VZCZCXRO7364
OO RUEHCI
DE RUEHKA #1914/01 3440314
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
O 100314Z DEC 07
FM AMEMBASSY DHAKA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 5764
INFO RUEHKT/AMEMBASSY KATHMANDU 9423
RUEHCI/AMCONSUL KOLKATA 1057
RUEHNE/AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI 0355
RUEHGO/AMEMBASSY RANGOON 2625
RUEHLM/AMEMBASSY COLOMBO 8213
RUEHBK/AMEMBASSY BANGKOK 8315
RUEHIL/AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD 1944
RUEHRO/AMEMBASSY ROME 0430
RUEHGV/USMISSION GENEVA 0611
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 0061
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC
RUEKDIA/JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC
RHHMUNA/USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI
RHHMUNA/CDR USPACOM HONOLULU HI
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC
RUEKDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC
RUEATRS/DEPT OF TREASURY WASHINGTON DC

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 DHAKA 001914 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPT FOR SES-O 
DEPT FOR SCA/PB, SCA/EX 
DCHA/OFDA FOR ROBERT THAYER 
AID/W FOR AA MARK WARD AND ANE ANNE DIX 
DCHA/FFP FOR MATTHEW NIMS AND PAUL NOVICK 
ROME FOR FODAG 
BANGKOK FOR RDM/A TOM DOLAN, ROB BARTON 
KATHMANDU FOR USAID OFDA BILL BERGER AND SUE MCINTYRE 
TREASURY FOR ELIZABETH WEISS AND SUSAN CHUN 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: EAID PREL ASEC CASC AMGT SOCI ECON PINR EAGR SENV
BG 
 
SUBJECT:  Country Team, USAID/DART, and U.S. Military Coordination 
in the Cyclone Sidr Response 
 
REF:  DHAKA 1848 
 
¶1. Summary.  In response to Tropical Cyclone Sidr in southern 
Bangladesh, the U.S. Government (USG) organized an interagency 
response under the leadership of the Department of State that 
included contributions from USAID and the Department of Defense 
(DOD).  USAID's Disaster Assistance Response Team (USAID/DART) was 
integrated into the country team effort to assess needs and 
coordinate logistical support for emergency relief efforts, 
including through the use of unique DOD capabilities.  The U.S. 
military contribution to the cyclone relief operation focused on 
providing potable water, transportation of relief commodities 
between Dhaka and the affected area, and providing medical support. 
The USAID/DART attended weekly planning meetings with country team 
members, as well as U.S. and Bangladesh military leadership, to 
discuss the U.S. contribution to the cyclone response.  As part of 
the country team effort, the USAID/DART contributed to operational 
and transition planning, once the acute phase of the disaster had 
shifted to recovery and rehabilitation.  End Summary. 
 
------------------------------------------- 
U.S. DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE RESPONSE EFFORTS 
------------------------------------------- 
 
¶2. At the request of the Charge dQAffaires, a.i., on November 17 and 
18, U.S. Pacific Command (PACOM) deployed a 23-member Humanitarian 
Assistance Survey Team (HAST) from III Marine Expeditionary Force to 
identify key areas for U.S. military support.  Following the formal 
Government of Bangladesh (GOB) request for U.S. military assistance, 
PACOM amplified response operations and deployed 3d Marine 
Expeditionary Brigade commanded by BGen Ronald Bailey.  His command 
includes USS Kearsarge, with helicopters from 22d MEU and US Navy 
hovercraft, U.S. Air Force and Marine Corps C-130 transport 
aircraft, as well as elements of the 13th Air Force Contingency 
Response Group for the management of airfield operations and cargo 
handling.  In addition, a U.S. army medical team, which was already 
in country for an earlier planned exercise, began operating 
alongside Bangladeshi counterparts at Patuakhali hospital. 
 
¶3. At the request of the Bangladesh military during joint planning 
meetings, US C-130s moved GOB and donor relief commodities from 
Dhaka to Barisal.  Subsequently, helicopters from the 22d MEU and 
hovercraft from USS Kearsarge along with Bangladesh military 
helicopters transported this cargo to approximately 20 high priority 
locations identified by the GOB, per reftel.  U.S. military planners 
provided information to the USAID/DART on types of cargo and 
destinations. 
 
¶4. Overall, the requirement for military airlift support for USAID's 
Office of U.S. Foreign Disaster Assistance (USAID/OFDA) relief 
commodities was limited.  The first USAID/OFDA shipment of emergency 
relief goods on November 20 occurred prior to arrival of USS 
Kearsarge and 22d MEU helicopter assets and was moved by commercial 
trucks.  The U.S. military expedited the second USAID/OFDA shipment 
via air transport on November 27 as the commodities, including water 
purification units and water bladders, were considered priority 
needs for cyclone-affected populations.  Afterward, two missions 
using C-130s moved these relief items to Barisal on November 28 and 
¶29. 
 
¶5.  While non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and international 
 
DHAKA 00001914  002 OF 003 
 
 
organizations did not report the need for extensive military lift, 
the USAID/DART did validate a few requests.  Most of the requirement 
for III MEB support came from the GOB to move goods from its relief 
stocks.  U.S. military assets greatly facilitated the movement of 
USAID/OFDA and Embassy personnel conducting assessments, and the 
Civil Military Operations Center in Barisal played a key role in 
ensuring the smooth delivery of relief supplies.  We also 
effectively integrated our public affairs efforts and took advantage 
of the militaryQs unique capabilities. 
 
¶6. The USS Kearsarge remained on station until the arrival of the 
USS Tarawa and the 11th Marine Expeditionary Unit, which was already 
scheduled to deploy to Bangladesh for a previously scheduled 
exercise, QBengal Flash,Q around December 3.  With the concurrence 
of the GOB, the 11th MEU was re-tasked to support ongoing USG 
efforts, by assuming the logistical support role previously carried 
out by the USS Kearsarge and the 22nd MEU.  This change to Tarawa's 
mission was consistent with the prevailing humanitarian support 
environment and USG priorities. 
 
--------------------------------------------- --- 
GOB AND U.S. GOVERNMENT WEEKLY PLANNING MEETINGS 
--------------------------------------------- --- 
 
¶7. During Operation Sea Angel II, U.S. and Bangladesh military 
leadership held regular planning meetings to discuss the U.S. role 
in the current humanitarian response to Cyclone Sidr.  USAID/DART, 
country team, and U.S. military commanders and staff generally 
attended these meetings, which were hosted by the Bangladesh Armed 
Forces Division.  At the November 25 meeting, the Bangladesh 
military outlined major priorities and how U.S. assets could address 
these needs (see reftel). 
 
¶8. On November 29, the USAID/DART attended the second planning 
meeting.  The Bangladesh military declined a proposal by U.S. 
military planners to open a second logistical base in Chittagong. 
U.S. military C-130s to conduct four to six daily flights between 
Dhaka and Barisal until December 4 to transport the remaining 
humanitarian cargo identified by the Bangladesh military (see 
reftel).  In addition, the U.S. continued helicopter transport of 
relief commodities from Barisal to the remote locations the 
Bangladesh military identified as most needing assistance. 
 
¶9.  Based on consultation with the GOB military and with the 
concurrence of the country team, the U.S. military shifted its 
priority to moving food supplies.  This decision was reached after 
USG representatives and the Bangladeshi military assessed that the 
need for clean water had largely been met.  Although the GOB 
positioned 424 doctors and medical teams to respond to the disaster, 
there was a remaining requirement for U.S.-provided emergency 
medical services, which the USG helped meet.  U.S. military 
commanders assisted with relief efforts until all major supplies 
related to disaster relief had been delivered, but did not take part 
in long term recovery activities during this deployment.  The 
Country Team is now re-examining theater security cooperation plans 
to determine possible future DOD contributions to follow-on phases 
of recovery and rehabilitation.  Specifically, we have requested the 
deployment of civil affairs assessment teams to help develop plans 
for future civil and military reconstruction programs. 
 
---------------------------------- 
 
DHAKA 00001914  003 OF 003 
 
 
USAID/DART COORDINATION ACTIVITIES 
---------------------------------- 
 
¶10. Over the past three weeks, the USAID/DART's military liaison 
officer worked closely with the country team and both U.S. and 
Bangladesh military counterparts to ensure that military support 
activities comply with overall USG priorities.  U.S. military 
commanders and planners have collaborated effectively during this 
crisis.  Country team representatives have also been integrated into 
the military planning efforts, with liaison officers assigned to the 
III MEU in Dhaka and Barisal. The USAID/DART assisted the U.S. 
military to shape and define the requirements and to vet incoming 
requests for support.  The U.S. military commander on the ground was 
able to draw upon USAID/OFDA planning documents to help define his 
indicators and triggers for mission completion. 
 
¶11. Coordination and cooperation with the host nation military was 
excellent.  On November 29, the USAID/DART met with Brigadier 
General Rashid, commander of the coordination cell in Barisal, who 
outlined overall logistical support in response to the cyclone. 
Highlighting the large quantity of cargo now moving by truck and 
barge, he agreed that air operations from Dhaka to Barisal will 
likely become unnecessary in the coming days.  In addition, 
Brigadier General Rashid reported that water delivery had become 
less of a humanitarian priority now, noting, however, that several 
isolated coastal islands still require food assistance.  (Note: 
The CDA a.i. and III MEU Commanding General subsequently met with 
Bangladesh Army Chief of Staff General Moeen Uddin Ahmed and 
obtained his concurrence with our proposed transition plan). 
 
--------------- 
LOOKING FORWARD 
--------------- 
 
¶12. Diplomacy, Development, and Defense have been integrated 
effectively in the response to Cyclone SidrQs devastation.  The 
Embassy intends to expand upon this analysis further and conduct a 
formal Qlessons learnedQ exercise as we transition from the 
emergency response to the longer term recovery and rehabilitation 
phases.  The USG response to this cyclone drew upon our 
institutional and individual experiences with previous interagency 
responses to disasters in Bangladesh, Pakistan, and Southeast Asia. 
We believe some of the lessons learned from this operation will also 
be useful to policy makers as we plan for the future. 
 
PASI