VZCZCXYZ0010
OO RUEHWEB

DE RUEHDM #1171/01 3471031
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
O 131031Z DEC 07
FM AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 4447
INFO RUEHAM/AMEMBASSY AMMAN 7168
RUEHEG/AMEMBASSY CAIRO 3506
RUEHLB/AMEMBASSY BEIRUT 4816
RUEHGB/AMEMBASSY BAGHDAD 0623
RUEHYN/AMEMBASSY SANAA 0311
RUEHKU/AMEMBASSY KUWAIT 1288
RUEHAK/AMEMBASSY ANKARA 5399
RUEHIT/AMCONSUL ISTANBUL 0304
RUEHTV/AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV 2050
RUEHMS/AMEMBASSY MUSCAT 0092
RUEHMK/AMEMBASSY MANAMA 0639
RUEHAD/AMEMBASSY ABU DHABI 1358
RUEHDO/AMEMBASSY DOHA 0459
RUEHTH/AMEMBASSY ATHENS 0319
RUEHPNH/NVC PORTSMOUTH 6421
RUEAHLC/HOMELAND SECURITY CENTER WASHINGTON DC
RUCNFB/DIR FBI WASHDC

UNCLAS DAMASCUS 001171 
 
SIPDIS 
 
 
ATHENS FOR DHS 
DEPT FOR INL/HSTC 
DEPT FOR NPC PORTSMOUTH 
 
SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: CVIS CPAS KFRD KCRM CMGT ASEC SY
SUBJECT: DAMASCUS FRAUD PREVENTION MANAGEMENT REPORT 
JULY-SEPTEMBER 2007 
 
REF: 05 SECSTATE 205073 
 
The following is submitted in response to the Department's request 
in Reftel. 
 
a. Country Conditions 
 
(U) No change. 
 
b. NIV Fraud 
 
(SBU) Post continues to see an increase in Iraqi applicants as 
tourists, students, H1b workers and medical cases.  Post's FPU 
reviews all Iraqi documents if the applicant is going to be issued. 
Concerns over the authenticity of Iraqi documents and lack of 
standardization of Iraqi passports are mitigated by the fact that 
many Iraqis are found ineligible for nonimmigrant visas under 
214(b). 
 
(SBU) Several competing offices located near the Consular Section 
which offer a wide range of "services," claiming frequently to be 
affiliated with the Embassy.  As a result, Post has developed a 
flyer which we distribute regularly to applicants and have posted 
around the Embassy to discourage applicants from using their 
services or being persuaded by the visa agents to lie on their 
applications. 
 
c. IV Fraud 
 
(SBU) Over the last quarter, FPU was able to compile information on 
fraud in ongoing IV files and IV files that have already been issued 
as a result of thorough NIV interviews and Post's ACS walk-in hour. 
Officers now email the FPM whenever this occurs in addition to 
noting the potential fraud in their case notes.  This way if the IV 
has already been issued, the information is forwarded to the FPM at 
NVC for further investigation and possible review of status.  If it 
is an ongoing IV case, the FPM adds case notes to alert the 
interviewing officer and opens an FPU investigation if necessary. 
 
(SBU) Post continues to see a dramatic increase in Iraqi IV cases, 
mainly due to the inability of Iraqis to travel to Cairo and Amman. 
The majority of Iraqi cases are fianc (K1) or spouse (K3, CR-1) 
cases.  Fraud indicators involved in most cases include, but are not 
limited to, unreliable documents and limited documentation.  Since 
some Iraqi applicants are not living in Syria, they do not generally 
travel with all of their identity documents and are unable or 
unwilling to go back to Iraq due to the current environment to get 
additional identity documents.  Post has instituted a new policy by 
which FPU examines all Iraqi documents before the IV officer 
conducts the interview.  Over the past quarter, FPU has identified 
several forged Iraqi passports of each series (S, G, H) and a fake 
MFA seal. 
 
(SBU) Post initially identified several suspect Iraqi IDs from the 
northern regions of Iraq over the last quarter.  Based on initial 
review, the FPU believed they were fraudulent because they differed 
from standard Iraqi IDs seen at Post.  Based on further 
investigation and discussion with colleagues in Damascus, Post 
determined that the documents presented from the northern (Kurdish) 
areas of Iraq lack standardization and are of poor quality but are 
genuine IDs produced by Iraqi government offices. 
 
d. DV Fraud 
 
(SBU) FPU has not conducted any DV fraud investigations this 
quarter. 
 
e. ACS and Passport Fraud 
 
 
 
(SBU) Post has not had serious cases of passport or CRBA fraud this 
quarter. 
 
f. Adoption Fraud 
 
(SBU) Post has not has not conducted any fraud investigations on 
adoptions this quarter because we have not had any adoptions.  Our 
adoption flier is currently in the clearance process. 
 
g. Asylum and DHS Benefit Fraud 
 
(SBU) Once again this quarter, Post has investigated documents for 
DHS in connection with naturalization proceedings, adjustment of 
status, labor certification, and political asylum.  Most of the 
documents proved to be fraudulent, particularly divorce certificates 
and employment/work experience letters. 
 
h. Cooperation with Host Government Authorities 
 
(U) No change. 
 
j. Staffing and Training 
 
(SBU) Post continues to produce regular training documents and 
presentations on fake Iraqi documents encountered at Post.  The FPU 
distributes the presentations to other colleagues at missions in 
Damascus as well as CA/FPP, NVC, posts in the region, DHS and other 
interested agencies.  The FPU presentation on a fake G passport 
associated with an IV case at Post was one of the first fake G 
passports reported.  Our powerpoint presentations can be obtained by 
writing to fpmdamascus@state.gov. 
 
(SBU) Over the last quarter, the FPU has been coordinating with 
Airport Liaison Officers (ALOs) from other embassies in Damascus to 
obtain information on mala fide passengers who have been off-loaded 
either in Damascus.  The FPU has produced various reports individual 
off-loaded passengers which were distributed to CA/FPP, Posts in the 
region, DHS and other interested agencies. 
 
CORBIN