VZCZCXRO3992
OO RUEHGI RUEHMA RUEHROV
DE RUEHKH #1924/01 3391019
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
O 051019Z DEC 07
FM AMEMBASSY KHARTOUM
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 9450
INFO RUCNFUR/DARFUR COLLECTIVE
RHMFISS/CJTF HOA

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 KHARTOUM 001924 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPT FOR AF/SPG, S/CRS, AF SE NATSIOS 
ADDIS ABABA FOR USAU, NSC FOR PITTMAN AND HUDSON 
DEPT PLS PASS USAID FOR AFR/SUDAN 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PGOV PREL KPKO SOCI AU UNSC SU
SUBJECT: "GUEHENNO IS LYING" ON UNAMID DEPLOYMENT, SUDAN CLAIMS 
PROGRESS, COMPLIANCE 
 
REF: (A) KHARTOUM 1906 
(B) KHARTOUM 1842 
(C)KHARTOUM 1804 
(D)KHARTOUM 1787 
 
¶1. (SBU) See para 8 for action request. 
 
¶2. (SBU) In a December 4 meeting with CDA Fernandez, State Minister 
for Foreign Affairs Al-Samani Al-Wasila decried recent UN 
allegations that the Government of Sudan (GoS) is obstructing the 
conditions necessary for the deployment of the AU-UN hybrid force. 
Al-Samani referred angrily to recent statements that UN DPKO 
Under-Secretary General Jean-Marie Guehenno made to the UN Security 
Council - that the GoS has intentionally raised barriers to UNAMID 
deployment by rejecting non-African troop contingents, failing to 
provide land for the construction of UNAMID headquarters, and 
creating operational restrictions. 
 
BOTH U.S. AND UN ON THE GROUND KNOW THERE IS PROGRESS 
--------------------------------------------- -------- 
 
¶3. (SBU) Al-Samani called Guehenno a "liar" and claimed the reason 
for the GoS' refusal to allow the Norwegian and Swedish engineers to 
deploy was that their requests arrived too late, after the TCC 
composition had been discussed with the UN.  Al-Samani said the 
issue of land for the construction of UNAMID headquarters had 
already been resolved, and was visibly irritated that Guehenno had 
publicly stated otherwise.  Regarding the equipment delays, 
Al-Samani scolded the UN for not presenting specifications and prior 
information about the materials, which in turn led to delays in its 
clearance and distribution.  He claimed that both the US Embassy and 
even UN officials on the ground know that there has been progress. 
He recalled the issue of "night flights in Darfur" had shown that 
Sudan was not lying or intentionally obstructing deployment (Emboffs 
in El Fasher have essentially confirmed his view on the night flying 
issue). 
 
¶4. (SBU) CDA Fernandez reassured Al-Samani that the USG understands 
the difficulties of UNAMID deployment are not entirely due to GoS 
obstruction (reftels).  However it is important to take all 
necessary steps to facilitate deployment and rapidly approve 
materials and other items for the mission. This is very important 
given the very deep lack of credibility that Sudan has on the 
international stage.  CDA acknowledged the USG's awareness of the 
lack of UN organization in the preparation and deployment of UNAMID. 
 
 
¶5. (SBU) Regarding troop contributions, CDA urged Al-Samani to 
convince his superiors "at the very least" to allow Thai and 
Nepalese units to be deployed soon to Darfur.  CDA stated this would 
be a good way to put a stop to the UN's allegations that the GoS is 
not cooperating on UNAMID roll-out.  CDA said that if the GoS were 
to allow these Asian units to deploy, it would gain credibility with 
the UN and the U.S. at a point when US-Sudanese relations could 
improve or further deteriorate. CDA warned Al-Samani not to think 
they can solve one issue and obstruct on another - "don't think you 
can accept the Thais and then obstruct American companies like 
Dyncorp which are providing logistics for UNAMID and that we'll be 
happy with this." 
 
SOFA SOLVED FOR NOW, COMMO FOR NEXT WEEK 
---------------------------------------- 
 
¶6. (SBU) Al-Samani responded saying "we must talk about these 
issues, rather than forcing them" noting that companies like PAE and 
Dyncorp are chosen without Sudanese input but promised to discuss 
the proposal on the Thai and Nepalese units with his superiors. He 
said that the Nordics had already been rejected as part of the HSP 
and were not wanted. There was also the issue of the Scandinavian 
cartoons on the Prophet Muhammad and the fact that high profile 
Western troops would be a magnet for Al-Qa'ida.  He said that he 
expected the UNAMID communications equipment to be cleared by next 
week (delays caused by improper UN paperwork and lack of follow up 
by them) and that Sudan had cleared up misunderstandings on the 
Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA) with the acceptance of the Model 
SOFA until at least the end of the year.  He pulled out the minutes 
of a meeting with the UN's Muhammad Yunus which showed progress on 
land use for camps which seemed to directly contradict Guehenno's 
public complaints. 
 
7.(SBU) Comment:  Although reports from the field indicate that 
UNAMID has made plenty of mistakes that have delayed deployment, it 
is also clear that the GoS is not doing everything possible to 
facilitate deployment.  The GoS is certainly maneuvering to control 
the timing of deployment, as well as the composition and 
capabilities of the Mission.  Although the GoS has some valid points 
 
KHARTOUM 00001924  002 OF 002 
 
 
on troop contributions (the Nordic unit was not among the TCCs 
initially proposed for the mission) its habit of making an issue out 
of every step of UNAMID deployment - from clearance of equipment to 
flight permissions - is certainly not gaining it any points with the 
UN and the international community.  The GoS' passive-aggressive 
actions will continue to set back UNAMID deployment and ensure that 
it is a long, arduous, painful process for all involved. Sudanese 
actions are not helpful, and its long history of dishonesty and 
delay is a cause for deep skepticism, but the greatest factor for 
delay is the very cumbersome, clumsy and deliberative process an 
apparently reluctant UN has for setting up peacekeeping activities 
in Darfur. 
 
¶8. (SBU) Recommendation: At the very least, the US and international 
community should push for the early inclusion of Thai and Nepalese 
troops since the Sudanese have been vaguely positive about the 
acceptance of these units.  The GOS has no ready excuse for not 
accepting these units (except that African infantry contributions 
are over-subscribed and that the Thais are "not needed") and its 
allies on the UNSC should be encouraged to press them on this point. 
 The inclusion of these units plus a tactical helicopter element 
could qualitatively improve the force on the ground. 
 
FERNANDEZ