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Viewing cable 07KHARTOUM1928, SPLA CHIEF OF STAFF OYAI DENG ON MILITARY STATE OF PLAY

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
07KHARTOUM1928 2007-12-06 06:14 2011-08-24 16:30 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Embassy Khartoum
VZCZCXRO4967
PP RUEHGI RUEHMA RUEHROV
DE RUEHKH #1928/01 3400614
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 060614Z DEC 07
FM AMEMBASSY KHARTOUM
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 9457
INFO RUCNIAD/IGAD COLLECTIVE
RUCNFUR/DARFUR COLLECTIVE
RHMFISS/CJTF HOA
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 KHARTOUM 001928 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPT FOR AF/SPG, S/CRS, AF SE NATSIOS 
ADDIS ABABA FOR USAU 
DEPT PLS PASS USAID FOR AFR/SUDAN 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958:  N/A 
TAGS: PGOV MOPS PREL AU SOCI SU
SUBJECT: SPLA CHIEF OF STAFF OYAI DENG ON MILITARY STATE OF PLAY 
 
REF: KHARTOUM 1709 
 
1. (SBU) Summary: SPLA Chief of Staff Lt. General Oyai Deng Ajak 
told CDA that he was pessimistic about any great progress in 
deploying SAF-SPLA Joint Integrated Units (JIUs), and downplayed the 
significance of remaining southern troops on the border areas such 
as Nuba Mountains and Blue Nile.  He said tension between the two 
forces remains and suggested that the space between the two armies 
be increased and welcomed planned increases in USAID humanitarian 
programs in the border areas known as the "Three Areas." End 
summary. 
 
2. (SBU) Sudanese Peoples Liberation Army (SPLA) Chief of Staff LTG 
Oyai Deng told CDA Fernandez on December 5 that he was in Khartoum 
to attend the Joint Defense Board (JDB) meeting on the SPLA-Sudan 
Armed Forces (SAF) Joint Integrated Units (JIU).  Deng was 
pessimistic on making any real headway towards an agreement on the 
JIUs, offering his view that the SAF military leadership is waiting 
for the political green light to any possible agreement towards 
integration. "It's always next time, next time with them."  He had 
met with FVP Salva Kiir earlier in the day who told him to do 
everything possible to ease tensions between the SPLA and SAF. 
 
3. (SBU) Giving a snapshot of current redeployment efforts, Deng 
said that the SPLA is supposed to redeploy out of the Blue Nile and 
in Nuba Mountains.  He said the SPLA formerly had a division in the 
Blue Nile State, but now has only a battalion which is with the JIU. 
 In the Nuba Mountains, he said the SPLA has only one brigade 
remaining. He said that the UN had checked the redeployed SPLA 
troops and asked where were their weapons, "we told them that we 
were a guerrilla army and sometimes you had one rifle for several 
fighters" (this also raises the possibility that the SPLA may have 
stashed weapons caches in Nuba Mountains and Blue Nile). 
 
4. (SBU) He said the SAF remains in great force in the Nuba 
Mountains and Blue Nile, and "well south of the 1-1-56 border" (in 
Unity and Upper Nile States) and claimed the SAF would still be in 
the south even if they redeploy northward 20 kilometers because in 
some cases they are 50 km south of the border.  Regarding Abyei, 
Deng commented that because of the oil the SAF is unlikely to agree 
to redeploy from the area, therefore he said SPLM forces would not 
withdraw either. 
 
5. (SBU) LTG Deng said recent recruitment of militias in Kordofan 
went well, and noted that President Bashir said that these same 
militias should be disarmed and returned to civilian life. This is a 
suggestion the SPLA finds laughable. Bashir, he said, considers 
these militias to be northerners, and therefore should not be in the 
south, "but we consider them to be southerners, so they can remain 
armed and supported by us."  The SPLA is preparing camp sites for 
these (mostly Missiriyya Arab) units around Bentiu in Unity State. 
 
6. (SBU) Asked what issues CDA Fernandez might raise with Minister 
of Defense Lt. General Abdel Rahim Mohamed Hussein in a future 
meeting, Deng said to press the Minister on enlarging the space 
between the two sides from a 20 kilometer gap to a larger one.  Deng 
said that while this begs the issue of demarcating the dividing 
line, it is in everybody's interest to have both sides move back. 
He claimed that even if the SAF moves back further than 20 
kilometers, they would still be deep in the south.  Secondly, Deng 
suggested that SAF forces in the Blue Nile and Nuba mountains be 
downsized.  Deng said that the Nubans fought for their land and feel 
betrayed by the south because they do not have a right to self 
determination in the CPA (unlike Abyei), so a reduction in SAF 
forces would not undermine northern control of the area. 
 
7. (SBU) Deng reacted positively when CDA Fernandez reported that 
USAID is planning to expand its humanitarian programs in the Three 
Areas and would like to work with returning SPLA leader Abdul Aziz 
Helou.  Deng said, "the people love him, and we would value his 
leadership in the Nuba Mountains."  As for the government's 
leadership, Deng opined that people under President Bashir, such as 
Interior Minister Al Zubair Bashir Taha, should stop pushing Bashir 
into re-arming the militias.  Deng observed that Bashir's underlings 
try to be more hardline than Bashir to curry favor, and "they can't 
break the habit." 
 
8. (SBU) Comment: Deng's suggestion to increase the distance between 
armies is not something the SAF would agree to, and we question why 
Deng would not have proposed it in the Ceasefire Political 
Commission if it is something the SPLA is serious about.  The more 
pressing issue is demarcation of the border and the monitoring 
mechanism by the JDB and UNMIS.  Leaving Abyei aside, border 
demarcation and redeployment of troops seems to be something the two 
sides actually agree on, and we expect to see some progress in this 
area over the next few months since this is a prominent element in 
 
KHARTOUM 00001928  002 OF 002 
 
 
all the ongoing SPLM-NCP talks. 
 
FERNANDEZ