VZCZCXRO3211
PP RUEHROV
DE RUEHKH #1916/01 3381459
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 041459Z DEC 07
FM AMEMBASSY KHARTOUM
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 9441
INFO RUCNIAD/IGAD COLLECTIVE
RHMFISS/CJTF HOA

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 KHARTOUM 001916 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPT FOR AF/SPG, S/CRS, AF SE NATSIOS 
ADDIS ABABA FOR USAU 
DEPT PLS PASS USAID FOR AFR/SUDAN 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PGOV PREL KPKO SOCI AU UNSC SU
SUBJECT: DEPUTY SRSG ON PROSPECTS FOR CPA 
 
¶1. (SBU) Summary: CDA Fernandez met with Deputy SRSG Taye-Brook 
Zerihoun December 2 to discuss the prospects for CPA implementation. 
 A shrewd observer of Sudan and the region for many years, Zerihoun 
is not overly concerned by the current crisis and believes war is 
unlikely.  The parties are comfortable with their current 
arrangement and the next key event is the 2009 election, which can 
be organized with a minimum of fuss.  Troop redeployments are 
essential however; both sides have been caught cheating with troops 
on each other's side of the border. End summary. 
 
¶2. (SBU) UN Deputy SRSG for Sudan Taye-Brook Zerihoun told CDA 
Fernandez December 2 that he believes a return to war in Sudan is 
unlikely.  He bases his assessment on the fact that the parties, 
despite their constant bickering over process and details, are 
actually relatively comfortable with their current arrangement. 
Revenues have never been better for both sides and their status 
within the CPA guarantees them supremacy as the two primary 
political forces in Sudan.  So the SPLM will soon return their 
Ministers to the Government of National Unity (GNU) under protest 
even if all their conditions are not met.  The two sides are 
condemned to work together, "like a broken marriage that stays 
together for the kids."  Zerihoun said he would not want to be in 
the shoes of SPLM member Deng Alor, who is slated to take over as 
GNU Foreign Minister following the proposed cabinet reshuffle.  "How 
will he function?" Zerihoun asked rhetorically.  "You can't disagree 
with the President every day," and if Alor refuses to play his role 
the President will simply bypass him and use his Presidential 
Advisor for Foreign Affairs as de facto Foreign Minster. 
 
¶3. (SBU) Zerihoun says the real watershed event in Sudan will be the 
2009 election, which is in the interests of the National Congress 
Party (NCP) to retain its legitimacy, and which Zerihoun believes 
can be organized quickly and "with a minimum of fuss."  Zerihoun 
believes the SPLM will not be able to recreate the National 
Democratic Alliance (NDA) in order to oust the NCP from power. 
Therefore the SPLM's only choice is to partner with the NCP in 
elections, or look to independence in 2011.  However, Zerihoun 
expressed doubt that the SPLM will look toward separation when they 
see what is required - the infinite number of details which must be 
negotiated and managed to become an independent state - not to 
mention selling the policy to regional partners, none of whom want 
to see an independent Southern Sudan.  In 2009 the SPLM's only 
option is to run on a unity platform, and their best chance of 
remaining a national power and protecting their interests in the CPA 
is to partner with the NCP.  Otherwise they risk opening the CPA to 
renegotiation and dilution under another coalition, or if the NCP 
seeks another coalition of political alliances.  However the NCP is 
even less interested in opening the CPA to renegotiation because it 
wants to keep other "Northern" parties marginalized. 
 
¶4. (SBU) Zerihoun observed that nothing the NCP does with regard to 
slowing down CPA implementation is in its own interests.  CDA 
Fernandez agreed, noting that most observes see clearly that the NCP 
is brilliant tactically but short-sighted strategically.  Zerihoun 
said he believes this is because the NCP thrives when it is in 
crisis mode, a behavior learned in its struggle to remain in power 
for the last 18 years.  The NCP pursues a strategy of "war by other 
means" with the SPLM, seeking to weaken its opponent and partner but 
without any intention of returning to war despite the rhetoric.  The 
NCP's strategy is to tire and frustrate its opponent through 
attrition, and the SPLM's only card at the moment is escalation. 
However, the SPLM should recognize that its greatest weapon in this 
struggle is the 2009 election.  The SPLM can deliver votes for unity 
in exchange for a better deal on Abyei or other issues. 
Unfortunately the SPLM is currently afraid of the election because 
they don't have the same resources and organizational capacity, and 
because they know that under the census it will be clear that the 
South only has 8, at most 10 million people, far less than the 
thirty percent they are hoping for - something more in the range of 
twenty five percent or less is likely. 
 
¶5. (SBU) Zerihoun predicted that more small-scale clashes are 
likely, like the recent fighting at Malakal.  However this fighting 
will remain localized.  The key to ensure stability and reduce 
unnecessary casualties is the redeployment of troops.  Zerihoun 
noted that the SPLM has agreed to military withdrawals from the Nuba 
Mountains and Blue Nile, where it was cheating on numbers of 
soldiers across the border and now has been caught by the UN 
monitoring team.  Zerihoun predicted that the SAF will also 
eventually redeploy from North Bahr al Ghazal and Unity States. 
(Comment: Though full redeployment from the oil-rich areas is 
unlikely to happen quickly, and Northern-controlled GNU petroleum 
police will likely remain.) The SPLA withdrawal from border areas in 
the North will present them with a major internal political problem 
as it will have to "abandon" some of its most faithful 
constituencies. 
 
 
KHARTOUM 00001916  002 OF 002 
 
 
¶6. (SBU) Comment: Zerihoun is one of the most prescient observers of 
Sudanese politics currently residing in Khartoum.  An Ethiopian, he 
is from the region and was responsible for Sudan and the Horn of 
Africa from UN headquarters before this assignment.  We agree with 
his assessments, especially of Northern interests and strategy, but 
what he did not address is the possibility that the SPLM will 
implode.  The pressure of organizing elections, administering its 
territory, and trying to manage its strained relationship with the 
North while maintaining cohesion in its own ranks is a tremendous 
challenge.  Thus the North's tactic of "war by other means" could 
lead to dangerous and unanticipated consequences if some of the 
"6,000 captains" that SPLM SG Amun has expressed concern about 
become frustrated and decide to take matters into their own hands or 
break from the SPLM.  Zerihoun's bottom line of "expect more of the 
same tension, bickering and dysfunctionality" between the SPLM and 
NCP for the next 2-4 years is probably right. 
 
FERNANDEZ