VZCZCXRO5317
PP RUEHGI RUEHMA RUEHROV
DE RUEHKH #1933/01 3401331
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 061331Z DEC 07
FM AMEMBASSY KHARTOUM
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 9466
INFO RUCNFUR/DARFUR COLLECTIVE
RHMFISS/CJTF HOA

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 KHARTOUM 001933 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SENSITIVE, SIPDIS 
 
DEPT FOR AF/SPG, S/CRS 
DEPT PLS PASS USAID FOR AFR/SUDAN 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PGOV PREL KPKO SOCI AU UNSC SU
SUBJECT: UNMIS SAYS GUEHENNO "NOT LYING" IN NOV 27 BRIEFING TO UNSC 
 
¶1. (SBU) SUMMARY.  In a December 5 meeting with FieldOff, Head of 
Office in El Fasher for the United Nation Mission in the Sudan 
(UNMIS) asserted that Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) 
Under-Secretary-General Jean-Marie Guhenno "was not lying" in his 
November 27 briefing to the UN Security Council (UNSC) about 
impediments imposed by the Government of Sudan to the UN-African 
Union Mission in Darfur (UNAMID) deployment. At the same time, 
however, the UNMIS chief said that Guhenno had not told the whole 
story and that even if GoS obstacles were removed, challenges to 
UNAMID deployment would remain.  FieldOff will talk separately on 
December 6 with the UNAMID Chief of Integrated Support Services and 
a representative of the UN Air Safety Office in a further attempt to 
reconcile DPKO allegations and the reality on the ground regarding 
UNAMID deployment.  END SUMMARY. 
 
GUHENNO'S HALF-TRUTHS 
---------------------- 
¶2. (SBU) In a December 5 meeting with FieldOff, UNMIS Head of Office 
in El Fasher commented on U/SYG Guhenno's November 27 remarks to 
the UNSC on progress in Darfur peacekeeping efforts, remarks which 
have drawn ire from the GoS, which considers them to be unjustly 
accusatory and one-sided.  The UNMIS Chief said that "Guhenno was 
not lying, but he was not telling the whole truth, either," in his 
statement, elaborating that while GoS obstruction does in fact 
exist, it will not in and of itself be the reason for the problems 
plaguing UNAMID.  First, he acknowledges that it is true that the 
GoS had not yet approved the October 2 list of UNAMID troop 
contributing countries (TCCs), which is raising questions about the 
composition of the force.  However, the UNMIS chief notes that even 
if the GoS were to sign off unequivocally on the force's 
composition, "it would not mean that 26,000 troops would arrive in 
Darfur tomorrow." 
 
¶3. (SBU) Second, the UNMIS head pointed out that the GoS is indeed 
playing legal games with the UN to hamper progress in finalizing the 
Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA) for UNAMID.  Again, as with the 
TCC list, the UNMIS chief did not see where an expeditiously 
finalized SOFA free would in fact translate into immediate and 
effective UNAMID deployment.  The UNMIS head noted that the GoS is 
imposing similar obstacles to delivery of communications equipment 
(VSATs have been held in El Fasher Airport for well over one month) 
and to permission for night flights [NOTE: In a separate meeting 
with FieldOff and PolOff, UNAMID Chief of Staff BG Patrick 
Davidson-Houston noted that UN helicopters did not need a special 
airstrip to accommodate night landings and could do so without GoS 
authorization.  END NOTE] but added that neither prohibition, if 
lifted, would mean smooth sailing for UNAMID in the immediate term. 
 
¶4. (SBU) What the UNMIS chief saw as the most disturbing obstacle 
thrown in UNAMID's path was what he considered the GoS' deliberate 
blocking of civil society members and IDPs from participating in 
Sirte Talks by preventing them from obtaining travel permits and 
visas.  No matter how long the GoS stalled on the TCC list or how 
many legal hurdles it could concoct for the SOFA, nothing could 
compare to the damage done to the peace process, which the UNMIS 
head saw as the only real hope for Darfur and to which the 
peacekeeping operation would ultimately be secondary. 
 
¶5. (SBU) The UNMIS head did not dismiss the influence of other 
actors in the Darfur drama.  On the political side, he singled out 
Libya as a self-interested spoiler and said the UN and AU needed to 
think more carefully before choosing a venue for subsequent rounds. 
He then talked about TCC self-interest and noted the difficulty the 
UN faced in working with the AU on this operation, a reality that 
Guhenno did not include in his statement to the Council but that 
nevertheless was as much of a hindrance to operations as any GoS 
obstacle. 
 
TIMING RIGHT FOR DPKO MESSAGE 
----------------------------- 
¶6. (SBU) Despite what he considered its shortcomings, the UNMIS head 
regards Guhenno's statement as necessary and well-timed.  "The 
international community needs to know what we are facing on the 
ground," he said.  However, what to do with that information was the 
trick.  The UNMIS chief did not see sanctions or ICC indictments as 
the best way forward in inducing the GoS or "those who stay away 
from the peace process" to do the right thing.  Without offering a 
definitive plan for proceeding, the UNMIS head simply acknowledged 
that careful, targeted pressure would be the appropriate follow-up. 
 
 
¶7. (SBU) In the immediate term, however, the UNMIS Chief recommends 
the international community focus its efforts in identifying air 
assets for UNAMID, which, in his assessment, could make the tangible 
difference on the ground that IDPs were expecting with regard to 
camp security and protection.  He regretted the UN's lack of 
foresight in failing to amass its own stock of helicopters and APCs 
for use in peacekeeping operations, a stock that could have 
prevented the scramble for assets currently experienced by UNAMID. 
 
KHARTOUM 00001933  002 OF 002 
 
 
[Note: The UNMIS chief's emphasis on helicopters echoed recent 
remarks by Force Commander Agwai.  END NOTE]. 
 
¶8. (SBU) COMMENT.  The UNMIS Chief's views are not necessarily 
representative of the whole of the UN community with regard to 
UNAMID deployment.  For example, a UNAMID Civil Affairs Officer 
considers that the hold-up of the VSATs is having direct and 
potentially devastating effects not only on the mission's short-term 
operation but on its ability to maintain personnel recruited as 
well.  This discrepancy raises the bigger-picture issue of what the 
underlying issue raised by Guhenno really is:  that UNAMID should 
focus on addressing individually the GoS' short-term delay tactics 
or on looking at the effects of the sum of these parts on long-term 
Darfur stability, especially with regard to the peace negotiations. 
Planned December 6 conversations with UN Chief of Integrated Support 
Services and with a rep of the UN Air Safety Office should shed some 
further light on the picture on the ground.  END COMMENT. 
 
¶9. (U) Tripoli minimize considered. 
 
FERNANDEZ