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Viewing cable 07DAKAR2376, SENEGAL WANTS AUDIT OF ASECNA ACCOUNTS

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
07DAKAR2376 2007-12-07 09:13 2011-08-24 16:30 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Embassy Dakar
VZCZCXRO7634
PP RUEHMA RUEHPA
DE RUEHDK #2376/01 3410913
ZNR UUUUU ZZH ZDK
P 070913Z DEC 07
FM AMEMBASSY DAKAR
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 9737
INFO RUEHZK/ECOWAS COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHAN/AMEMBASSY ANTANANARIVO 0293
RUEHBZ/AMEMBASSY BRAZZAVILLE
RUEHLC/AMEMBASSY LIBREVILLE 0985
RUEHGI/AMEMBASSY BANGUI 0026
RUEHMA/AMEMBASSY MALABO
RUEHNJ/AMEMBASSY NDJAMENA 0774
RUEHGI/AMEMBASSY BANGUI 0027
RUEHYD/AMEMBASSY YAOUNDE 0322
RUEHNK/AMEMBASSY NOUAKCHOTT 5030
RUEHRO/TSA ROME IT
RULSDMK/DEPT OF TRANSPORTATION WASHDC
RHMFIUU/FAA NATIONAL HQ LONGMONT
RHMFIUU/DEPT OF HOMELAND SECURITY WASHDC
RUEPGBA/CDR USEUCOM INTEL VAIHINGEN GE//ECJ2/ECJ3/ECJ5//
RUFOADA/JAC MOLESWORTH RAF MOLESWORTH UK//DOA/DOB/DOI//
RUZFNAI/NASIC WRIGHT PATTERSON AFB OH//DXOA/TAAO//
RHMFISS/HQ USAFE COMMAND CENTER RAMSTEIN AB GE
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 DAKAR 002376 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
SENSITIVE 
 
DEPT FOR AF/W, AF/EPS, AND EB/TRA 
DOT FOR OST 
BRUSSELS FOR FAA 
ROME FOR TSA JWHALINSKI 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: EAIR ECON PGOV SG
SUBJECT: SENEGAL WANTS AUDIT OF ASECNA ACCOUNTS 
 
DAKAR 00002376  001.6 OF 003 
 
 
1.  (SBU) SUMMARY:  Shortly after announcing its withdrawal from the 
Agency for Air Navigation Safety in Africa (ASECNA) with an eye 
towards directly collecting civil aviation revenues, Senegal 
reversed its decision in favor of the status quo.  However, Senegal 
demanded that ASECNA's Board of Directors commit to an independent 
international audit of its accounts with all member countries to 
establish a more transparent, reliable and equitable distribution of 
ASECNA resources among its member states -- something that would 
require the cooperation of all member states.  Senegal's sudden 
announcement that it was abandoning ASECNA, and then reversing that 
decision, is one of a number of recent poorly-considered policy 
initiatives.  END SUMMARY. 
 
SENEGAL THREATENED TO DEFECT 
---------------------------- 
2.  (U) In a November 2 press conference, Senegal's then-Minister of 
Civil Aviation, Farba Senghor, announced that Senegal would end its 
agreement with ASECNA for the management of the country's airports 
and airfields.  On November 15, Senghor confirmed the Wade 
administration's intention to withdraw completely from ASECNA.  He 
added "our decision to withdraw is irrevocable and we have already 
established a national committee to assess the modalities including 
the potential of moving the agency's technical and administrative 
headquarters [from Dakar] to another country." 
 
3.  (U) Senghor argued that Senegal is losing CFA 20 billion per 
year (USD 40 million) due to ASECNA's inadequate and inequitable 
investment (or lack thereof) for equipment, training and the upgrade 
of facilities with revenues the agency collects at Senegal's 
airports.  Senghor claimed the GOS would monitor and manage the 
safety of its airspace, as well as run or contract out the 
management of its airports, as of May 2008 through a new agency 
called "Senegalese Aerial Safety Agency." 
 
SENEGAL TO STAY; WANTS AUDIT OF ASECNA'S ACCOUNTS 
--------------------------------------------- ---- 
4.  (SBU) After the announcement to leave ASECNA, the government 
came under criticism for acting in haste and mostly with an eye for 
new sources of revenue to deal with budget and current account 
deficits, and without fully studying the civil aviation security, 
safety, and administrative requirements such a step would require. 
There was also speculation that the GOS' goal was to reclaim 
valuable buildings and real estate occupied by ASECNA.  The GOS also 
faced an immediate diplomatic assault to reverse its decision. 
WAEMU President's special envoy, Amadou Chefou (and former ASECNA 
General Manager and former ICAO Residential Representative for West 
and Central Africa), Gabon's Ministers of Foreign Affairs and Civil 
Aviation, and a French Special envoy all met separately with 
President Wade to convince him to keep Senegal in ASECNA. 
 
5.  (U) President Wade indicated that Senegal's interests have been 
severely undercut by the iniquitous management of revenue derived 
from each ASECNA member country's civil aviation activities, but he 
stated, "I was deeply touched by the message of special envoys from 
friendly countries like France, Gabon, and WAEMU, whom together have 
offered their support to have Senegal remain in ASECNA and seek with 
our partners the internal solutions on the distribution of 
resources."  On November 22, Senegal's Council of Ministers held a 
special session and reversed Senghor's previous declarations. 
Though agreeing to maintain the status quo, including having ASECNA 
manage Senegal's airports, the final "communique" by the Council of 
Ministers insisted that ASECNA's Board of Directors commit to an 
independent international audit of ASECNA's accounts, with a focus 
on: 
 
-- the establishment of transparent management that highlights each 
country's contribution to ASECNA resources, including revenue from 
airport and airspace management, and from the oceanic and land 
 
DAKAR 00002376  002.2 OF 003 
 
 
flight information region (FIR); 
 
-- an assessment of ASECNA's financial contributions to each member 
country in relation to revenues collected and respective investment 
in infrastructure and equipment; 
 
-- an assessment of expenditures committed from the GOS's budget to 
support the infrastructure and operation of the airports; and 
 
-- the valuation of the GOS's buildings occupied by ASECNA. 
 
ASECNA CLAIMS ALL IS WELL 
------------------------- 
6.  (U) During a meeting with the press on November 16, Youssouph 
Mahamat, ASECNA General Manager from Niger, acknowledged that other 
countries have considered leaving the organization, including 
Madagascar and Mauritania.  Mahamat dismissed rumors that ASECNA was 
facing a financial crisis, and instead claimed that that ASECNA is a 
"victim of its success and financial stability." 
 
ASECNA'S ROLE IN SENEGAL 
------------------------ 
7.  (U) Unlike in most member states, all airports in Senegal are 
operated and managed by ASECNA, which does not return any revenue to 
the Senegalese treasury.  At the same time, the GOS does not have 
any line-item for funding its airports' infrastructure.  ASECNA's 
revenues are, in theory, to be reinvested to upgrade airport 
facilities and equipment within the member states.  The bulk of 
ASECNA's revenues derive from navigation safety, over-flight, and 
passenger fees, and, in the case of Senegal, from landing, parking, 
and handling fees.  The lack of revenue from ASECNA has long been a 
point of contention for the GOS, which feels, with reason, that it 
is not receiving the investment it deserves.  A case in point is 
Leopold Senghor International Airport's inadequate perimeter wall 
and fence, which has long been cited by airline companies, ICAO, and 
DHS/TSA as a major security failure.  Neither ASECNA nor the GOS has 
been willing to pay for improvements to the airport's perimeter. 
 
COMMENT 
------- 
8.  (SBU) As a reflection on the Wade administration, the GOS's 
announcement that it will definitively withdraw from ASECNA, only to 
reverse that decision a few days latter is one of many recent 
examples of poorly thought-out and coordinated policy initiatives, 
all with the same result:  a sudden, and at times embarrassing, 
backtracking by the government when serious opposition is voiced. 
Other recent examples, reported septel, include the cutting of civil 
servant salaries, the selling of government shares of important 
companies, and restrictions on street vendors in Dakar.  In these 
actions, the Wade government has lost credibility in the eyes of the 
population, the donor community, and potential investors, and has 
opened itself up to greater public scrutiny to its policy decisions 
-- not necessarily a bad thing. 
 
9.  (U) Regarding ASECNA, Senegal's frustration with the 
organization is justifiable, and the GOS' call for comprehensive 
audits of ASECNA's financial management is reasonable, if unlikely 
without the buy-in of all member countries' civil aviation 
authorities.  It is clear that for ASECNA to remain and effective 
regional body it needs to significantly improve transparency and 
equity on the distribution of revenues collected on behalf of member 
countries.  These resources should be a significant source of 
funding for improved civil aviation infrastructure in Senegal and 
other member countries.  Without improving its accountability, 
ASECNA will likely face additional attempts at defection, perhaps 
again from Senegal, if not in the near future then at least once 
Dakar's new international airport moves towards completion in 3-5 
years. 
 
DAKAR 00002376  003.2 OF 003 
 
 
 
SMITH