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Viewing cable 07KHARTOUM1937, DARFUR TASK FORCE MEMBER ON JUBA TALKS AND THE FUTURE OF

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
07KHARTOUM1937 2007-12-07 11:25 2011-08-24 16:30 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Embassy Khartoum
VZCZCXRO6241
PP RUEHGI RUEHMA RUEHROV
DE RUEHKH #1937/01 3411125
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 071125Z DEC 07
FM AMEMBASSY KHARTOUM
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 9472
INFO RUCNFUR/DARFUR COLLECTIVE
RHMFISS/CJTF HOA
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 KHARTOUM 001937 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPT FOR AF/SPG, S/CRS, AF SE NATSIOS 
DEPARTMENT PLEASE PASS NSC FOR HUDSON AND PITTMAN 
ADDIS ABABA FOR USAU 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PGOV PREL KPKO SOCI AU UNSC SU
SUBJECT: DARFUR TASK FORCE MEMBER ON JUBA TALKS AND THE FUTURE OF 
SUDAN 
 
1.  (SBU) Summary:  On December 6, SPLM Darfur Task Force member 
Edward Lino asserted that the National Congress Party (NCP) is 
alarmed by the success of the Juba Darfur initiative and is seeking 
to thwart its success.  He said that the Darfur rebel groups have 
continued to talk in Juba and make progress toward unity.  Now 
Darfurian Arab groups are exploring joining the process as well.  He 
predicted that a coalition of marginalized peoples could sweep the 
2009 national elections and the resulting national government would 
hold Sudan together beyond the 2011 referendum.  End Summary. 
 
2.  (SBU)  On December 6 in Juba, a confident and expansive Edward 
Lino discussed with Acting C/G and Norwegian Consular Officer the 
status of the SPLM's Juba initiative to unite Darfur rebel groups 
and his take on Sudan's future. 
 
------------------------------ 
NCP Discomfort at SPLM Success 
------------------------------ 
 
3.  (SBU) Lino began by complaining that the NCP is delaying the 
AU/UN sponsored travel of the United Resistance Front (URF) to 
consult with their field commanders by denying approval of their 
flight from Juba to Darfur.  The URF delegation had planned to fly 
that same day, December 6.  Lino appealed for the U.S. to intercede 
with the GNU to grant permission.  (Note:  Acting C/G was later told 
by the UN/AU point-man on the SPLM Darfur initiative, based in Juba, 
that the flight was being delayed by logistical, not political, 
problems and that Khartoum is working with the UN to allow the 
flight to Darfur.  He indicated that the URF delegation was expected 
to depart on Saturday, December 8.  End note.) 
 
4.  (SBU) According to Lino, the NCP are angered by the SPLM's 
success in bringing the Darfur rebel factions together into a 
cohesive negotiating front.  He asserted that the NCP also are 
annoyed because the SPLM had apprehended and ejected a National 
Intelligence and Security Service (NISS) agent who attempted to 
penetrate the talks to gather information. 
 
5.  (SBU) Lino was aware of harsh criticism of him in the Arabic 
press by GNU Presidential advisor Dr. Mustafa Osman Ismail, but did 
not appear to have seen the stories themselves or to know precisely 
what Ismail said.  He said that any criticism coming from someone 
like Ismail is "good."  He dismissed NCP "name calling" and said it 
is a sign of how insecure and threatened the NCP now feels. 
 
-------------------------- 
Juba Darfur Talks Continue 
-------------------------- 
 
6.  (SBU) Lino said that talks between the Darfur rebel factions 
have continued in Juba after the formal "closing ceremony" on 
November 29.  He said that on Sunday, December 9, SLM/Unity will 
formally announce its newly chosen leader, its structure, and 
present its manifesto.  A total of l2 factions now have joined 
SLM/Unity, he said.  (Note: In a conversations with Poloff on 
December 7, SLM/Unity leaders Suleiman Jamous and Abdullah Yehia 
denied that any announcement on leadership will be made December 9. 
According to Jamous and Yehia, SLM/Unity is awaiting the arrival of 
URF representatives from Juba and SLM/Unity representatives from 
Libya to conduct consultations on leadership and a future structure 
of the movements.  End note.) 
 
7.  (SBU) The URF delegation was to have flown from Juba to Darfur 
December 6 to consult with field commanders and secure their 
concurrence to agreements made in Juba. They planned to return on 
Sunday, December 9, to pursue merger with SLM/UNITY into a single 
front.  The SPLM wants to ensure there is no rift between 
negotiators and the field -- of the kind that has previously led to 
the proliferation of rebel groups.  (Note:  At the November 29 
ceremony, Lino had said that the only difference separating the 
SLM/UNITY and the URF was whether they needed to consult with the 
field before formally uniting.  In several recent conversations with 
Poloff, however, URF and SLM/Unity representatives were equally 
emphatic that field consultations are essential before making any 
decisions on leadership or an alliance between two the two groups. 
The political commissar of the Justice and Equality 
Movement/Collective Leadership (JEM/CL)--the main faction within the 
URF--told Poloff on December 7 that even the selection of the URF 
leadership is dependent on the consultations in Darfur, as JEM/CL 
leader Bahar Idriss Abu Gharda will not arrive from Ndjamena to 
Darfur until December 10.  End note.) 
 
------------------------------------ 
Arab Militias Enter the Juba Process 
------------------------------------ 
 
 
KHARTOUM 00001937  002 OF 002 
 
 
8.  (SBU) Asked about the Darfur Arab groups that are reported to 
have come to Juba for talks, Lino said they have been meeting with 
GoSS VP Riek Machar, who is seeking to persuade them to come into 
the peace process as part of the rebel front.  "Peace in Darfur will 
be incomplete without the Arabs," and they must be brought into the 
process, he said.  He added Janjaweed leader Musa Hillal has not 
come to Juba, but the SPLM are trying to persuade him to do so. 
 
9.  (SBU) Asked why the Arab groups are deserting Khartoum and may 
want to join with the rebels, Lino said that the NCP incited the 
Arabs to fight its war in Darfur, but never had any plans to reward 
them for their sacrifice.  The Arab militias realize that they were 
used by Khartoum for its own interests and are bitter.  In addition, 
he said there is a generational split within the Arab tribes, with 
younger people having a different perspective than their parents. 
He claimed the NCP is very worried about a possible Arab "intifada" 
in South Darfur (possibly led by the heretofore quiescent Baggara 
Rizeigat). 
 
10.  (SBU) Lino continued that SLM/UNITY and the URF already include 
Arab factions and that both want to talk with the Arab groups that 
now have come to Juba.  He predicted that the bulk of the Arab 
factions are likely to join the SLM as the process continues. 
 
--------------------------------------------- ------ 
A Government of the Marginalized and a United Sudan 
--------------------------------------------- ------ 
 
11.  (SBU) Lino predicted that the political situation in Sudan will 
change radically the next few years.  Khartoum now realizes that its 
old strategy for staying in power no longer works.  The marginalized 
people of Sudan are starting to come together and the NCP fears it 
is being surrounded.  Lino expressed confidence that these groups 
will vote together in the 2009 elections and elect a "government of 
the marginalized."  He also expressed confidence that these groups 
would have more than enough qualified people to be able to govern 
Sudan successfully once in power.  The NCP is seeking to thwart this 
through a strategy intended to delay the elections indefinitely. 
 
12.  (SBU) Lino said he had no doubt that the people of the South 
will support such a national government and a united Sudan.  He 
contended that today's separatists, in the South and elsewhere, 
really are disappointed Sudanese patriots.  They are reacting to 
decades of being kept from participating in the life of the nation. 
The Arab tribes of the Nile valley have controlled Sudan's 
government for their own benefit since independence in 1956.  Once 
their power is broken and the marginalized groups see that they can 
participate fully, the pressure for separation will fade away. 
 
13.  (SBU) Comment:  The SPLM is feeling its oats with the success 
of the Darfur mediation, and views itself as the leader of a 
coalition of the marginalized periphery.  (Note: We have heard 
similar comments from SPLM officials in Khartoum, who now see the 
SLPM playing a mediation role even outside Sudan, and have offered 
their assistance negotiating with Ethiopia and Eritrea.)  The NCP is 
certainly concerned by this, and would rather strike a deal with the 
SPLM for unity after the elections.  Knowing this, the SPLM is using 
the Darfur mediation to put maximum pressure on Khartoum to get what 
it wants on Abyei and CPA implementation.  Darfur Arab unification 
with the Fur/Zaghawa insurgency is what the NCP fears most, 
especially if combined with SPLM leadership.  However at this point 
the Arab tribes may be simply "exploring options" to apply their own 
pressure to Khartoum, to ensure they are taken care of in advance of 
the next round of peace talks. The SPLM's dream of a grand coalition 
of the marginalized is still an attractive dream but far from 
fruition. 
 
FERNANDEZ