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Viewing cable 07HELSINKI897, OSCE KAZAKHSTAN DEMARCHE: FINLAND AGREES AND

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
07HELSINKI897 2007-12-27 12:39 2011-04-24 00:00 CONFIDENTIAL Embassy Helsinki
VZCZCXRO0252
RR RUEHFL RUEHLA RUEHMRE RUEHROV RUEHSR
DE RUEHHE #0897 3611239
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
R 271239Z DEC 07
FM AMEMBASSY HELSINKI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 3974
INFO RUCNOSC/ORGANIZATION FOR SECURITY COOPERATION IN EUROPE
RUEHTA/AMEMBASSY ALMATY 0207
RUEHVEN/USMISSION USOSCE 0123
C O N F I D E N T I A L HELSINKI 000897 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/27/2017 
TAGS: OSCE PGOV PREL KZ FI
SUBJECT: OSCE KAZAKHSTAN DEMARCHE: FINLAND AGREES AND 
COMMENTS 
 
REF: SECSTATE 167807 
 
Classified By: POLOFF LISA CONESA FOR REASONS 1.4 (B) & (D) 
 
1. (C) PolOff delivered subject demarche to Ms. Paivi 
Peltokoski, First Secretary, Finnish OSCE Chairmanship Task 
Force December 20.  Peltokoski stated that the GoF agrees 
with the Kazakhstani commitments and &practically 
everything8.  Peltokoski characterized the delay itself as 
minimally significant to Kazakhstan since Kazakhstan came 
willing to negotiate on the year. 
 
First Commitments First 
------------------------------------ 
2.  (C) Peltokoski noted that the Kazakhstanis publicly 
withdrew their support for Russia in making their commitments 
to preserve the ODIHR and maintain the existing access 
Non-Governmental organizations currently enjoy.  GoF views 
the 1992 Helsinki and 1994 Budapest documents as viable with 
unchanged principals.  They perceive the Kazakhstani speech 
and commitments in Madrid November 29 as significant. 
 
At Home in Kazakhstan 
---------------------------------- 
3. (C) Peltokoski views domestic commitments as harder to 
verify.  The OSCE is limited in mechanism and resources to 
verify domestic compliance in the field in such a large 
country.  She raised concern twice that the OSCE field 
mission in Almaty, the former capital, must continue at an 
effective level, citing the reduction to  project 
coordination level, in the Uzbek and the Ukrainian missions, 
and now possibly the Tajik mission. Kazahkstanis must also 
ensure political opposition groups have a voice; Peltokoski 
cited the lower house, currently occupied by only one 
political party.  She noted that many OSCE delegations were 
disappointed with the outcome of Kazahkstani parliamentary 
elections. 
 
Kazakhstan Success at OSCE as a Bridge for the Future 
---------------------------------- 
4. (C) The GoF sees potential in Kazakhstan,s OSCE 
Chairmanship as the first Chairmanship of a former Soviet 
Republic and hopes the OSCE is ready to help.  Kazakhstan 
could be a bridge, ending discussion once and for all on 
east-west divisions in the OSCE, finally squelching the 
feeling of two groups in one.   Kazakhstan actively 
approached Finland and Romania for OSCE training and has 
already taken some training in Vienna, pursuing practical 
information on personnel, travel and budget, study, and 
organizational issues.  GoF views Kazakhstan as seriously 
preparing for its role. 
 
Comment on Response 
---------------------------------- 
5. (C) The GoF is deeply focused on moving into its own 
Chairmanship.  They are attentive to what the Chairmanship 
turnover requires.  They believe that the decision to set up 
3 chairmanships instead of 2 was crucial and that the OSCE 
was close to crisis.  This way will be more pragmatic in 
their view and could ensure long term planning and a 
potentially common approach to priorities.  They recognize 
that each Chairmanship comes with an agenda.  They embraced 
the potential success of a Kazakhstani Chairmanship as a 
forum for the active demonstration of OSCE successes on a 
number of levels. 
HYATT