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UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 10 HANOI 002051 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR EAP/MLS AND EAP/RSP 
SECDEF FOR ISA/SHUBERT 
PACOM FOR J5/MAJ MA 
U-183-07 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: MASS MOPS PHSA VM
SUBJECT: SCENESETTER FOR VISIT BY COMMANDER, UNITED STATES 
PACIFIC COMMAND 
 
Introduction 
------------ 
 
¶1. (SBU) Admiral, your visit to Vietnam is well timed to 
complement the successes of recent trips by other senior 
civilian and military leaders and will be an important 
contribution to the growing U.S.-Vietnam relationship, 
especially in advance of Vietnam taking its seat on the UNSC 
next year.  Your visit will build on positive participation 
of Vietnam in the Chiefs of Defense conference you hosted in 
Hawaii during early November as well as the June visit by 
then Chief of Naval Operations, the May visit by your Deputy, 
and last February's visit by then Commander, Pacific Fleet. 
Your discussions will allow us to build-on advancements in 
military bilateral cooperation that to date have grown but 
continue to lag behind its full potential, particularly in 
the areas of search and rescue and naval cooperation. 
 
¶2. (SBU) A series of high-level bilateral visits, the 
highlights of which were President Bush's trip to Vietnam in 
November 2006 and President Nguyen Minh Triet's Washington 
visit in June 2007, have helped push the bilateral 
relationship to a higher plane.  Vietnam's desire last year 
to successfully host APEC and accede to the WTO also helped 
strengthen bilateral ties.  Vietnam's recent election to a 
non-permanent seat on the UN Security Council during the 
2008-2009 term, and its emerging leadership role in ASEAN, 
are also key indications of the GVN's desire to pursue a more 
outward looking and engaged role in the world community. 
 
¶3. (SBU) Our strengthening relations are in large part due to 
Vietnam's realization that the United States is an important 
force in maintaining a stable geopolitical environment in 
which even "small" countries like Vietnam are assured their 
independence and freedom of action.  Vietnam also sees in the 
United States, its largest export market, an increasingly 
vital source of development aid, technical assistance and 
foreign direct investment.  For these reasons, Vietnam's 
leaders are committed to continued progress in bilateral 
relations and will likely speak positively and optimistically 
about the future of U.S.-Vietnam ties.  Differences over 
human rights remain, however, and lingering fears that the 
United States supports the overthrow of the current regime 
through &peaceful evolution8 continue to complicate the 
relationship.  China also looms as a factor coloring Hanoi's 
reactions to our proposals in the security realm, as 
discussed further below. 
 
¶4. (SBU) We have planned a full schedule for your visit. 
During your stay, you will have the opportunity to meet with 
key senior civilian and military leaders in Hanoi.  You will 
also have an opportunity to meet again with the Minister of 
Defense, the Deputy Prime Minister/Minister of Foreign 
Affairs, and the Deputy Chief of the General Staff, who also 
serves as the standing director of the National Committee for 
Search and Rescue (Vietnam,s Federal Emergency Management 
Agency equivalent). Below are issues and topics that are 
likely to be raised in your meetings in Hanoi. 
 
Counterterrorism: Case-by-Case Cooperation 
------------------------------------------ 
 
¶5. (SBU) Vietnam says the right things about terrorism, 
underscoring its willingness to respond rapidly to specific 
cases or incidents. However, in response to our efforts, 
together with like-minded countries, to urge GVN 
participation in multilateral efforts such as the 
Proliferation Security Initiative and the Global Initiative 
to Combat Nuclear Terrorism, the GVN has stood firm in 
limiting its involvement to cooperation only on a 
"case-by-case basis." 
Nonetheless, the GVN and the United States have made gradual 
progress in strengthening our joint counterterrorism efforts. 
 During President Bush's visit last year, the President and 
his Vietnamese counterpart pledged to increase cooperation to 
halt the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and 
related technology and materials in accordance with 
international and national laws and each country's 
 
HANOI 00002051  002 OF 010 
 
 
capacities.  The U.S.-led project to repatriate Highly 
Enriched Uranium (HEU) from the Nuclear Research Institute in 
Dalat and convert the reactor to Low Enriched Uranium (LEU), 
completed in mid-September, was an important deliverable on 
this commitment.  The United States provides counterterrorism 
assistance to Vietnam by funding Vietnamese participation in 
counterterrorism-related training at the International Law 
Enforcement Academy (ILEA) in Bangkok, and through 
military-to-military exchanges with an emphasis on 
counterterrorism themes.  We'd like to do much more. 
 
¶6. (SBU) In the multilateral arena, Vietnam has signed eight 
out of 13 UN terrorism conventions.  Approval of the 
remaining five is winding its way through the cumbersome GVN 
bureaucracy, the delay explained in part by GVN concern with 
its capacity to carry out obligations under the conventions. 
Two of the remaining conventions are reportedly in the final 
stages of GVN approval, while the status of the other three 
remains unclear. 
 
Gradual Progress in Defense Cooperation 
--------------------------------------- 
 
¶7. (SBU) Defense relations have advanced at a measured pace, 
with a deliberate but positive shift in defense relationship. 
Senior defense leader visits have been key to enhancing 
mutual trust through the development of personal 
relationships.  We now conduct professional military 
exchanges with the People's Army of Vietnam (PAVN) in a wide 
range of areas including military medicine, meteorological/ 
oceanographic (METOC) prediction, search and rescue, military 
law and disaster preparedness.  PAVN officers have been 
invited as observers to Cobra Gold for the past four years 
and routinely attend U.S. Pacific Command-sponsored 
multilateral conferences.  This year, they also sent 
observers to Cooperation Afloat Readiness and Training 
(CARAT) activities in Brunei. Since 1997, nearly seventy GVN 
officials, including more than thirty-five PAVN officers, 
have attended courses and seminars at the Asia Pacific Center 
for Security Studies (APCSS). 
 
¶8. (SBU) Since 2003, U.S. Navy ships have made five official 
port visits at three different Vietnamese ports. The most 
recent port visit was November 14-18 by two mine 
countermeasures ships, the USS Guardian and the USS Patriot, 
to Haiphong port.  Additionally, the USS Peleliu visited 
Danang City in July to carry-out humanitarian medical 
activities and the USNS Bruce C. Heezen visited Danang City 
in October to participate in hydro-meteorological technical 
exchanges.  Vietnam agreed to participate in the 
International Military Education and Training Program (IMET), 
in June 2005, and the first two officers from the PAVN 
completed their IMET-sponsored (almost one year long) English 
language training in Texas this year.  In October, PAVN sent 
another six officers for a year of English training in the 
United States.  This year, IMET will provide a language 
laboratory in Hanoi.  In addition, IMET will expand mil-mil 
contacts in FY08 with a U.S. mobile training team (MTT) visit 
for Search and Rescue and another MTT for military medical 
techniques training.  This will open a new phase in bilateral 
military contacts. 
 
¶9. These increased military contacts have elicited some 
noticeable results. For example, the GVN recently responded 
quickly (within 24 hours) by approving two different USPACOM 
blanket overflight clearance requests for U.S. military 
flights in support of disaster response in Bangladesh. This 
was only the second time that such as clearance has been 
approved by the GVN.  The Ministry of Defense also has 
recently invited the United States to send an officer to its 
National Defense Academy's new International Officers Course 
starting next spring. These are constructive steps, but we 
have far to go to achieve our full potential for closer 
cooperation in defense activities, including multilateral 
peacekeeping, humanitarian assistance efforts and attendance 
at U.S. military schools exists. These goals are attainable, 
but will require time, persistence and patience. 
 
 
HANOI 00002051  003 OF 010 
 
 
Expanding U.S. Naval Ship Visits 
-------------------------------- 
 
¶10. (SBU) While we have regularized regular ship visits over 
recent years, the GVN has remained firm in limiting the 
frequency of port visits by U.S. Navy warships to one per 
year.  This restriction is frequently cited as being 
consistent with GVN laws that regulate visits by foreign 
warships; however, some other nations conduct more frequent 
port visits, and we have not identified any published laws 
that substantiate the limits of one visit per year rule.  We 
still seek to persuade the GVN to permit more frequent access 
for ships to conduct limited, technical calls for refueling, 
replenishment or special purpose visits (technical exchanges 
or humanitarian assistance).  This would support our overall 
goal of increasing routine access for U.S. Naval vessels at 
Vietnam's ports, while not escalating the pace of military 
contacts beyond a level that is comfortable for the GVN.  We 
also hope to continue asking the GVN to participate in 
fly-outs and believe that the general positive trend in the 
relationship will result in an acceptance at some point.  We 
are eager to welcome the USNS Mercy's visit next year. This 
visit will expand upon the groundwork laid by the July 2007 
USS Peleliu visit and that greater PAVN medical participation 
will be achieved. 
 
Peacekeeping Operations 
----------------------- 
 
¶11. (SBU) Peacekeeping Operations (PKO) are well outside the 
range of normal PAVN missions of protecting sovereignty, 
building the nation and preserving the Communist Party 
regime.  Over past years, however, the GVN has expressed 
increasing interest in potential involvement in PKO missions 
organized under UN auspices.  We believe that Vietnam's 
recent election to a non-permanent seat on the UN Security 
Council during the 2008-2009 term has given significant 
impetus to this thinking.  Vietnamese military leaders remain 
cautious, however, saying that Vietnam would focus Vietnam's 
PKO participation only on providing medical or engineer 
support missions, including demining. 
 
¶12. (SBU) Several PAVN officers have already gone abroad to 
participate in Peace Operations Military Observer's Courses 
offered by several nations and in 2005 the GVN hosted a 
strategic-level peacekeeping seminar in Hanoi co-sponsored by 
Great Britain.  PAVN leaders nonetheless have yet to discuss 
Vietnamese commitment to any actual PKO contingency.  To move 
to that stage, the GVN would have to do much more to meet the 
remaining challenges of the lack of interoperability, the 
paucity of English language speakers in the military and 
complications due to funding issues. Vietnamese military 
leaders have told us that any PKO participation by Vietnam 
troops would have to be approved by the National Assembly, 
which has not yet publicly considered that initiative. 
 
Consequences of War 
-------------------- 
 
¶13. (SBU) In your meetings, you are likely to hear references 
to "consequences of war" or "legacies of war" issues.  This 
is the catch-all term that the GVN applies to a myriad of 
problems, including Agent Orange(AO)/Dioxin contamination, 
unexploded ordnance (UXO) and land mines from the war era, 
and the incomplete recovery of missing Vietnamese military 
personnel. 
 
¶14. (SBU) While scientists and GVN officials continue to 
debate the human impact of the 80 million liters of AO 
sprayed over 2.6 million hectares and 3,000 villages in 
Vietnam, recent GVN-approved studies reveal that Dioxin 
contamination is not widespread, but rather is concentrated 
in roughly 20 "hotspots."  Former U.S. bases, from which 
Operation Ranch Hand missions were staged and AO was stored, 
have soil dioxin concentrations exceeding concentration 
levels recommended by the U. S. Environmental Protection 
Agency (EPA) and World Health Organization, while other areas 
thought to be targets of heavy aerial spraying do not 
 
HANOI 00002051  004 OF 010 
 
 
currently have soil concentrations considered hazardous to 
health. 
 
¶15. (SBU) Much has been accomplished recently in turning a 
new leaf on the AO/Dioxin issue with regard to 
government-to-government relations and changing the tone of 
the dialogue both in meetings and in the press.  The 
Department of Defense role in this effort has been to share 
data on wartime Operation Ranch Hand sites and share DOD 
experiences in remediation efforts that DOD supervised during 
and after the Vietnam War.  To this end, DOD sponsored a 
dioxin remediation workshop in Hanoi in 2005 where the U.S. 
experience in dioxin remediation was reviewed. In addition a 
second DOD workshop was held in 2007 in Hanoi to provide 
Vietnam's Military with updated data on Operation Ranch Hand 
sites and potential hazardous areas. On November 17, 2006 the 
Joint Statement between the GVN and USG on the occasion of 
President Bush's visit to Vietnam stated: "The U.S. and 
Vietnam also agreed that further joint efforts to address the 
environmental contamination near former Dioxin storage sites 
would make a valuable contribution to the continued 
development of their bilateral relationship." 
 
¶16. (SBU) Beginning in 2006, the State Department and EPA 
provided USD 
400,000 in technical assistance to the GVN's Office 33 and 
PAVN,s Chemical Command for remediation planning and 
immediate interventions at the Danang City airport.  Congress 
recently appropriated an additional USD 3 million in Economic 
Support Funds (ESF) for "dioxin mitigation and health 
activities," thereby helping Vietnam to remediate areas with 
demonstrably high levels of dioxin and assist those with 
disabilities.  This follows four years of USG support to 
build the capacity of the Vietnam Academy of Science for 
analysis of contaminated soils and sediment.  The USG is 
continuing to work with the GVN, and in parallel to efforts 
by UNDP, Ford Foundation and other NGOs, to examine the next 
steps in the environmental remediation of three priority 
hotspots in Danang, Hoa Binh and Phu Cat airfields. 
Developing a partnership to share all information and best 
practices in environmental remediation between the DOD and 
MOD would be well received by the GVN. 
 
Impacts of Remaining UXO 
------------------------ 
 
¶17. (SBU) Since 1989, USAID and the U.S. Department of 
State,s Office of Weapons Removal and Abatement (WRA), 
through support from the Patrick J. Leahy War Victims Fund 
(LWVF) and other sources, has provided over USD 43 million to 
support NGOs and private voluntary organizations to develop 
comprehensive programs for people with disabilities.  In 
addition, since 1993 the USG has been actively involved in 
assisting the people of Vietnam in overcoming the social and 
economic impacts of remaining UXO from the war.  Vietnam was 
formally accepted as the 37th participant in the U.S. 
Humanitarian De-mining Program in June 2000, and the USG is 
now the largest donor of humanitarian assistance for mine 
action programs in Vietnam.  The USG has invested over USD 37 
million in a broad spectrum of programs not only to locate, 
remove and destroy unexploded ordnance and landmines, but 
also to address the UXO effects on health and livelihood of 
Vietnamese living in affected areas. 
 
¶18. (SBU) Today, various NGOs conduct UXO and land mine 
clearance, risk education and victim rehabilitation. The USG 
has also donated a significant quantity of equipment to the 
PAVN to assist efforts in UXO and landmine clearance and 
return land to productive use.  In 2006, the State Department 
provided USD 3.5 million to support UXO action and demining 
activities in Vietnam, almost a third of which went directly 
to PAVN in the form of donated demining equipment.  In 2007, 
an additional USD 2.5 million was provided to underwrite mine 
action related activities in Vietnam, however, sharp 
decreases in humanitarian mine action (HMA) funding in 2008 
due to tight budgets will force the cancellation of key 
programs. 
 
 
HANOI 00002051  005 OF 010 
 
 
¶19. (SBU) The GVN remains keenly interested in building 
capacity to conduct underwater mine and UXO detection and 
clearance.  In 2005, the maritime economy contributed about 
fifteen percent of the overall GDP, however the GVN announced 
in January 2007 a goal of growing the maritime economy to 
constitute 53-55 percent by 2020.  After 20 years of reform 
development, Vietnam still does not have a deep water port 
that can handle large container ships, adding some 28% to the 
cost of shipments to the United States.  The development of 
deep-water ports to augment existing inadequate port 
infrastructure is thus viewed as a critical requirement to 
fuel the growing maritime economy. 
¶20. (SBU) Additionally, Vietnam's fishing fleet consists of 
more than eighty thousand small fishing vessels with less 
than 500-600 horse power, operating both close to the coast 
and offshore.  Of these, fishing boats in the 40-50 horse 
power-range account for about two thirds of the fleet, and 
most of these do not have the equipment to maintain contact 
with the land.  One of the biggest disaster preparedness 
challenges faced by the GVN is that of recalling vessels back 
to port in case of a storm, as well as providing adequate 
safe havens and anchorages for all these vessels.  Thus, 
another key component of Vietnam,s design for the future of 
the maritime economic sector is the development of coastal 
and island safe havens for its fishing fleet.  This 
necessitates extensive mine/UXO clearance activities in the 
coastal areas of many of the northern provinces and 
assistance in these activities would undoubtedly be welcomed. 
Fullest Possible Accounting 
--------------------------- 
 
¶21. (SBU) Predating the re-establishment of diplomatic 
relations and normal defense contacts, U.S. military and DoD 
elements continue their efforts toward the fullest possible 
accounting of Americans missing from the Vietnam Conflict. 
Since 1988, the Joint POW/MIA Accounting Command (JPAC), a 
USPACOM subordinate element, has evolved to include forward 
Detachments in Vietnam, Laos, and Thailand/Cambodia.  With 
its Vietnam Detachment (Det 2), it has completed 90 Joint 
Field Activities (JFA), which incorporated extensive 
research, interviews, analysis, and excavations in order to 
accomplish its mission.  From its inception, Det 2 has forged 
excellent relations with its GVN counterparts (notably, the 
Vietnam Office for Seeking Missing Persons or VNOSMP). 
Ultimately, JPAC's efforts in Southeast Asia have resulted in 
accounting for 880 American's who were previously unaccounted 
for.  The foundation has been set for sustaining JPAC's 
success as it continues to account for the remaining 1766 
missing Americans throughout Southeast Asia. 
 
¶22. (SBU) JPAC Det 2 is currently working toward the: (1) 
admission of JPAC teams to research or recover cases located 
in select areas of high GVN sensitivity; (2) the access to 
information held in classified military and security ministry 
archives and records that have not previously been made 
available to USG; and (3) further assistance in resolving 
cases in Laos and Cambodia where members of Vietnam's armed 
forces might provide the largest pool of eyewitnesses. 
 
¶23. (SBU) An area of heightened bilateral cooperation is the 
undertaking of investigation and recovery efforts at sea. 
During the Vietnam Conflict, more than 400 American aviators 
were lost in the waters off the coast of Vietnam.  While the 
majority of those American's were declared dead and their 
remains deemed not recoverable, JPAC continues to conduct 
underwater investigation and survey activity when information 
obtained and validated has the potential to lead to a 
recovery.  This is a resource-intensive endeavor.  In 
December, 2006 the GVN gave its approval for the use of U.S. 
naval vessels to operate within their territorial waters in 
order to enhance JPAC's underwater investigations towards the 
identification of potential recovery sites. 
 
Humanitarian Assistance 
----------------------- 
 
¶24. (SBU) Since 1995, U.S. Agency for International 
Development (USAID) programs have provided aid in legal 
 
HANOI 00002051  006 OF 010 
 
 
reform, governance, economic growth, HIV/AIDS, environmental 
protection and disaster prevention.  For FY 2007, total U.S. 
assistance from all agencies was about USD 86.6 million, most 
of which has gone towards providing health-related 
assistance, notably in the area of HIV/AIDS treatment and 
prevention.  Vietnam is one of fifteen countries in the 
President's Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief (PEPFAR).  The 
United States provided USD 65 million in 2007 to expand 
integrated HIV/AIDS prevention, care and treatment programs. 
This figure includes approximately USD 3.1 million dollars 
for the Department of Defense (DOD)-managed portion of PEPFAR 
HIV/AIDS programs with Vietnam's Ministry of Defense. 
 
¶25. (SBU) Since 2000, when Vietnam experienced a particularly 
devastating season of floods and storms, DOD has supported a 
wide variety of Overseas Humanitarian, Disaster and Civic Aid 
(OHDCA) projects in Vietnam.  Through USPACOM, DOD sponsored 
the construction of eight medical clinics in Thua Thien-Hue 
Province, a primary school in Quang Binh Province, and two 
centers for disabled children in Quang Binh Province.  In 
2006 two additional humanitarian assistance construction 
projects were completed in Central Vietnam: a medical clinic 
in Quang Binh Province, and a 10-room primary school in Quang 
Tri Province.  This year USPACOM has used OHDCA and APRI 
funds to sponsor construction of a medical clinic and school 
projects in Danang City, Lai Chau and Nghe An Provinces as 
well as Flood Management Centers in both Danang City and 
Quang Nam Province.  Additionally, USPACOM has facilitated 
multiple donations of excess medical property to various 
medical facilities throughout Vietnam.  The Defense Attache 
Office and other Country Team members are currently working 
with Vietnamese officials to gain information to develop a 
rationale, scalable plan for focused HA that will provide a 
greater impact over a larger area and over an extended 
timeframe for future HA proposals.  We believe this is 
similar to recent initiatives being recommended by your 
USPACOM J4. 
 
¶26. (SBU) Through a combination of Fulbright grants and the 
Vietnam Education Foundation (VEF), an innovative program 
created through legislation to facilitate the training of 
Vietnamese scientists, the United States sponsors over 100 
students yearly for graduate study in the United States.  The 
Fulbright program is the largest in Asia.  The VEF was 
established with the unpaid proceeds of loans extended to the 
old South Vietnamese government.  Another important activity 
is the Fulbright Education Training Program, through which 
seventy mid-level Vietnamese professionals receive in-country 
training in economics and public policy each year. 
 
A Word on the Economy, WTO and Investment 
----------------------------------------- 
 
¶27. (SBU) Vietnam today is fueled by a dynamic economy, which 
grew at an 8.1% rate last year.  Per capita annual income 
jumped from about USD 220 in 1994 to USD 720 in 2006.  The 
ongoing implementation of economic reforms first launched in 
1986 in a program known as "Doi Moi" (renovation) has been 
effective in promoting market-oriented changes and has 
improved the quality of life for many Vietnamese.  Foreign 
trade and foreign direct investment have increased 
dramatically and poverty rates have dropped.  Vietnam 
formally acceded to the WTO as its 150th member on January 
11, 2007.  Vietnam's chief exports are crude oil, textiles, 
footwear and aquatic products.  The United States is 
currently Vietnam's fourth largest overall trade partner 
(behind China, Japan and the EU), but remains its largest 
export market.  The economy still faces challenges, 
especially from the inherent difficulties of transforming 
legacy command-economy structures, systemic corruption and 
the slow pace of reform in many areas. 
 
Future Prospects 
---------------- 
 
¶28. (SBU) Since 1991, the GVN has sought to improve 
diplomatic ties both regionally and worldwide.  The GVN 
recognizes the strategic importance of the United States in 
 
HANOI 00002051  007 OF 010 
 
 
the region and the world, but is not shy about raising the 
specter of "peaceful evolution," or to criticize U.S. actions 
it perceives as outside the multilateral system.  They 
routinely chafe over U.S. criticism of Vietnam's record of 
human rights and religious freedom.  Nonetheless, Vietnam's 
leaders are also pragmatic and recognize that Vietnam's own 
continued economic well-being, growth and security are, in 
large measure, inexorably tied to its relationship with the 
United States. 
 
¶29. (SBU) Vietnam has begun to explore opportunities within 
regional organizations, to increase joint efforts against 
terrorism, narcotics, maritime piracy and other issues of 
shared concern.  Vietnam has also recently begun joint sea 
patrols with other neighbors in the Gulf of Thailand and has 
established hotlines to help facilitate coordination along 
sea boundaries.  The recent success of the Royal Thai Navy 
rescue of Vietnamese seamen adrift in the Gulf of Thailand 
was largely credited to the use of one such hotline. 
Nevertheless, for historic and foreign policy reasons, the 
GVN is generally reluctant to speak out against its 
"traditional friends" such as North Korea and Iran when they 
engage in behavior that the rest of the international 
community condemns. 
 
¶30. (SBU) In November the National Defense Academy (NDA) 
Director announced Vietnam's new professional military 
education course for foreign senior officers and civilians. 
Much of this course is likely to be little more than a 
government primer on Vietnam, but the opportunity for 
interaction among the thirty or so foreign officers and their 
host nation instructors (many of whom do speak English) 
coupled with the increased contact and access to military 
facilities could make this a credible step forward towards 
increase military transparency and international cooperation 
between Vietnam and other militaries. 
 
The China Factor 
---------------- 
 
¶31. (SBU) China constitutes Vietnam's most important 
strategic preoccupation.  Relations must remain on an even 
keel, and Hanoi has no illusions about the relative power 
balance.  Vietnam's huge neighbor to the north constitutes a 
vital and necessary commercial partner and former ally.  The 
two nations share ideological roots.  At the same time, China 
is perceived as a constraint to Vietnam's freedom of action, 
and the undertone of Beijing's dominance in the relationship 
has a nasty implication due to China's 1,000 year history of 
colonial domination.  Even today, Beijing appears to be 
willing to set aside its core policy strategy of improving 
relations with nations on its periphery when faced with 
energy security and sovereignty issues.  Both of these are 
coming into play as China engages in bullying of foreign 
companies to cause them to cease oil and gas exploration 
efforts in the South China Sea, as has been reported in the 
press. 
 
¶32. (SBU) Recent rhetorical disputes over territorial 
sovereignty in the Hoang Sa (Paracel Islands) and Truong Sa 
archipelagos (Spratly Islands) have escalated recently with 
strong GVN criticism concerning PRC military exercises in the 
Hoang Sa islands in late November and the PRC,s recent 
establishment of Sansha Administrative Town in early 
December, which includes both the disputed Hoang Sa and 
Truong Sa islands.  GVN re-affirmations of claims to 
territorial sovereignty to both island chains were widely 
carried in the local press, which also expressed dismay over 
the PRC,s unilateral moves to abrogate the spirit of the 
2002 Declaration on the Code of Parties in the East Sea. 
 
¶33. (SBU) Sensitivity about China's possible reactions to 
engagement with the United States has definitely not 
constrained Hanoi willingness to engage on broad economic 
issues.  We are a driver of Vietnam's integration into the 
world economy, which is not proceeding according to the 
"Chinese model."  On security matters, however, GVN 
reluctance to engage with us more fully is attributable to 
 
HANOI 00002051  008 OF 010 
 
 
concern over China's potential reaction, in particular, mixed 
with an institutional conservatism born out of concern over 
"peaceful evolution" as a real threat to the regime.  Also, 
there is an ingrained caution on the part of Vietnam's 
military in the face of relative power calculations vis-a-vis 
China.  As documented above, while progress is still being 
made, we are moving at a measured pace and within these 
constraints. 
 
PAVN'S ROLE 
------------ 
 
¶34. (SBU) PAVN has three primary missions: to defend 
Vietnam,s territorial sovereignty, to support and preserve 
the CPV regime, and to contribute to the economic welfare and 
development of the nation. 
 
¶35. (SBU) PAVN currently has about 480,000 active duty 
forces, backed by twice as many paramilitary forces and a 
pool of reserve soldiers that potentially also numbers up to 
a million strong.  The defense establishment also includes 
perhaps an additional half million civilian workers whose 
livelihood is tied into the success of military-run, 
state-owned enterprises and factories.  In principle, Vietnam 
has universal eighteen-month conscription for men and women 
aged 18-25 years and this ensures a ready pool to fill the 
active duty, paramilitary and reserve ranks. Many former 
conscripts find employment in military businesses.  The PAVN 
is professionalizing, but slowly and at an uneven pace.  In 
the past five years, it has sought to improve the officer 
accession process, link promotions to education, and 
standardize everything from military salaries to military 
training curricula.  Most recently, Vietnam also reduced the 
obligated service time for conscripts. 
 
¶36. (SBU) PAVN forces are arrayed in bases throughout the 
country.  This includes Border Guard forces deployed at 
hundreds of checkpoints along Vietnam's borders with China, 
Laos and Cambodia and along the coast.  Vietnam also has 
troops deployed on reefs it claims in the Spratly Islands. 
PAVN has a large footprint in the Central Highlands 
provinces, where it participates in large-scale economic 
development and community building projects. 
 
¶37. (SBU) PAVN is not a particularly well-equipped force. 
Equipment modernization is constrained by limited resources 
and the government's emphasis on fostering economic growth 
through infrastructure investment.  Some high-tech 
acquisitions have been made for modern air and air defense 
systems including: Russian S-300 Surface to Air Missile (SAM) 
systems, a limited number of SU-27 and SU-30MK multi-role 
fighters, SU-22 ground attack aircraft, and M28 Skytruck 
STOL-class, multi-role cargo aircraft.  The navy continues a 
slow buildup of its capability to defend the coasts and 
territorial claims in the South China Sea.  It hopes to have 
a ship capable of cross-ocean voyages by 2010, and even 
mentioned this during a recent visit by senior State 
Department Official, but Vietnam is not building toward a 
serious blue-water navy capability. 
 
¶38. (SBU) Most new naval vessels have been acquired through 
foreign sales, but some are now domestically built through 
partnership arrangements with foreign governments.  In a 2003 
contract worth USD 120 million, Vietnam reportedly received 
two Russian-built Tarantul II Class fast attack missile boats 
and eight more will be locally assembled under license using 
Russian components.  Russia remains the primary source of 
high-tech acquisitions, but Vietnam has also acquired defense 
articles from Poland, Ukraine, India, Israel, Slovenia, 
Hungary, China, and the Czech Republic.  In September 2005 
the last of six Search and Rescue patrol boats was handed 
over to Vietnam,s National Maritime Bureau (VINAMARINE). 
Although these vessels will be based in the central region of 
Vietnam, they were primarily built at the Song Cam Shipyard 
in Hai Phong using a complete component package delivered by 
the DAMEN Technical Cooperation of the Netherlands.  Another 
USD 19 million contract with the DAMEN Technical Cooperation 
led to the construction of four 5,000 HP Rescue tug boats for 
 
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Vietnam's Marine Police (under the Navy) at the military,s 
Danang-based Song Thu Shipyard.  PAVN,s organic shipbuilding 
capacity while good is still limited to vessels less than 70K 
DWT, and remains constrained by the use of many imported 
components, such as navigation and communication systems, as 
well as engines and weaponry. 
 
¶39. (SBU) PAVN,s missions include disaster relief and search 
and rescue in times of natural calamity.  PAVN also plays an 
active and important role in maintaining domestic political 
stability through its widespread programs aimed at 
indoctrinating Vietnam,s citizenry in their moral and 
patriotic duties.  Conscription, in combination with 
long-term mandatory militia and reserve service, serves to 
underscore the idea that each citizen has an obligation to 
participate in defending the state and the regime against 
attempts to erode or usurp the party,s grip on power.  The 
threat of &peaceful evolution8 and efforts by unspecified 
forces (the United States/West) to use ideas like 
&democracy8, and &human rights8 to foment social unrest 
continue to be employed as ideological bogeymen. 
 
¶40. (SBU) PAVN also plays a vital role in fostering economic 
development and infrastructure modernization throughout 
Vietnam, but particularly in those areas that are underserved 
by other government or commercial development programs. 
Military participation in productive matters is not simply an 
expedient means to fund force modernization in an era of 
dwindling defense budgets.  It also reflects a long-standing 
historical linkage between national defense and the nation,s 
productive capacity that remains central to the doctrinal 
roles of a People,s Army in both wartime and peacetime. 
 
¶41. (SBU) PAVN also operates more than 250 economic 
enterprises in a wide range of fields including capital 
construction, tourism, textiles, agriculture, chemical 
manufacturing, shipbuilding, aqua-culture, petroleum 
distribution, port operations, banking and 
telecommunications.  PAVN businesses operate nationwide and 
many are diverse conglomerates with a wide spectrum of 
interests.  PAVN has recently consolidated the number of 
military-run businesses to gain efficiencies, and although 
there has been recent talk about reducing the military,s 
role in business, few meaningful changes have apparently 
taken place to date. 
 
¶42. (SBU) Along with the Public Security Forces, PAVN remains 
perhaps the most conservative and insular of GVN institutions 
and it zealously carries out the mission of conducting 
national defense education.  This program is compulsory for 
almost every citizen.  It includes rudimentary military 
training and political indoctrination.  PAVN applies 
significant resources to defense education and continues to 
expand the network of defense education centers throughout 
the country, including those at most high schools and major 
universities.  Priorities for training focus on youth, ethnic 
minorities in sensitive areas, and provincial or local 
government officials.  Millions of citizens undergo some form 
of defense education training every year. 
 
¶43. (SBU) Leadership and decision-making in the military is a 
fragmented and often prolonged affair because it utilizes a 
Communist Party system of committees at all levels.  Recent 
efforts to weaken the unilateral authority of military 
commanders in favor of strengthening the role of these party 
committees and units political commissars and political 
officers was intended to re-invigorate the controlling 
influence of the Communist Party over all military matters. 
 
 
What You Can Expect 
-------------------- 
 
¶44. (SBU) You can expect your interlocutors not only to be 
articulate and well informed, but also to speak in terms 
generally supportive of growth in the bilateral relationship. 
 As noted above, lingering suspicions still exist among 
conservatives in leadership about the development of closer 
 
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ties with the United States, but the overall tenor is one of 
support and interest at a measured pace that will not upset 
the GVN's calibrated attempts to maintain balance among its 
other regional partners.  Your upcoming trip to Hanoi will 
continue to help translate those good feelings into 
measurable accomplishments in the defense and security 
relationship. 
 
¶45. (SBU) We look forward to your visit and stand ready to do 
everything we can to make your time in Vietnam as productive 
as possible. 
MICHALAK