VZCZCXRO1668
OO RUEHCHI RUEHCN RUEHDT RUEHHM
DE RUEHJA #3397/01 3480750
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
O 140750Z DEC 07
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 7401
INFO RUEHZS/ASSOCIATION OF SOUTHEAST ASIAN NATIONS PRIORITY
RUEHBY/AMEMBASSY CANBERRA 1766
RUEHKO/AMEMBASSY TOKYO 1317
RUEHWL/AMEMBASSY WELLINGTON 2161
RHMCSUU/FBI WASHINGTON DC
RUEAWJB/DEPT OF JUSTICE WASHDC
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC
RHHJJPI/USPACOM HONOLULU HI

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 JAKARTA 003397 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPT FOR EAP, EAP/MTS, EAP/MLS, INR/EAP, DS/IP/EAP, 
DS/T/ATA, EAP/ANP 
S/CT FOR RHONDA SHORE 
NSC FOR E.PHU 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PREL PGOV PTER ID
SUBJECT: INDONESIA -- DRAFT 2007 COUNTRY REPORT ON TERRORISM 
 
REF: STATE 145833 
 
¶1. (U) This message is Sensitive but Unclassified -- Please 
handle accordingly. 
 
¶2. (SBU) The draft text of Mission's 2007 Country Report on 
Terrorism for Indonesia follows in para 3.  This text will be 
posted on Intellipedia, the USG classified website, as part 
of its review by Washington agencies. 
 
¶3. (SBU) Begin text: 
 
INDONESIA -- 2007 COUNTRY REPORT ON TERRORISM 
 
Indonesia experienced its second consecutive year of no major 
terrorist incidents in 2007. Radical groups in Indonesia have 
had their ability to carry out attacks further diminished 
during the past year due to the Indonesian government's 
counterterrorism efforts. The Indonesian National Police 
(INP) scored major successes in breaking up terrorist cells 
linked to Jemaah Islamiyah (JI) and other violent Islamic 
extremist organizations.  While JI cells in Java and Central 
Sulawesi have been weakened, JI and its radical associates 
remained a security threat to both Western and domestic 
targets.  The Attorney General,s Office made some strides 
toward conducting more efficient and effective CT 
prosecutions despite weaknesses in Indonesia's anti-terror 
law.  The Government of Indonesia (GOI) continued to create a 
legal and law enforcement environment conducive to fighting 
terrorism within its borders, and numerous terrorists were 
convicted of crimes in 2007. 
 
In January, the INP conducted two raids against a radical 
stronghold in Poso, Central Sulawesi.  The second raid used 
500 security force personnel against a large group of 
terrorists and their supporters, who were armed with small 
arms and Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs).  The raids 
ended with 18 dead, 18 injured and 28 captured.  Subsequent 
operations netted five more suspects.  While the Poso 
operation was criticized as "heavy-handed" by some members of 
the local community, it calmed the previously tense situation 
in Central Sulawesi.  In March, information gained from the 
Poso suspects helped the INP initiate a series of raids in 
Central and East Java which resulted in the arrest of several 
members of the so-called "military wing" of JI and several 
cell leaders and the seizure of a large cache of explosives 
in East Java.  In June, INP,s Special Detachment 88 (SD-88), 
stationed in Central Java, arrested several key JI terrorist 
operatives, including alleged JI Emir Ustad Syahroni (aka 
Zarkasih)) and senior JI operative Abu Dujana (aka Ainal 
Bahri).  As the JI Emir, Afghanistan-veteran Zarkasih, a 
former JI leader, is thought to be senior to Dujana in the JI 
hierarchy.  Dujana, also an Afghanistan-veteran, was part of 
JI's central command and had been involved in several JI 
attacks in recent years. 
 
The arrests in January, March, and June removed several key 
JI leaders.  To create sympathy for these radical groups and 
to discredit the INP (especially SD-88), lawsuits were 
brought against the INP by Abu Dujana's wife and by JI 
co-founder and spiritual leader, Abu Bakar Ba,asyir.  The 
two lawsuits did not create the expected groundswell of 
public attention and were eventually thrown out of court. 
 
The newly-formed U.S.-funded Attorney General's Task Force on 
Terrorism and Transnational Crime took the leading role in 
handling prosecutions of terrorists.  The Task Force won 
convictions against:  Hasanuddin, a JI leader in Poso; four 
men who participated in the 2005 schoolgirl beheadings; and 
three others who were involved in the 2005 Tentena market 
bombings.  The Attorney General also won convictions against 
17 Poso Christians who had murdered two Muslims in revenge 
killings in September 2006.  The Task Force is currently 
prosecuting six members of JI,s military unit who were 
arrested in March.  JI top operatives Abu Dujana and Zarkasih 
are expected to come to trial in December 2007. 
 
 
JAKARTA 00003397  002 OF 002 
 
 
Other Indonesian legal institutions also took a hard line 
against terrorists.  In September, the Supreme Court rejected 
the final appeals of three men on death row for carrying out 
the 2002 Bali bombings.  The Court also upheld the life 
sentence imposed on JI trainer/recruiter Subur Sugiyarto.  In 
October, the Ministry of Law and Human Rights announced that 
convicted terrorists would no longer be given automatic 
sentence remissions at major holidays.  The new policy came 
too late to prevent the early release of some 20 convicted 
terrorists in 2007, but most of these were minor figures. 
 
The Indonesian government made genuine efforts to develop an 
effective anti-money laundering system for investigations and 
prosecutions.  Indonesian police froze terrorist financial 
assets uncovered during investigations.  However, the 
government's implementation of the UNSCR 1267 sanctions was 
hampered by poor interagency coordination and by continued 
lack of human and technical capacity within both the 
government and financial institutions.  It remains to be seen 
whether or not the GOI has the political will to do what is 
necessary to implement UNSCR 1267.  USAID is promoting 
capacity building through its Financial Crimes Prevention 
Project, a multi-year program to provide technical advisors 
and support to Indonesia's effort to develop an effective and 
credible regime against money laundering and terrorism 
finance.  Other donors are also providing assistance to the 
Financial Crimes Transaction and Analysis Center (PPATK). 
The unit receives Suspicious Transaction Reports (STRs) and 
Cash Transaction Reports.  PPATK has dramatically increased 
the number of STRs from 10 per month in 2002 to 483 per month 
in 2007 and these reports have led to 32 successful 
prosecutions to date.  While only one of these had a 
terrorist component, strengthened financial oversight will 
assist the GOI in tracking potential terrorist financial 
transactions. 
 
In 2007, the INP continued a program to "de-radicalize" 
convicted terrorists.  The program identifies individuals who 
may be open to more moderate teachings and INP officials work 
with them while they are in prison.  The program focuses on 
providing spiritual support to the men and modest financial 
support to their families.  By providing this support, the 
police attempt to gain the trust of the men and receive 
valuable information about terrorist networks.  The program 
also aims to reduce terrorist recruitment inside prisons. 
 
While Indonesia's counterterrorism efforts have been 
impressive, more could be done in some areas.  Despite the 
successes in Sulawesi and Central Java, JI networks and 
"sleeper" cells remain intact, and have the capacity to go 
operational with little warning.  Moreover, Malaysian JI 
operative and recruiter Noordin Mohammed Top remains at 
large, despite his suspected involvement in nearly every 
major terrorist attack in Indonesia since 2002.  Finally, the 
GOI needs to address weaknesses in the prison system, where 
convicted terrorists are able to maintain ties to their 
communities and to recruit new members into groups like 
Jemaah Islamiyah. 
 
End Text. 
HUME