsored 
by the "international community"--must come before 
reconvening peace negotiations.  The UN could then assist 
SLA/Unity in consolidating the success of its own internal 
consultations and formalizing its alliances with the Justice 
and Equality Movement (JEM)/Collective Leadership and other 
rebel factions.  Once these steps are completed, the UN could 
reconvene pace talks in a "free location." 
 
----------------------------- 
Mistrust of AU, African Venue 
----------------------------- 
 
¶7. (SBU) Neither the movements nor the people of Darfur trust 
the AU, said both cadres, believing that the NCP easily 
manipulates the organization through pressure on its member 
states.  The Government does not respect the UN or the AU, 
viewed both bodies as weak, and will easily resist any effort 
by the UN/AU to push for compromise.  Within these 
constraints, Wadi reiterated his and Himidi's assertion that 
only a united, politically and militarily strong movement 
could counterbalance the Government. They also discounted 
Libya as a viable venue for talks, saying that in addition to 
needing more time for internal consultations, SLA/Unity 
boycotted the Sirte negotiations out of fear that Tripoli 
would allow the Sudanese Government to intimidate the 
movements.  They suggested the UN/AU reconvene the talks in 
either Europe or the United States (this idea has been 
categorically rejected by the AU before). 
 
------- 
Comment 
------- 
 
¶8. (SBU) While SLA/Unity may be overstating the degree to 
which Abdulwahid's support is waning in the camps, 
particularly in South Darfur, their argument that the 
Government will only compromise when challenged by a movement 
where both political and military power is sound.  The 
influence of SLA/Unity leader Suleiman Jamous, who claims 
both Fur and Zaghawa ancestry and appears to be instrumental 
in the burgeoning SLA/Unity--JEM/CL alliance (reftel), may 
explain Wadi and Himidi's optimism about outreach efforts to 
the Fur.  If the UN/AU are to navigate the mediation process 
to a successful outcome, they will need to monitor their 
undercurrents and respond adeptly.  Given the level of 
secrecy involved in Poloff's discussion with Wadi and Himidi 
(which included no phone contact with either operative prior 
to the meeting, an exchange of messages through a third-party 
interlocutor, and last minute changes in time and location), 
such agile mediation will require greater UN/AU capacity on 
the ground, a capacity which has been sorely lacking for 
years.  End comment. 
 
¶9. (U) Tripoli minimize considered. 
FERNANDEZ